Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (2006) / Chapter Skim
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Such an attack could kill or maim hundreds of thousands of city residents and spread radioactive fallout for hundreds of miles. Thus far, the acquisition of such a capability by terrorist groups has been constrained primarily by the difficulty these groups face in obtaining sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
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During the past several years, the number of reported thefts and attempted thefts of weapon-usable material from Russian facilities has declined, although there is no basis for judging the number of unreported attempts or the number of undiscovered successful thefts.2 Security enhancements installed through the U.S.-Russian cooperative program to protect weapon-usable material may have played a role in limiting the number of incidents. The Russian government is clearly concerned about the security of nuclear facilities, as evidenced by the prompt dispatch of additional security personnel to these facilities following the destruction of two Russian airliners by suicide bombers and the seizure by terrorists of 1,200 hostages at a Russian school in Beslan, near Chechnya, in mid-2004.
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to an MPC&A program managed, maintained, and financed by Russia that ensures the security of weaponusable material at a level that is necessitated by the threat of international terrorism and is consistent with internationally acceptable practices. Indigenization is the focus of this report.
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For example, despite the significant increase in Russian technical capabilities, DOE continues to dominate the selection of MPC&A upgrade priorities and approaches. Indeed a contract administration culture has emerged in DOE that too often regards Russian counterparts as contractors whose role is to comply with U.S.-determined checklists.
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and DOE agreed during the 2004 meeting of the Joint Coordinating Committee to establish a working group to develop a joint sustainability strategy. Even taking into account such progress, the cooperative program has moved very slowly in bringing hundreds of tons of weapon-usable material under an acceptable level of security.
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Political Commitment Few Russian officials deny the importance of MPC&A systems. But many are not convinced that Russia must modernize or even replace the traditional Soviet security systems for protecting nuclear material.
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The Russian contribution would support particularly sensitive projects, and the monitoring and auditing of these projects would be carried out by Russian specialists using the guidelines of the Fund. · The Fund would be managed by a new intergovernmental entity taking into account the experiences of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and other intergovernmental mechanisms that have been effectively used to provide international funds to Russian nuclear facilities.
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As a first step, international experts, including Russian specialists, should prepare a detailed analysis of the technical and budgetary requirements of an effective MPC&A system, thereby providing the foundation for international negotiations. In addition to this new initiative, Congressionally-appropriated funds should continue to support current DOE efforts.
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Also, DOE should give special attention to assisting Rosatom and other organizations in removing fuel from obsolete research reactors that required weapon-usable material, converting operating reactors that use HEU to reactors dependent on low enriched uranium (LEU) , and shipping excess HEU to appropriate storage sites.
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The job initiated through the cooperative program must be finished correctly, rapidly, and in a manner that facilitates the transition of full responsibility to the Russian Federation. Fortunately, since this study was initiated in 2003, the DOE management team has devoted increased attention and resources to issues of indigenization, a positive trend that should be continued and expanded.
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