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4 Implementation: Navy Support to Space Mission Areas
Pages 82-142

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From page 82...
... ; meteorology and oceanography (METOC) ; theater and ballistic missile defense (TBMD)
From page 83...
... . The capabilities of the individual Sea Power 21 pillars -- Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing -- are all, to varying degrees, dependent on ISR involving data from space-based, airborne, ground-based, and sea-based sensors.
From page 84...
... NRO systems, FIA, SBR commercial imagery Yes Electronic intelligence (ELINT) NRO systems Yes Navigation GPS Yes Timing GPS Yes Meteorology and oceanography GOES, POES, NPOESS Yes Ground moving target indication SBR No Airborne moving target indication None No Boost-phase missile defense SBIRS-H No Midcourse missile defense SBIRS-L No Space-based IP networks (GIG)
From page 85...
... Combining improved persistent NSS ISR capability with improved communications, processing, and exploitation systems will enhance the ability of the Navy to engage in future missions (provided that the capabilities are developed in accordance with naval needs)
From page 86...
... While these past and current NSS ISR systems and augmentations have proven their value, NSS systems currently in the development and/or planning stage by the NRO and the Air Force hold promise of even more improvements in naval capability. Two systems in particular are noteworthy in this regard: · The Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)
From page 87...
... The resulting Sea Power 21 capability dependencies are summarized in Appendix C Sea Power 21 Capabilities Sea Strike Through Sea Strike operations, naval forces will execute and direct decisive and sustained influence in joint campaigns.
From page 88...
... In general, the future FIA and SBR systems could greatly enhance NSS support for Sea Strike by- · Improving persistence through increased numbers of satellites, and · Improving image resolution, thereby strengthening the ability of naval forces to identify, track, and target terrorist and other small-unit threats. Sea Shield To maintain littoral superiority for naval and joint force components, ISR resources must be able to support protection against conventional and unconventional (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and environmental)
From page 89...
... to provide the ISR information necessary to support Sea Shield operations effectively. For surface warfare, Sea Shield requires that ISR capability provide nearhorizon and over-the-horizon warning, tracking, and targeting information against surface targets; these requirements are similar in many regards to the Sea Strike capability needs.
From page 90...
... Capability Shortfalls and Technology Gaps of National Security Space Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems for Navy Use Given the needs discussed above for ISR support from space, there are several shortfalls and gaps in current and currently planned NSS ISR capability that will limit the Navy in carrying out the elements of Sea Power 21 effectively. These are summarized in Table 4.2.
From page 91...
... This approach requires a knowledgeable space cadre that understands both space technology and the operations of naval forces. To date, the Navy has used such an approach effectively in many programs for which the NRO or the Navy itself has been the lead agency.
From page 92...
... The Department of the Navy should coordinate with other agencies to support the development of advanced sensing technologies not currently part of the program plans of the DOD Executive Agent for Space. One such program that the committee believes has significant potential to provide new naval capabilities is the Naval EarthMap Observer (NEMO)
From page 93...
... Such data are used to augment ocean circulation models and to help predict ocean weather. In addition, GFO data are used to refine the DOD geophysical models used by the ballistic missile submarine community.
From page 94...
... WindSat represents a risk-reduction program for the planned National Polar orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Conical Scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS)
From page 95...
... One drawback to NOAA's role as executive agent for environmental satellite development is that NOAA recently indicated to the Navy that active sensor systems (such as synthetic aperture radar or radar and laser altimeters) will not be placed on the next generation of national environmental monitoring satellites (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES)
From page 96...
... · Enhanced Warfighting Capabilities -- Fully characterize the battlespace environment to the warfighter in terms that enable optimal employment of systems and platforms.9 The mission objectives Safe Operating Forces and Optimized Warfighting Resources tend to capture the largest share of the METOC community's resources. The primary products meeting these objectives are derived from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)
From page 97...
... As described in the following subsections, these METOC mission objectives can be mapped into the Sea Power 21 pillars: Safe Operating Forces principally supports Sea Strike, specifically, carrier operations; Optimized Warfighting Resources supports Sea Basing, specifically, ocean routing; and Enhanced Warfighting Capabilities, the most challenging objective, supports tactical elements of both Sea Strike and Sea Shield. Appendix C presents additional detail regarding the dependency of Sea Power 21 capabilities on METOC products.
From page 98...
... Enhanced Warfighting Capabilities, Including Sea Shield and Sea Strike The METOC mission objective Enhanced Warfighting Capabilities includes tactical geospatial products -- such as Special Tactical Oceanographic Information Charts (STOICS) and Special Annotated Imagery-Littoral (SAIL)
From page 99...
... While these data serve the needs of overall weather forecasting, there is currently no dedicated, space-based environmental support for conducting naval warfare in the littorals -- including needs for expeditionary warfare, support for Special Operations Forces, shallowwater antisubmarine warfare, and countermine warfare. Generally, these needs are first addressed through a substantive S&T program; however, the Navy has recently cut most of its funding support for advanced satellite-based METOC systems.
From page 100...
... As discussed in Chapter 3,10 without a defined transition path programs funded through the Office of Naval Research, and through the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program in particular, are at a significant disadvantage when competing for advanced development S&T funds.
From page 101...
... Cruise Missile Defense Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities to defend against cruise missiles are provided with the SPY-1 air defense radar (aboard Aegis-class ships) , the SPQ9B surface search radar (scheduled to be replaced by the multifunction horizon search radar)
From page 102...
... Overland cruise missile defense can present challenging situations when the line-of-sight paths that permit the detection and illumination of threat missiles are blocked by coastal hills or mountains. Thus, continued use of defensive missiles that are dependent on semiactive radar guidance (such as the SM-2)
From page 103...
... In a sense, the AMTI SBR concept would need to evolve from an ISR sensor into a tactical missile control radar. An additional OCMD problem is that the performance of the E-2C RMP may be degraded by cruise missiles with extremely low nose-on RCS values.
From page 104...
... In general, a fully deployed theater ballistic missile defense system likely will be based on integrating the capabilities provided by the following: · Patriot Advanced Capability-3, · Medium Extended Air Defense System, · Theater High Altitude Area Defense System, · Airborne Laser (ABL) , · Navy Area Defense (NAD)
From page 105...
... Current national, space-based sensor capabilities that have relevance to ballistic missile defense include these: · The DSP, and · Various signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection programs and their associated Tactical Receive Applications Program/Tactical Receive Equipment information dissemination systems.
From page 106...
... . Under the Sea Shield concept, forward-deployed naval forces are envisaged as being capable of making this contribution during the developing phases of a conflict, when they would be called upon to protect threatened nations and arriving joint forces against attacks by ballistic missiles.
From page 107...
... A nearer-term NSS opportunity to address the missile defense mission could also involve a persistent, multiple-look-angle NSS infrared detection capability. Individual satellite sensors might each be similar in capability to that available with SBIRS-H, and multiple satellites with a view of all points of interest on Earth could permit detection and tracking of theater ballistic missiles that must be defended against by Sea Shield.
From page 108...
... Recommendation 4.9. The Department of the Navy should begin operational analysis of the cost, benefits, and requirements of a cruise and ballistic missile defense system based on a multimode missile and an airborne moving target indication (AMTI)
From page 109...
... uplinks downlinks Services RADIO, S/ 2.0 Link 1.5 US , Opns uplinks downlinks - L GHz GHz Band Com'l L Opns S for (SGLS) satellite ico globalstar XM SIRIUS Military 1.98 2.2 GHz GHz GHz Ground- US 1.842- 2.290- (USB)
From page 110...
... While big-dish antennas 7 to 9 ft in diameter may easily fit on large, surface ships, they are infeasible for the advanced amphibious assault vehicle of the Marine Corps or for submarines. Thus, large-deck ships are far more likely to enjoy direct, high-capacity satellite links than are smaller platforms or dismounted units.12 Most high-capacity satellite systems also rely on 12To this end, it may be desirable to create a FORCEnet network architecture with large-deck or otherwise advantaged platforms as satellite downlink and uplink "hubs" that relay packets to other platforms via a variety of near-Earth networks, such as provided by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
From page 111...
... 111 of if., list ogram Cal A Pr Joint NOTE: Segundo, El satellites. Communications Workshop, Satellite communications Architectures Military planned)
From page 112...
... are conceptually similar to highly directional, high-band RF systems -- though laser transmitters and receivers are physically quite different from radio equipment. Lasercom is capable of very high bandwidth capacity, up to tens of gigabits per second to a terminal and, as envisioned by the DOD Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA)
From page 113...
... Sea Shield relies critically on space-based communications to provide individual and fused threat information quickly and to cue theater and strategic missile defense assets. Sea Basing cannot function without the high bandwidth necessary to link commanders to tactical units throughout the theater, and to link the chain of command for rapid strategic and tactical planning and decision making.
From page 114...
... Some of the more important space-based communications links in strike operations include the following: · Defining and coordinating missions with other command elements; · Requesting appropriate support, including logistics and search and rescue; · Tasking and relaying data requests from nonorganic sensors; · Providing communications of information from space-based, airborne, and ground-based sensors to processing and interpretation centers; · Supporting data fusion operations by communicating raw and processed information to interpretation, data fusion, information analysis, target identification, and target selection elements; · Providing selected communication of strategic and tactical targeting information to weapons delivery systems; and · Relaying post-strike information for damage assessment and interpretation. In addition, space-based communications have an increasingly important role in recent conflicts, supporting Special Operations Forces and Marine Corps operations in littorals as well as supporting forced entry and other small, mobile ground force operations.
From page 115...
... Space-Based Communications Support for Sea Shield To maintain littoral superiority for naval and joint force components, communications resources must be able to support protection against conventional and unconventional (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive) threats from special operations and terrorist forces as well as threats that might be mounted by more conventional enemy ground forces.
From page 116...
... and to provide defense over land and over sea against theater air and ballistic missile threats. The Sea Shield mission requires that naval forces establish air control against hostile aircraft and be capable of mounting a successful defense against cruise and ballistic missile attack, both in naval operating areas and as far inland as practicable.
From page 117...
... Space-Based Communications Support for Sea Basing Sea Basing provides the operational platform capability from which the Navy will project both offensive strike (i.e., Sea Strike) and defensive protection (i.e., Sea Shield)
From page 118...
... It is planned to be the integrator and enabler for the three pillars Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. It will rely on programs such as the GIG and TCA to implement information transmission worldwide, and is focused on providing the communications infrastructure, network protection, and information-assurance functions internal to the network.
From page 119...
... As discussed above, major shortfalls already exist in the scale of the bandwidth that supports the Navy, but the gaps will grow as other organizations supported by Sea Shield and Sea Basing increase their information bandwidth demands on Navy communications systems. In particular, these demands will involve the current NGA migration toward greatly increased bandwidth sensors outputting high-quality, high-definition-television information and streams of UAV video; powerful new video teleconferencing tools being deployed to improve planning and coordination (some of which require up to 6 Mb/s of capacity)
From page 120...
... of the Navy's total capacity. To understand how much bandwidth may be required by a large naval platform, the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM)
From page 121...
... Finally, it appears to the committee that the Navy's input to the TCA is also based on this limited analysis. Table 4.3 presents an estimate of the aggregate theater bandwidth that was available for naval forces in FY00, the actual theater bandwidth available to U.S.
From page 122...
... , since a joint forces command-and-control center may need to be based at sea and thus rely solely on space-based communications. Communications Capability Gaps In reviewing available information and in assessing the space-based communications capabilities required to implement the robust elements of Sea Power 21 described above, the committee noted several gaps and apparent issues that will 22Lt Gen T
From page 123...
... . Finally, the migration to TPPU from the previous concept of tasking, processing, exploiting, and TABLE 4.4 Naval Platform Wideband Capacity Available for Naval Forces in FY00, Actual Naval Platform Wideband Capacity Available in FY03, and Naval Network Warfare Command's (NETWARCOM's)
From page 124...
... The Transformational Information Grid Communications Architecture will strongly migrate to IP-based architecture, and will require a large shift in communications philosophy, systems, operations, training, and platform systems. Very low latency Beyond-line-of-sight cueing for theater and strategic missile worldwide warning and defensive systems will require revision in many communications communications concepts, infrastructure, and capabilities.
From page 125...
... Findings and Recommendations Regarding Space-Based Communications Basic Communications Capabilities For the naval forces of the future to be effectively engaged in large-scale planning, command and control, and ISR operations as part of the joint forces, naval capability requirements for future fleet space-based communications appear to be significantly underestimated in the following areas: · Total fleet bandwidth requirements, · Individual platform bandwidth requirements, and · Availability and assurance of GIG communications for mobile/tactical users. The shortcomings of official requirements estimates are recognized by the Navy and are likely being accounted for in FORCEnet requirements studies now under way.23 However, a large mismatch currently exists between the FORCEnet and Sea Basing needs and the current bandwidth planning estimates.
From page 126...
... In particular, such an analysis program should include the following: · Input from the space-based-communications, information-assurance, and science and technology communities, as well as from warfighters, to help ensure that potential limitations and future capabilities are included in the analysis; · Regular interaction with large-scale experimental testbeds, including the evolving Transformational Communications testbed being developed by the Naval Research Laboratory; · Investigation of the partitioning of requirements between space- and ground-based systems and additionally among various space-based systems, independent of current program management -- the investigation should also be revalidated periodically to ensure that it is current with warfighting, weapons, sensors, and threat analyses and should serve as a basis for participation in the development of detailed requirements for all space-based communications acquisition programs undertaken by the Navy, Air Force, or other DOD agencies; · Review of future terminal and antenna configurations and strategies in order to develop a long-range strategy to consolidate antennas, terminals, and network interface electronics into an efficient, continuous interface to the Global Information Grid for naval platforms; · Regular red teaming to ensure that space-based communications requirements are consistent with warfighting strategy, new systems concepts, and evolving technology; and · A comprehensive account of naval and joint warfighting operations and of technology evolution. Specific elements should include the following:
From page 127...
... recently stated that "extremely high data rates using laser communications will not be available to the Navy tactical user without technology development for the `final mile' to the fleet."24 Thus, reliable, extremely wide bandwidth communications connectivity is the most significant projected Sea Power 21 capability gap. The Navy currently lacks the space-based communications operational analysis needed to assess future technical options and their maturity.
From page 128...
... The Department of the Navy should direct research and development aimed at the problem of low-latency communications from spacebased sensors to platforms, particularly with respect to the cueing of fast-moving targets from beyond-line-of-sight sensors and national systems. Such an activity should be done in conjunction with improvements to the Cooperative Engagement Capability as well as other missile defense efforts.
From page 129...
... Navy Participation in National Security Space Activities The leadership of the Navy in defining the Transformational Communications Architecture is established, but its increased participation in evolving the system concept is essential in providing the technology base and the system definition, development, and acquisition. Recommendation 4.18.
From page 130...
... Highly accurate clocks and frequency sources are now of vital importance to the DOD, because the accuracy and stability of these devices are key determinants of the performance of command, control, communications, and intelligence; navigation; surveillance; electronic warfare; missile guidance; identification-friend-or-foe systems; and precision military operations. Background Transit The first satellite navigation system, the Navy's navigation satellite system -- Transit -- had its inception just days after the former Soviet Union launched Sputnik on October 4, 1957.25 The idea for Transit came about when scientists at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL)
From page 131...
... These spacequalified atomic clocks were then used in the next-generation satellite navigation system, the Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging/Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR/GPS) , more commonly known as GPS.27 NAVSTAR Global Positioning System The position, navigation, and timing system known today as NAVSTAR/ GPS (or just GPS)
From page 132...
... 1995. The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
From page 133...
... 1995. The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
From page 134...
... 1995. The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
From page 135...
... There are currently eight Block IIR satellites on orbit, with the next launch planned for October 2003.35 Block IIR satellites boast dramatic improvements over the previous blocks. They also have reprogrammable satellite processors enabling in-flight 33Global Positioning System Joint Program Office (GPS JPO)
From page 136...
... Major improvements are planned for the OCS. They include a new master control station with improved operator interfaces and Block IIR/IIF capabilities at Schriever Air Force Base, an alternate master control station at Vandenberg Air Force Base, and the establishment of additional monitoring sites at NGA locations around the globe.38 36Global Positioning System Joint Program Office (GPS JPO)
From page 137...
... To assist the GPS JPO with these activities, the DOD Executive Agent for Space recently requested that each of the Service departments conduct a GPS user equipment synchronization study to ensure that M-code user equipment development is synchronized with space- and groundsegment M-code capabilities. Global Positioning System Block III A future positioning system, the Block III Global Positioning System (GPS III)
From page 138...
... Table 4.7 provides a summary of military aviation and precision-guided munitions applications and associated positioning and RFI resistance requirements. Both of these tables were published in 1995 in the National Research Council report The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset,41 and although somewhat dated, they provide a good indication of requirements placed on GPS for positional accuracy, integrity, and RFI resistance.
From page 139...
... its Timation program NRL made significant contributions to the development of precision frequency standards suitable for spaceflight. NRL became a key participant in the development of advanced atomic clocks for flight in GPS satellites.42 Navy responsibility in precision time is currently designated by DOD Instruction 5000.2, Part 7, Section C, which calls for the Department of the Navy to carry out the following: · Maintain the DOD reference standard through the USNO.
From page 140...
... 1995. The Global Positioning System: A Shared National Asset, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
From page 141...
... Naval forces arrayed over thousands (even tens of thousands) of miles rely heavily on space-derived PNT to coordinate and execute these operations effectively.
From page 142...
... Although the Under Secretary of the Air Force, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, has the lead for space control efforts, it appears that other Services could support these activities within their own areas of competence. Thus, it would appear appropriate for the Navy to pursue potential sea-based space control concepts in close coordination with the Air Force.


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