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2 The Need for Russian Champions for MPC&A
Pages 27-30

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From page 27...
... Indeed, based on comments from Russian specialists and officials to the committee, had it not been for the economic difficulties in Russia and the availability of United States funding in the early 1990s, participation in the cooperative MPC&A program would have been of little interest to the Russian government and to individual facilities. In the absence of immediate and substantial financial support at a time of economic hardship, the sensitivity of the topic 27
From page 28...
... If MPC&A programs are to be truly effective in the long term, committed Russian champions must mobilize broadly based political and financial support for the current cooperative program. Without such support, upgrading MPC&A systems will be of interest only to the extent that the U.S.
From page 29...
... DOE should continually share persuasive documentation on the risks associated with nuclear proliferation and high-consequence nuclear terrorism with key Russian policy officials. At the same time, DOE should not allow other DOEfunded programs in Russia (for example, those on radiological terrorism and on improving nuclear safety in future reactor designs such as inherently safe reactors)
From page 30...
... Also, as previously noted, DOE and Rosatom should subject a draft of the strategy to external review by recognized experts in order to obtain independent perspectives. DOE and Rosatom should ensure that each site where cooperative MPC&A projects are located has a jointly developed indigenization plan.


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