U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike Issues for 2008 and Beyond (2008) / Chapter Skim
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6 Key Questions and Major Findings and Recommendations
6 Key Questions and Major Findings and Recommendations
Pages 147-164
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From page 147... ...
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) systems, including analysis of leading CPGS options, are discussed in detail in Chapters 1 through 5 of this report.
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From page 148... ...
In February 2007, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State submitted to Congress a report that clearly articulated CPGS mission types and made clear the shared DOD and State Department view that CTM is a needed near-term CPGS capability. At present, U.S. strikes with conventional weapons are conducted primarily through the use of forward-based systems, particularly tactical aircraft and cruise missiles, and with heavy bombers.
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From page 149... ...
local air defenses do not pose an unacceptable threat to the success of the mission, then armed UAVs would provide an option for prompt 20 18 16 14 Existing conventional capability using subsonic flight Flight Time (hr) 12 10 8 CPGS Capability Gap 6 4 Hypersonic 2 Cruise Missiles Ballistic Missiles 0 0 2000 2,000 4,000 4000 6000 6,000 8000 8,000 10,000 10000 Range to Target (nmi)
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From page 150... ...
In light of the appropriately extreme reluctance to use nuclear weapons, conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) could be of particular value in some important scenarios in that it would eliminate the dilemma of having to choose between responding to a sudden threat either by using nuclear weapons or by not responding at all.
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From page 151... ...
from nuclear-armed to conventionally armed. Each converted Trident missile would carry up to four reentry vehicles equipped with advanced navigation, guidance, and control capabilities.
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From page 152... ...
The criteria for evaluation include time to implementation, anticipated cost, delivery accuracy, weapons effectiveness, technical risk, proposed performance in various military scenarios, and contribution to the evolution of long-term CPGS capability. CTM would be effective against some targets of political and military significance that cannot be struck promptly with existing systems.
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From page 153... ...
The committee believes that a fundamental command-and-control imperative for CPGS systems would be that the weapon could be employed only on the order of the President of the United States. A comprehensive study of the military and diplomatic implications of acquiring and possibly employing CPGS capabilities should precede any deployment and should include the consideration of factors such as the potential for inappropriate, mistaken, or accidental use; the implications for nuclear deterrence and crisis stability (including ambiguity considerations)
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From page 154... ...
d Existing systems USA, USAF, Cruise missiles, 1,500 to >6,000 nmi 1,000-2,000 lb Available now Not applicable USMC, USN tactical aircraft, and heavy bombers CTM USN Trident: D5 >4,000 nmi >1,000 lb 2011 1 (sea-based) (3-stage)
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From page 155... ...
aData on range and payload for CTM, SLGSM, CSM-1, CSM-2, and hypersonic cruise missile options are extracted from Amy F Woolf, 2007, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., June 19, pp.
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From page 156... ...
There are two aspects, logically and practically distinct, of the nuclear ambiguity issue. The first is the possible misinterpretation by an observing nation of a conventional strike on a third party as a nuclear strike on its own territory.
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From page 157... ...
• This risk could be reduced even further by means of cooperative measures, such as providing information to bilateral partners about the CPGS system, its operation, and the doctrine for its use; immediately notifying of launches against countries; and installing devices (such as continuous monitoring systems) to increase the confidence that conventional warheads had not been replaced by nuclear warheads.10 • The possibility of conditions in which misinterpretations would be plausible is not, in the committee's judgment, a valid reason to forgo the CPGS capability for those many other cases in which the risk of misinterpretation is negligible.
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From page 158... ...
The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration. START requires the United States and Russia to limit their deployed strategic arsenals to no more than 6,000 warheads, with no more than 4,900 on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
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From page 159... ...
Other CPGS systems could raise arms control issues if the INF Treaty and START remain in force or are renegotiated without including provisions that would permit the deployment of these systems.
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From page 160... ...
that the Navy has proposed reasonable technical and procedural safeguards against accidental or mistaken launch of a nuclear-armed Trident missile from an SSBN loaded with both nuclear-armed and conventionally armed missiles (and that these safeguards should be strengthened even further in accordance with lessons learned from the Air Force incident in 2007 involving the mistaken transport of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on a B-52 bomber,12 and that these safeguards should be tested to ensure their effectiveness)
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From page 161... ...
Of the long-term alternative CPGS systems, the Submarine-Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM) appears to have the lowest technical risk and to offer important capabilities, such as the ability to launch from existing, dedicated, conventional strike platforms (nuclear-powered guided missile submarines, or SSGNs)
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From page 162... ...
• Initiate programs to improve targeting, planning, and decision making to support CPGS capability, and establish decision points about where to go beyond CTM. • Initiate what will likely be a multiyear study of concepts and doctrine for potential larger-scale CPGS deployments, recognizing that going beyond the niche capability anticipated currently would raise profound issues that have not yet been adequately explored and debated.
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From page 163... ...
, the following be done: • Explore a range of CPGS options and fund RDT&E of the most promising options at levels sufficient to improve weapon effectiveness (especially maneuverability, accuracy, range, and lethality)
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