U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike Issues for 2008 and Beyond (2008) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix E: Interim Letter Report to Congress
Appendix E: Interim Letter Report to Congress
Pages 185-203
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E Interim Letter Report to Congress 185
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From page 186... ...
payloads to provide a prompt global strike capability and, where appropriate, consider and recommend alternatives that meet the prompt global strike mission in the near-, mid-, and long-term. The study requested analyses of the military, political, and international issues associated with each alternative and asked that the committee consider
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From page 187... ...
a letter report, following the second full com mittee meeting, that summarizes the requirements and supporting enablers for a conventional prompt global strike capability and recommends a near term option or options to provide this capability; and (2) a comprehensive report that addresses the issues as outlined above.
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, the DOD has assessed potential conventional prompt global strike options, including sea- and land-based ballistic missiles and advanced technologies such as hypersonic glide vehicles. The QDR called for deployment, within 2 years, of an "initial capability to deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
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From page 189... ...
It has also raised technical questions regarding the characteristics of a conventional ballistic missile warhead and its effects against a range of targets, including ones that are mobile, hardened, or deeply buried. As a result, the FY 07 defense bill funded only a small portion of the President's budget request for CTM and limited use of the funding to efforts that are not unique to CTM as such but also support other options for CPGS.
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From page 190... ...
strike at distant, time-critical targets as the leading edge of A major combat operations. These two purposes are quite different in their operational require ments and also in how the political environment affects the decision to use specific types of weapon delivery, especially ballistic missiles.
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From page 191... ...
Inventory requirements for a CPGS weapon would depend on the range of the weapon, the number of warheads needed to accomplish a militarily effective strike, and the concomitant basing plan required to achieve prompt global coverage. The committee suspects that very limited strikes using a CPGS weapon in, say, the first decade after its fielding would likely number at most a few dozen.
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From page 192... ...
is the second, distinguishable purpose for a CPGS capability. DOD representa tives presented scenarios where the use of CPGS weapons in the first hours of what might become major combat operations to attack distant target sets could be of great operational importance.
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This might be especially true for a CPGS weapon delivered by a ballistic missile. CTM in Relation to a CPGS Capability The committee has concluded that the CPGS option represented by the CTM is best assessed in terms of a very limited strike rather than as the leading edge of something larger. Many of the scenarios involving CPGS as the leading edge of MCO are likely to require the use of many prompt conventional weapons, not just the one or two missiles' worth of kinetic energy weapons to be implemented in CTM.
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From page 194... ...
A comprehensive policy for a prompt, if not initially literally global, strike capability should ensure that the United States has done all that is reasonable to assure that forces using conventional weapons -- notably cruise missiles on aircraft, submarines, or surface ships, and attack aircraft with precision munitions (and, for some scenarios, stealth characteristics) -- are appropriately deployed, trained, and supported for urgent, very limited strikes.
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The Navy and USSTRATCOM described safeguards that have been designed and, in most cases, integrated into the weapon system and the supporting command and control that would prevent accidental launch of the "wrong" type of missile. The committee has confidence in these measures because they are extensions of measures already used to positively prevent such an event during current operational tests.10 The committee recognizes that other countries may not share the same high confidence with regard to proposed safeguards for preventing an accidental launch, but it is presumed that CTM would be subject to the same rigorous testing and validation procedures associated with current Trident missiles and that the proposed command and control would be sufficiently demonstrated prior to CTM becoming operational.
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The boost glide and high-speed cruise missile concepts as CPGS options require advanced technologies, especially in the areas of thermal protection and management; guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) ; and submunition dispensing mechanisms.
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While it is not the optimal solution for the longer term, CTM offers the only viable truly global CPGS capability within the next 6 years, and it can be achieved, with military mission capabilities still to be quantified, at a relatively modest initial and life-cycle cost because of the minimal changes required in most components of the delivery system and its infrastructure. The ability of the Navy's SSP to respond to USSTRATCOM (and DOD more broadly)
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From page 198... ...
The committee estimates that such development and testing will require an additional year to accomplish, but emphasizes that it should be part of the ongoing CTM development effort. If successfully developed and tested, this technology would also be applicable to a three-stage SLGSM, and possibly some ICBM conventional delivery options.
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Sincerely, Albert Carnesale, Chair Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability
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C Acknowledgment of Reviewers D Summary of Data-Gathering Sessions cc: Sidney Ashworth, Clerk, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations Charlie Huoy, Clerk, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations
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This 15-month study will produce two reports: (1) a letter report fol lowing the second full committee meeting that summarizes the requirements and supporting enablers for a conventional prompt global strike capability and recommends a near-term option or options to provide this capability; and (2)
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Enclosure D Summary of Data-Gathering Sessions The Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability first convened in February 2007 and held two full committee meetings and two subcommittee meetings prior to issuing this letter report. In addi
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First full committee meeting: Briefings on policy, requirements, supporting enablers, and tech nology plans for conventional prompt global strike from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; U.S. Strategic Command; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; U.S.
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