C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups (2006) / Chapter Skim
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1 The Security Context for Future Naval Forces
1 The Security Context for Future Naval Forces
Pages 15-40
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From page 15... ...
armed forces enjoy decided advantages in equipment, training, and readiness. They have a long lead in the adaptation and use of modern technologies across the spectrum of military missions.
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From page 16... ...
The chapter then presents an overview of changing requirements and missions for naval operations and the changing organizational constructs that the Navy and Marine Corps are adopting to face the new threats and capitalize on emerging technologies. The chapter concludes with findings and recommendations.
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From page 17... ...
THE SECURITY CONTEXT FOR FUTURE NAVAL FORCES 17 United States Europe NATO Europe EU Japan France Non-EU Europe Germany United Kingdom China Non-NATO Europe Saudi Arabia South Korea Russia Israel Iran Pakistan North Korea Syria 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 2004 U.S. Dollars (billions)
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1-5, 26-28. 8 Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 through 1.8 in this chapter are from the presentation "Time, Speed, and Strategy" originally made by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7)
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From page 19... ...
Finally, traditional threats -- the conventional air, ground, and naval forces of great powers or rogue states -- still represent an area of risk; in today's world, however, they appear less likely than catastrophic or irregular threats and -- for the one military force in the world that enjoys command of the commons -- less challenging to overcome than catastrophic or disruptive threats would be. Not every threat viewed as important to U.S.
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of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Time, Speed, and Strategy," presentation at the U.S. Navy Retired Four Star Flag Symposium, December 6, 2004, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
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More fundamentally, the United States has changed the way that it operates with military partners and allies around the globe. Alliances of long standing are still valued for the advantages that accrue when political and military leaders can plan operations together in advance and armed forces can be equipped and trained together for future operations; nonetheless, the United States increasingly enters into wars and other military operations as a leader in "coalitions of the willing"-that is, more-impromptu and less-lasting coalitions that come together for a single operation and later disband.
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From page 22... ...
military will have to operate under the assumption that access to key locations, bases, and infrastructure may be denied, either through military attacks or for political reasons. The antiaccess challenge has significant implications for future naval forces and concepts of operations, as discussed in Section 1.2, "Technological Environment." 1.1.5 Recalibrating the Major-Theater-War Measuring Stick Reflecting the national security environment current at this writing, the DOD is developing a new yardstick by which to measure the size of the forces that the United States requires.
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From page 23... ...
armed forces should be able to prepare for, deploy to, and conduct military operations in the future.15 The goal of this stringent time line, which goes by the name "10-30-30," is to shift from a situation in which it can take months to ready U.S. forces and deploy them into theater, to one in which forces are positioned and ready to deploy to a hot spot and seize the initiative within 10 days, swiftly defeat the adversary within 30 days, and are ready to fight again in 30 days.
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staff has adopted a capabilities-based approach to planning and is working to assess naval capabilities in a variety of scenarios, the organizational structure of the naval acquisition community is not well matched to the capabilities-based approach. 1.2 THE TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 1.2.1 Observations on the Evolution of Military Communications and Information Technology A brief recap of the evolution of military communications and information technology in the Navy and Marine Corps will provide a context for the dramatic changes that are occurring.
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From page 25... ...
When they have satellite coverage they are limited to 64 kbps, divided as shown in Figure 1.4 -- clearly a long way from what one would consider real network-centric communications. For naval forces ashore, the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)
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From page 26... ...
Working through the issues has been slower than anticipated, but the NMCI has withstood numerous attacks and viruses during this period. The Marine Corps communications architecture has focused on operational and tactical communications.
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Like the other Services, the Marine Corps awaits the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) , for which reason no major tactical communications upgrades have been attempted within the acquisition system.
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With the fielding of NMCI throughout the Marine Corps, a capable enterprise network is being put into place to support logistics and nontactical operations. 1.2.2 Observations on the Evolution of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance As with the previous subsection, these observations are not intended to be comprehensive, but technologies related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
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From page 29... ...
Early antisubmarine warfare efforts required ships to "ping" enemy submarines using powerful sonars that gave away the ships' positions. The passive Sound Surveillance System array established on the ocean floor during the 1950s and 1960s greatly improved the Navy's ability to track enemy submarines without revealing sensitive information.
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· By 2015, 40 percent of today's IT job roles will be lost to automation. Considering the future in these terms, for the DOD and the Naval Services, the choices are lead, follow, or get out of the way.
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To achieve the strategic objectives, naval forces will be required to secure access and provide for an active forward defense. The Naval Services will rely on their ability to operate from the commons (sea, cyberspace, and space)
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, the CSG will have fewer surface combatants and submarines, although it is intended that the CSG continue in the role of providing air defense capabilities for shore- and sea-based joint and coalition forces, as well as strike capabilities, including Time Critical Strike (TCS) capabilities against land and sea targets.
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NOTE: Comms, communications; C2, command and control; IO, Information Operations; ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; TCS, Time Critical Strike; SOF, Special Operations Forces; ARF, amphibious ready force; NSFS, Naval Surface Fire Support; STOM, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver; SUW, surface warfare; AAW, antiair warfare; ASW, antisubmarine warfare; TBMD, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense; ME, Maneuver Enhancement (Brigade) ; FRP, Fleet Response Plan; FDNF, Forward Deployed Naval Forces; CONUS, continental United States.
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From page 34... ...
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Time, Speed, and Strategy," presentation at the U.S. Navy Retired Four Star Flag Symposium, December 6, 2004, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
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NOTE: MPSRON, Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron. SOURCE: Adapted from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7)
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From page 36... ...
; ARC, Amphibious Reconnaissance Course; MPSRON, Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron. SOURCE: Adapted from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7)
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2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p.
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architectures, the Naval Network Warfare Command and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7) should explore the trade-offs related to reach-back.
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Recommendation: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7) should ensure that naval C4ISR systems are designed for ease of use and maintenance.
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. Recommendation: The Naval Network Warfare Command should move aggressively to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps establish programs with U.S.
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