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Pages 57-59

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From page 57...
... FINDING 3B: The committee finds that, under some conditions, a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment Details are provided in the committee's classified report. It is not possible to predict the precise magnitude of such releases because the computer models have not been validated for this application.
From page 58...
... However, additional work on specific issues listed in the following recommendation is needed urgently. The analyses carried out to date for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Sandia National Laboratories and by other independent organizations such as EPRI and ENTERGY have provided a general understanding of spent fuel behavior in a loss-of-pool-coolant event and the vulnerability of spent fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks that could cause such events to occur.
From page 59...
... RECOMMENDATION: While the work described in the previous recommendation under Finding 3E, above, is being carried out, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that power plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events in spent fuel pools that could result in propagating zirconium cladding fires. The committee judges that there are at least two such measures that should be implemented promptly: • Reconfiguring of fuel in the pools so that high decay-heat fuel assemblies are surrounded by low decay heat assemblies.


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