U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike Issues for 2008 and Beyond (2008) / Chapter Skim
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3 Political, International, Policy, and Doctrinal Issues
3 Political, International, Policy, and Doctrinal Issues
Pages 61-86
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From page 61... ...
(The nature of these targets and the proposed capabilities and limitations of the Conventional Trident Modification [CTM] and various other CPGS concepts are addressed in detail in Chapter 2.)
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From page 62... ...
Additional matters addressed in this chapter include command and control and the requirement for presidential authorization, the potential for inappropriate or mistaken use, the prevention of an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon when a conventional strike has been ordered, overflight and debris, access to forward basing, proliferation, arms control and treaty issues, and strategic considerations. The consensus of the committee that emerged after study was that (1)
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From page 63... ...
It might seem, then, that most of the policy-level issues have long since been resolved and precedents established. Arguably, however, conventional prompt global strike raises some new issues.
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From page 64... ...
• Is there any chance that an attack with a CPGS system will be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, particularly in the midst of a crisis? • What are the longer-term reactions of other countries to the existence of the capability (and the use)
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From page 65... ...
There may be cases in which the principal benefit of a shorter execution time is that it gives more time for other steps in the process to be carried out properly, while still not missing the opportunity if the decision is made to strike. Planning for making effective and prudent use of the execution capability also requires addressing doctrinal issues and decision procedures as well as technical parameters.
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From page 66... ...
Potential for Inappropriate or Mistaken Use A concern has sometimes been raised that CPGS capability should not be acquired because it could be misused. More specifically, those who hold this view argue that CPGS would give the President a non-nuclear option that might be particularly susceptible to misuse, because decisions to use the system could seem "too easy": that is, the capability would facilitate military attacks deep in the territory of other countries, not just without using nuclear weapons but without deep and extensive commitment of other elements of the American military and other resources, and with little immediate risk to American personnel.
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From page 67... ...
The committee believes that the increased possibility of successful uses of CPGS in cases where that is the right decision justify having the capability and outweigh the theoretical possibility of inappropriate uses. Moreover, while it is obviously important to do all that can reasonably be done to avoid mistakes, the fact that CTM attacks would necessarily involve limited numbers and limited effects (compared with options involving existing conventional forces that might require defense suppression, a larger attacking force, and risk to personnel, not to mention comparison with nuclear attacks)
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From page 68... ...
In particular, introducing CTM as a conventional system on the Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) should not be permitted to interfere with core nuclear deterrence or with the readiness, deployments, training, discipline, day-to-day operations, research, and in general the focus and resources necessary to maintain that core deterrence.
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From page 69... ...
Of course, any attack on a nuclear-armed country is a very serious matter, simply because of the possibility of escalation, but the probability of a nuclear response to such a conventional attack is surely lower than the probability of a nuclear response to a nuclear attack. CTM and other CPGS systems are sometimes argued to have a more general effect of raising the nuclear threshold by allowing conventional attack where nuclear weapons would otherwise have been used.
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From page 70... ...
However, providing an option to fill part of the gap between what current conventional systems can do and the point at which a nuclear attack would be a wise action is an important advantage of CTM, whether that gap is large or small. Preventing AN accidental launch of a nuclear weapon when a conventional strike has been ordered Any CPGS concept must ensure that there is no possibility that an order to carry out an attack with the CPGS system would accidentally result in a nuclear attack, or that such an order would accidentally result in the launch of a missile
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From page 71... ...
These measures would mean that errors, if they occur, do not result in an accidental launch or detonation of nuclear weapons. NUCLEAR Ambiguity The most prominent objection on policy grounds to the conventionally armed Trident missile, and to some degree to all CPGS proposals, has been the "nuclear ambiguity" concern: the possibility, with potentially catastrophic consequences, that a launch could be misinterpreted by foreign observers as a nuclear attack.
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From page 72... ...
There simply is no "bright line" between nuclear and conventional systems when relatively long-range platforms are being considered. While long-range ballistic missiles are now associated exclusively with nuclear weapons, that was once equally true of many systems that have since come to have extensive conventional roles (e.g., the B-52, B-1, B-2, fighter bombers, sealaunched cruise missiles [SLCMs]
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From page 73... ...
The second is a mistaken conclusion by an observing nation that a conventional CTM attack headed toward its territory is a nuclear attack. The issues to be considered in analyzing the ambiguity question are as follows: • Who would be able to detect the launch?
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From page 74... ...
The risk of escalation makes any military action against a nuclear power a grave matter indeed, but these risks are no greater just because a CPGS system is involved. Consider first the most likely case -- a conventionally armed ballistic missile launch directed at a country other than Russia or China.
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From page 75... ...
appear to have very little capacity to detect a ballistic missile launch (and therefore very little potential for misinterpreting what they do not know)
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From page 76... ...
, but it does mean that the use of a CPGS capability to attack highly critical targets deep within the territory of Russia or China would require great justification and consideration. (It is difficult to conceive of situations in which the benefits of using CPGS against targets in Russia or China would outweigh the risks.)
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From page 77... ...
Overflight and debris As discussed in the section above on ambiguity, the overflight of third countries situated between the attacking and the targeted countries (or flight paths that generate concern about impending overflight) may lead decision makers to assume mistakenly that their own country is under attack.
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From page 78... ...
, the final stage of the missile contains enough propellant to allow mission planners to divert it hundreds of kilometers from its normal path, toward a body of water or a sparsely inhabited area, in order to minimize collateral damage. Boost-glide or air-breathing systems can take flight paths that avoid densely populated areas, but as with ballistic missiles, they are vulnerable to failures that could deposit debris anywhere along their flight path, which could diverge substantially from the planned flight path.
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From page 79... ...
. ACCESS TO FORWARD BASING Conventional Trident Modification and most other proposed CPGS concepts need not be deployed on forward U.S.
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From page 80... ...
Proliferation Although there have long been dual-capable aircraft, the long-range ballistic missiles deployed by the nuclear-weapons states have been armed only with nuclear warheads. Attempts by other countries, such as North Korea and Iran, to acquire long-range ballistic missiles generally have been viewed as an integral component of an effort to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability.
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From page 81... ...
On balance, the committee judges that the deployment or use of CTM or other CPGS systems is by itself unlikely to have a substantial effect on the proliferation of ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons or on the development of similar systems by other countries. In general, countries will do what is in their own national interest and within their technological capability and financial capacity, regardless of what the United States does -- or does not do -- about CPGS.
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From page 82... ...
The prohibition applies to missiles deployed anywhere in the world; thus, the United States could not deploy a conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile at a forward base, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration.
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From page 83... ...
The treaty contains no verification provisions or agreed counting rules. Because SORT applies only to nuclear warheads, it imposes no restrictions on ballistic missiles or other delivery vehicles armed with conventional warheads.
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From page 84... ...
A key issue in the negotiation of a follow-on agreement would be verification and transparency measures. Because the central goal of such an agreement would be to limit nuclear weapons, there might be a temptation to try to exclude conventionally armed ballistic missiles from any such measures.
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From page 85... ...
For China, this would represent a major change from its current declaratory policy of no-firstuse of nuclear weapons, but it would be a change that China might well make as a response to a clear threat to its deterrent. Russian or Chinese leaders might believe, however, that threats to order nuclear retaliation to conventional attacks would be less than credible in the eyes of U.S.
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From page 86... ...
In addition to keeping the number of deployed CPGS systems small, the United States can limit CPGS deployments to areas that minimize the potential for attacks deep in Russian territory, and it can adopt transparency measures, such as launch notification, joint early warning, technical briefings, inspections, and devices integrated into the payload that signal a conventional missile launch. At the same time, U.S.
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