Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces (2010) / Chapter Skim
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1 Background - Naval Network-Centric Operations, Information Assurance, and Current Cyberthreats
1 Background - Naval Network-Centric Operations, Information Assurance, and Current Cyberthreats
Pages 12-32
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From page 12... ...
Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces adopts the following definition from prior NRC reports conducted under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board (NSB) : Network-centric operations are military operations that exploit state-of-the-art information and networking technology to integrate widely dispersed human decision makers, situational and targeting sensors, and forces and weapons into a highly adaptive, comprehensive system to achieve unprecedented mission effectiveness.1,2 The NSB's report Network-Centric Naval Forces further characterizes network-centric operations in the following manner: Forward deployment of naval forces that may be widely dispersed geographi cally, the use of fire and forces massed rapidly from great distances at decisive 1 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p.
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From page 13... ...
Goal #3 -- Deny the enemy comparable advantages and exploit weaknesses.5 FORCEnet can be regarded as the naval means for achieving the goals listed above. It is envisioned by the Navy and Marine Corps as the naval element of 3Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p.
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From page 14... ...
This concept envisions that naval forces will be an integral part of a much larger joint, coalition-based, interagency and commercial network that will enjoy magnified support opportunities from the network because of its expanded scope. Within the GIG, naval nodes will be tightly integrated with non-naval nodes.
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From page 15... ...
Box 1.1 describes the unique naval mission element requirements of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, and Sea Warrior, Sea Enterprise, and Sea Trial as they relate to naval forces' IA. NATURE OF THE CYBERTHREAT The cybersecurity threat environment, in terms of possible attack techniques, is effectively limitless.
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From page 16... ...
Every area of naval warfare, as described in the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, and Marine Corps Strategy 21 will require FORCEnet to provide command-and-control functionality as follows: • Sea Strike: FORCEnet will provide synchronization of distributed strike and assessment assets for Sea Strike's projection of offensive power from the sea. The collection, integration, and dissemination of sur veillance, targeting, planning, and assessment information will facilitate the decision-making process through real-time collaborative planning and intelligent decision aids.
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From page 17... ...
• Sea Warrior, Sea Enterprise, and Sea Trial: FORCEnet's robust, collaborative, information sharing, distributed services, and decision superiority benefits will also extend to the non-warfighting enterprise domain. FORCEnet provides Sea Warrior with near-real-time information services for personnel and personnel management, training, medical sup port, professional growth, and other personnel considerations.
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From page 18... ...
Historically, the DOD has paid more attention to the detection of remote access penetrations than it has to close access detections, since the "closed" sys tems were felt to be safe by virtue of their physical and cryptographic isolation. Recently, for reasons discussed later, the DOD has begun to pay more attention to the possibility of close access penetrations.
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From page 19... ...
Accessed February 18, 2008. See also, Defense Science Board, 2007, Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September.
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15 Samuel T King, Joseph Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, and yuanyuan zhou.
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Simpson, USN, Director, Navy Networks, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Communica tion Networks (N6) , "Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)
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Because the Navy is increasingly conducting warfighting using commercial information technology systems, these cyberthreats represent a serious threat to the Navy's warfighting capability. Employment of Cyberattacks by Potential Adversaries Reports of computer network intrusions by various adversaries continue to increase.
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From page 23... ...
In November 2007, Jonathan Evans, Director-General of the British intelligence service, MI 5, alerted 300 financial institution officials that they were the target of state-sponsored computer network exploitation from the PRC.18 Cybersecurity vulnerabilities are necessitating the introduction of entirely new warfighting doctrine. This fact is illustrated by the following extract on Chinese thinking from Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force's Computer Network in the Future: China's ability to wage cyberwar against the United States is no longer specula tion; it occurs daily and is growing exponentially.
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From page 24... ...
Similarly, projections of future cyberthreats are required for the development of platforms and information systems. All presentations to the committee on the subject of cyberthreat, how ever, focused almost exclusively on the current threat, apart from a few general examples of projected future threats (see, e.g., Figure 1.1)
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From page 25... ...
Rather, threats are usually discussed in terms of specific examples. There appears to be no systematic taxonomy for characterizing and thinking about cyberthreats (beyond the very high level categorization of remote access, close access, and so on)
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From page 26... ...
King, Joseph Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, and yuanyuan zhou, 2008, "Designing and Implementing Malicious Hardware," Proceedings of the First USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEET) , San Francisco, Calif., April; "The State of Offensive Affairs in the COTS World," at |
From page 27... ...
Integration may in some cases reduce the likelihood of a successful attack; however, the potential consequences of a successful attack are greatly increased as a result of the expanded scope that the 25 Defense Science Board.
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From page 28... ...
The company shipped patches this week to address a pair of critical vulnerabilities affecting their product." All accessed February 17, 2009. Weekly cybersecurity reports providing summaries and ratings of new vulnerabilities are also provided by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team; available at |
From page 29... ...
This has led the industry to focus primarily on signature-based detection strategies that are highly accurate at detecting already-known threats but that are blind to new threats never seen before. Basing naval forces IA strategy solely on such commercial practices will result in a reactive IA strategy for naval forces that is incapable of achieving realization of the strategic desire to get ahead of the threat.28 Compounding this negative impact is the possibility that naval forces may face a significantly different threat from that confronting commercial industry, especially in a situation that could involve a nation-state conflict.
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From page 30... ...
Thus, the existing cyber vulnerabilities are expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 31 29An air-gap defense inserts a deliberate break, to be connected by manual action, in a link of the network (see Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p.
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From page 31... ...
For example, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, Cyber Crime: Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats, Report to Congressional Requesters, Washington, D.C., June; John Rollins and Clay Wilson, 2007, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyber Attack: Overview and Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., January 22; and U.S.
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From page 32... ...
Defense Science Board Study According to the Defense Science Board (DSB) study chairs, the findings and recommendations of the DSB study on information management for networkcentric operations published in 2007 can be distilled to three points: 34 • The combat information capability must be treated as a critical defense weapon system.
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