An International Perspective on Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks Report of a Workshop (2005) / Chapter Skim
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5 Models for Managing Change
5 Models for Managing Change
Pages 73-109
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From page 73... ...
. In his response, President Bush correctly and very importantly acknowledged that "stopping the gradual dissemination of knowledge is impractical if not impossible." But then he claimed that the "the key to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is preventing those seeking these weapons from gaining access to their most significant and technically challenging components."1 The notion that limiting access would be an effective strategy for controlling widely disseminated "dual-use" technologies may not appreciate fully the complexity of the "problem." If it were possible to gain such tight control, emerging infectious diseases (i.e., naturally occurring outbreaks and epidemics)
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From page 74... ...
, it was emphasized that there is a danger in being too restrictive with regards to believing in the omnipotence of any single tool. The workshop participants also suggested that there is a natural tendency to overemphasize the potential contribution of formal arms control.
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The fundamental purpose of developing and strengthening any weapons regime is to establish a clear sense of legitimate behavior by virtue of implicit and explicit rules, regulations, and norms. This section summarizes the workshop presentations and discussions that focused on the role of formal arms control measures in managing the dual-use risk of advancing technologies and lessons to be learned from the nuclear and chemical regimes.
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This section summarizes the nature of some of these challenges, as discussed during the workshop. Recent history of the BWC Several events in the 1990s created an incentive to strengthen the biological weapons prohibition regime.
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In the past, review conferences have not generally been a useful forum for undertaking such exchange, since they usually focused on drafting provisions about general implementation aspects of the Convention. Moreover, past provisions have been quite generic with respect to the future direction of the activities of states parties.
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From page 78... ...
For example, within the disarmament constituency, there is a natural tendency to overemphasize the potential contribution of arms control in addressing this threat. In fact, historically, over the past 30 to 40 years, every few years the "flavor" of the period changes, believing in the omnipotence of one or another tool, whether it be the BWC or something else, and ignoring the synergy that results when multiple tools are combined and used appropriately (see Figure 5-1)
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From page 79... ...
Within the disarmament constituency, there is a natural tendency to overemphasize the potential contribution of arms control in addressing the dual-use risk of advancing technologies. This chart represents the reality that, for all weapons regimes, disarmament is only one of many tools available.
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From page 80... ...
Table 5-1 summarizes the differences among these classes of weapons, with respect to weapons characteristics, requirements for weapons production, and sources of diversion. Not only are biological weapons different than other weapons of mass destruction, they are more destructive than they have generally been perceived to be in the past.
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From page 81... ...
As one participant said, "arms control really has to be relabeled as `counter-terrorism' because that, in effect, is what's happening, whether we like it or not." In light of this, although the BWC accommodates counter-terrorism activities to some extent, one of the major challenges it faces is translating the internationally agreed prohibitions into effective domestic enforcement. In response, it was argued that all five areas of focus for the BWC follow-up process offer possible spin-offs that address non-state terrorist scenarios.
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82 ) Release facility from radioactivity)
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83 100,000 t to 1,000 1,000 RW = =1,000 =10 =1,000 RW =100,000 =1,000 =10 = t industry BWC industrial t BWC industrial states biodefense increase) increase)
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From page 84... ...
These 40 states are under no obligation to the BWC, are not obliged to have national laws in place regarding BWC prohibitions, and are not obliged not to assist other states or terrorist groups in acquiring the equipment, know-how, or materials to make biological weapons. This creates a major international gap in terms of preventing bioterrorists from obtaining the materials they need to construct a biological weapon or device.
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From page 85... ...
Upholding norms When the United States decided to withdraw from the BWC compliance and verification negotiations in 2001, there was neither enough knowledge nor broadly based political will to react strongly by either finishing the job or revising the process in a dynamic way. In September 2002, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
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Bioregulators Neither the BWC nor the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are clear about the use of bioregulators in armed conflict.
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Biological weapons (and chemical weapons) fall between these two extremes.
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Importantly, verification is only one of many aspects of arms control. In the nuclear regimen, it represents only about one-third of IAEA activities.
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But other workshop participants argued that the parallels between the two regimes are more important than the differences and that there is a great deal to be learned from the "nuclear paradigm." The most important lessons to be learned from the nuclear regime may be those derived from the manner in which the regime developed through a slow, step-wise arms control process, involving various treaties and efforts. Two lessons in particular were highlighted during the workshop discussion.
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From page 90... ...
The nature of biological weapons proliferation This section summarizes discussion on how differences in the nature of nuclear versus biological threats bear on lessons to be learned from the nuclear regime. It was argued that using the term "biological arms race" connotes a meaningless analogy to the Cold War nuclear arms race, since the natures of the races are so different.
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From page 91... ...
If one country or set of countries or set of terrorist groups is moving in one particular direction, then defensive measures and deterrent actions will be based on that regional or sub-regional mindset. Lessons to Be Learned from the Chemical Regime8 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
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From page 92... ...
and the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 represent non-BWC efforts to close this "safe haven" gap. This section summarizes workshop presentations and discussions revolving around these efforts, as well as other non-BWC tools that could help inform general efforts to strengthen the biological weapons regime.
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From page 93... ...
Another question was raised about the actual extent to which export controls and other national boundary control measures are effective with respect to countering terrorism, particularly given that dual-use biological agents, knowledge, and technology are already well dispersed throughout the world. A story was told about a South African scientist who injected himself with a nonpathogenic strain of his study organism so that
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From page 94... ...
All UN member states are under the same obligations as BWC states parties: all member states are obliged to have national laws in place to prohibit the proliferation of terrorism with biological materials; all member states must adopt concrete national measures to fulfill these obligations; and all member states must report to a Security Council committee. The first report was due October 2004.
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18 This section is based on lengthy workshop discussion and the presentations of Peter Herby, Terence Taylor, Decio Ripandelli, and Abdallah Daar. 19 Based on presentations of Peter Herby, Terence Taylor, Decio Ripandelli, and multiple workshop participant comments.
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From page 96... ...
of conduct is in place? Several workshop participants agreed that, ultimately, both private and public funding organizations will play a central role in assuming ethical responsibility and monitoring research conduct.
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Lying mid-way between the hard norms of the BWC and the softer norms of a code of conduct, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been investigating the potential for a "principles of practice." In 2002, the ICRC issued its "Public Appeal of the ICRC on Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity." Directed toward all political and military authorities, scientific and medical communities, industry, and civil society, the ICRC appeal calls on all actors in the life sciences to recognize the potential risks, be aware of the existing rule and norms, and assume their responsibilities (see Box 5-2)
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From page 98... ...
cooperation programmes foreseen by the convention on biological diversity and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and to foster international cooperation in the exchange of information in the field of peaceful use of biotechnology, in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention." Based on this agreement, in 2003, the ICGEB was called upon to "assist the UN Secretariat in fulfilling the mandate received from the Security Council to reinforce ethical norms and the creation of codes of conduct for scientists through international and national scientific societies and institutions that teach sciences or engineering skills related to weapons technologies." The ICGEB then received approval to establish an operational committee -- composed of members of ICGEB and the National Academies of Sciences of China, Cuba, Italy, Nigeria, and the United States -- to draft a code of conduct. The operational group met for the first time on May 11, 2004, in Trieste, and then again on September 27, 2004, in Rome.
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IISS/CBACI charter In contrast to the ICGEB code, the code (or charter) drafted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
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and a specific mandate to focus on a safety and security agenda; and it would bring together scientists, technologists, and policy experts in the life sciences and encourage partnerships between private foundations and independent research institutes. The CBACI and IISS charter covers five categories: · International and national laws and regulations: "Observe, promote and cooperate to help develop effective national and international laws and regulations in relation to the life sciences." · Personnel: "Exercise the highest standards in the recruitment, training and management of personnel during and after employment, with special attention to those with access to information, materials and technology that could directly affect public safety and security if misused or not operated safely and appropriately." · Information: "Ensure the security of information by observing the relevant international and national laws and regulations in the handling of information that could have a negative impact on public safety and security; and also to contribute to developing, in cooperation with governments, the academic community and commercial sector as appropriate, effective and responsible procedures for the release of such information into the public domain." · Safe and secure operation of facilities: "Observe the highest possible standards for the safe and secure operation of all facilities in the interest of public and environmental safety; and to contribute to the development of more effective international and national laws, regulations, guidelines, and standards in this regard." · Governance of research and development activities: "Take full account of security, safety and ethical concerns when planning and conducting research and development activities and to support and contribute to effective and responsible international and national entities engaged in developing and promoting codes of conduct in this regard." IISS's vision for an International Centre for the Life Sciences (ICLS)
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This points to the need for more scientists to become involved in the dualuse challenge by speaking out and assuming leadership roles, rather than waiting or relying on government or industry to take charge. Research Oversight21 The notion of dangerous research, whether it be immune system evasion research or molecular biology research in general, does not neces 20 Based on multiple workshop participant comments.
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From page 102... ...
It was also suggested that lessons might be learned from South Africa, where research applications that involve dual-use technology must pass through a first stage of review by a non-proliferation counsel before they can be authorized; the process has been very effective and has resulted in a number of arrests over the years. The purpose of oversight is to instill transparency such that flagged research projects (i.e., flagged by a review committee)
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From page 103... ...
; and complications associated with identifying "high-consequence research."25 The Role of Industry26 Questions were raised about the role of the pharmaceutical and biotech industries in mitigating the risk of dual-use biological materials, as there has been a blatant lack of involvement by the life sciences industry in the dual-use debate. The ICRC has made a number of efforts to include industry in discussions of these issues, but it has been very difficult to make any sort of connection.
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From page 104... ...
104 TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING DUAL-USE RISKS It was noted that many companies seem to paint a rosy picture of the ultimate use of their products and the knowledge generated, without much concern for potential risks and the need to examine those risks in advance of the proliferation of the products and knowledge. Considering that every scientific revolution has been put to hostile use, believing or pretending that hostile consequences will not result in the absence of preventative measures almost constitutes intentional naiveté and practically defies history.
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From page 105... ...
play a hugely important role in managing the dual-use risk of advancing technologies. Risk Assessment29 It was emphasized that any proposed strategy must avoid promulgating the notion that "science is dangerous," given the enormous untold benefits of technological progress, while also recognizing the risks associated with the dissemination of scientific knowledge and dual-use biological agents, materials, and technology.
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From page 106... ...
It was noted that it may be impossible to identify all the risks, given that the plethora of possibilities practically defies definition and that new risks will continually emerge. The Human Security Lens32 It was suggested that it might be helpful to view the dual-use dilemma through a human security lens by asking the question, does the application advance human security?
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From page 107... ...
Viewing the dual-use dilemma through a human security lens, for example as the Global Genomics Initiative does, provides what one participant described as a "meta-guiding principle" for balancing the benefits and risks of advancing technologies. It was suggested that only those scientific and technological applications that advance human security be encouraged.
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From page 108... ...
Elements of all measures presented during the workshop -- from the BWC to the AG to all of the various informal strategic steps being taken or considered -- will be critical to recognizing, anticipating, preventing, and mitigating the destructive potential associated with advancing technologies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
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From page 109... ...
This creates the need for very high levels of international cooperation in comparing notes, adopting measures, and meeting regularly. One of the achievements of the BWC follow-up process has been the creation of a new forum for international dialogue.
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