Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces (2010) / Chapter Skim
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3 Mission Resilience - Viewing the Threat in Operational Terms
3 Mission Resilience - Viewing the Threat in Operational Terms
Pages 51-71
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From page 51... ...
It has been known for some time that these complex COTS-based capabilities are vulnerable to exploitation and attack.2 As described elsewhere in this report, it is now apparent that potential adversaries are vigorously working to exploit these vulnerabilities in a variety of ways, including the creation of vulnerabilities 1 Examples include the Aegis cruiser's open architecture, which uses commonly available computer resources, and the DDG-1000 (a planned new class of the Navy's multimission ships) , which has a single, commercially based network infrastructure supporting all shipboard functions.
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From page 52... ...
Naval forces are equipped with a variety of communications and information capabilities that are critical to their warfighting capabilities. (A current general layout for such systems and their computer network defense-in-depth structure is shown in Figure 3.1.)
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From page 53... ...
FIGURE 3.1 Naval forces' defense-in-depth computer network defense for shore and afloat infrastructure. SOURCE: Michael Davis, Space and Naval Warfare Systems/Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (SPAWAR/ PEO C4I)
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From page 54... ...
Today's networked force relies on the SIPRnet and JWICS for a host of primary warfighting functions, including secure command and control, shared situational awareness, synchronization of joint efforts, access to imagery and other intelligence, mission planning and execution, precision targeting, fires, and battle damage assessment. An example that raises concern is based on committee briefings and public reports which suggest that the DOD's NIPRnet used by naval forces has been penetrated.
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From page 55... ...
System has been proposed by the DOD; if delivered as currently specified, it would provide military services with high-data-rate military satellite communications and Internet-like services. Touted by the DOD as the spaceborne element of the Global Information Grid (GIG)
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From page 56... ...
In the committee's view, for mission resilience the Marine Corps needs to consider establishing multiple diverse reach-back facilities, where the operating forces can access "protected" enclaves of key protected data such as intelligence and logistics information that are critical to the mission. The Marine Corps also needs to conduct an end-to-end review of the original sources of its information to determine the vulnerability of those sources to denial of service or misinformation insertion.
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From page 57... ...
The committee has seen evi dence to suggest that the NIPRnet and legacy networks are highly vulnerable, and yet mission-critical functions such as managing logistics are being conducted on these shared networks. MAJOR RECOMMENDATION: To help address and reduce current perceived network risks related to the NIPRnet and legacy networks, the Department of the Navy should carry out the following: • Undertake a systematic risk analysis to understand the mission impacts that could be created by information assurance failures.
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From page 58... ...
Naval forces tactics, techniques and procedures for fighting through a cyberattack need to be updated. Such TTPs form the basis for training and exercising against the increased likelihood of such events.
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From page 59... ...
Where necessary -- and as defined by potential mission risks -- naval forces need to be prepared to revert to a mini mum essential capability that is as immune to information denial, exploitation, or manipulation as is reasonably possible (analogous to the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network used for command and control of nuclear forces) .19 This most basic capability could be as simple as a secure voice-based order wire and/or command wire, independent of normal Internet Protocol net works, augmented with a simple situational display capability.
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From page 60... ...
The committee believes that expanding the scope of these types of games to include heavy emphasis on cyber operations and mission assurance, using a broad range of cyber experts to formulate the exercises, would serve to better position Navy and Marine Corps leaders to make better operational and IA investment decisions in the future.
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From page 61... ...
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps need to review their warfighting doctrine and concepts to ensure that the actions, effects, and reactions to computer network attacks, including computer network defense and computer network exploitation, are adequately addressed in the appropriate documents. Policies and lines of authority in these areas must be unambiguous.
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From page 62... ...
2006. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, February 13, provides further guidance for military information operations planning and execution in support of joint operations.
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From page 63... ...
This effort should be threat-based; it should include increased operational training and exercises to improve proficiency in working through degraded information envi ronments, using advanced red teams to represent adversarial actions; and it should emphasize educating, training, and the holding of commanders accountable for the protection of the information and networks over which they have responsibility. INCREASINg LEVELS OF INTEgRATION AND SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS The Department of the Navy's ongoing movement toward integrating information networks (such as the NIPRnet and SIPRnet)
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From page 64... ...
The committee recommends that the risks associated with the current trend toward highly converged network infrastructure be examined in the context of evolving cyberthreats, including both network-borne and supply chain risks, and that mitigation techniques be developed to address these risks. 25 See Defense Science Board, 2007, Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C., Sep tember, for a more detailed discussion of issues raised by the growing use of COTS products developed offshore and DOD programs currently underway to address the associated assurance issues.
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From page 65... ...
In light of the emerging and evolving threat, the department needs to provide the same level of leadership, management, and resourcing to cyber-related issues that it provides to other critical warfighting technology support areas.26 Accordingly, the committee views the cyber- and IA-related education and training of officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians as a major challenge that needs to be addressed, with the results having a large impact on the degree of information assurance that naval forces can expect. The challenge is heightened by the fact that this education and training must be accomplished within the overall naval education and training program that supports more than 350,000 people.27 Education and Training For the purposes of this report, the committee uses the term "education" to represent formal college and postgraduate education that is principally directed toward the officer community; the term "training" is used to focus on job-specific process learning that is principally, although not exclusively, acquired by enlisted personnel.
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From page 66... ...
In the Navy today, there are 7,805 CTs and 787 ITs, and a small number of personnel from selected other ratings, who perform a computer network defense mission. The officer and enlisted groupings referred to above are the primary compo nent of the Navy's information operations career force.
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From page 67... ...
A variety of factors must be considered in developing and supporting the Navy's current information operations career force of 1,196 officers and approxi mately 8,600 enlisted personnel, as cited below: • Current DOD guidance makes no distinction between computer network defense and information assurance. However, the Navy does distinguish between computer network defense and information specialists (CTNs and ITs, respec tively)
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From page 68... ...
The above suggestion is made in addition to the committee's recommendation that the Navy and Marine Corps seek more actively to recruit and develop a cadre of future naval leaders with formal degrees in computer science and related information technologies. Career Paths Career paths are well laid out for the dedicated officer and enlisted com ponents of the Navy and Marine Corps information operations workforce.
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From page 69... ...
The program also defines strategic throughput goals across the Services, growing from today's approximately 400 personnel to double that amount over the next 5 years.33 The Corry Station program is a joint Services effort, including not only Navy and Marine Corps, but also Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard cryptologic and cyberdefense group participation. The Navy leads the joint effort and should be recognized for its vision in this area, as the committee views the Corry Station program to exemplify the type of strategic workforce development planning needed for future cyber operations.34 The committee recommends that the Corry Station program be aggressively supported and funded.
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From page 70... ...
37 The committee believes that the Navy is well positioned to lead the way on integrated cyber operations with the Naval Network Warfare Command and its subordinate commands, the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command and the Navy Information Operations Command.
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From page 71... ...
The naval forces require the support of non-naval information systems assets and must supply comparable information for other Services to use. Satisfaction of this need demands that the configuration of individual naval systems, including sup port systems from other Services, be accurately known and that sensor information on a system-by-system basis be made available to the Navy and Marine Corps, so that both technical and operational reconfiguration can be dealt with in a timely manner.
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