U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike Issues for 2008 and Beyond (2008) / Chapter Skim
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. In May 2007, the committee provided an interim letter report to the Congress which, together with this final report, satisfies the original congressional tasking. The committee first convened in February 2007 and met over a period of 8 months. In total, the committee received nearly 100 documents from a wide range of organizations, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Air Force, U.S.
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during a brief period of vulnerability; and the need to disable an adversary's command-and-control capability as the leading edge of a broader combat operation. With the benefit of these scenarios and more specifically defined test cases, the committee concluded that a high-confidence CPGS capability would be valu he Conventional Trident Modification program involves the conversion of two Trident II (D5)
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strikes with conventional weapons are conducted primarily through the use of forward-based systems, particularly tactical aircraft and cruise missiles, and with heavy bombers. Effective use of these systems requires that there be adequate time available to position the aircraft and/or missiles within range of the targets, to conduct detailed mission planning, and, when needed, to provide tanker refueling capability.
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12 10 8 CPGS Capability Gap 6 4 Hypersonic 2 Cruise Missiles Ballistic Missiles 0 0 2000 2,000 4,000 4000 6000 6,000 8000 8,000 10,000 10000 Range to Target (nmi) FIGURE S-1 Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS)
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from nuclear-armed to conventionally armed. Each converted Trident missile would carry up to four reentry vehicles equipped with advanced navigation, guidance, and control capabilities.
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. CSM-1 is a mid-term alternative and committee modification of the Air Force-proposed Conventional Strike Missile concept, which would be launched using a Minotaur ballistic missile (i.e., a modified version of the no longer operationally deployed Peacekeeper)
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Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) has advantages over alternative CPGS systems in its near-term availability, low development cost, low opportunity cost, low technical risk, and minimal required changes in declared policy or doctrine.
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d Existing systems USA, USAF, Cruise missiles, 1,500 to >6,000 nmi 1,000-2,000 lb Available now Not applicable USMC, USN tactical aircraft, and heavy bombers CTM USN Trident: D5 >4,000 nmi >1,000 lb 2011 1 (sea-based) (3-stage)
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aData on range and payload for CTM, SLGSM, CSM-1, CSM-2, and hypersonic cruise missile options are extracted from Amy F Woolf, 2007, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., June 19, pp.
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A comprehensive study of the military and diplomatic implications of acquiring and possibly employing CPGS capabilities should precede any deployment and should include the consideration of factors such as the potential for inappropriate, mistaken, or accidental use; the implications for nuclear deterrence and crisis stability (including ambiguity considerations) ; the impact of overflight and debris; and the implications for arms control and associated agreements.
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There are two aspects, logically and practically distinct, of the nuclear ambiguity issue. The first is the possible misinterpretation by an observing nation of a conventional strike on a third party as a nuclear strike on its own territory.
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international reactions to the U.S. acquisition and possible use of CPGS capabilities probably would include countermeasures intended to protect valuable potential targets and might include increased emphasis on acquiring comparable conventional strike capabilities.
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The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration. START requires the United States and Russia to limit their deployed strategic arsenals to no more than 6,000 warheads, with no more than 4,900 on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
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that the Navy has proposed reasonable technical and procedural safeguards against accidental or mistaken launch of a nuclear-armed Trident missile from an SSBN loaded with both nuclear-armed and conventionally armed missiles (and that these safeguards should be strengthened even further in accordance with lessons learned from the Air Force incident in 2007 involving the mistaken transport of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on a B-52 bomber,16 and that these safeguards should be tested to ensure their effectiveness)
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, and long term (SLGSM) and offer evolutionary paths that balance technical risk with the rapid fielding of improved capabilities.17 In the long term, boost-glide missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles offer versatile capabilities, but they have high cost and high technical risk and may be less able than ballistic missiles are to penetrate defenses.
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. Boost-glide missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles have higher technical risk but, if demonstrated, could provide some advantages beyond submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
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CPGS capability, including establishing cooperative measures to reduce ambiguity risks. • Conduct a comprehensive examination of strategic strike (nuclear and conventional)
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