Avoiding Technology Surprise for Tomorrow's Warfighter A Symposium Report (2009) / Chapter Skim
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2 Current Technology Surprise Problems
2 Current Technology Surprise Problems
Pages 9-16
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From page 9... ...
While discussions were not restricted to the questions provided, the moderators used those questions to focus the two independent discussions around common issues and to address the symposium goal of elucidating trends that could be used to improve the DOD's technology warning capability. This chapter summarizes discussion topics from the first panel session that emphasized understanding current issues related to technology surprise from the perspective of COCOMs and other key S&TI consumer communities as well as S&TI producers.
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In the IC, there is a need for more scientists and technologists who understand the intelligence community culture and can help to both craft focused collection requirements and provide scientific data and insight on a continuing basis. It was acknowledged that even individuals with deep technical expertise may be poorly equipped to translate that knowledge into discrete indicators that would focus intelligence collection assets.
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As an example, a description of raw technical capabilities is not particularly useful to consumers out side the defense R&D community. S&TI information must be provided together with sufficient operational context to help consumers understand the potential impact if the capability is used against the United States on the battlefield.
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government agencies outside the IC. Participants again identified the need for the S&TI community to develop a stronger understanding of S&T advances in the United States, as well as worldwide, and to build networks with these communities.
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Sources of Future Technology Surprise Threats span a spectrum from individuals to small groups to nation-states. Rapid advancement of technologies and increasingly easy access to these technologies provides sophisticated capabilities to nation-states, non-state actors, and or F additional information on ITAR and how it affects the exchange of unclassified, scientific information, please see the NRC report Beyond Fortress America: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World.
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The challenge of technology warning is further complicated by differing approaches stemming from strategic versus tactical actors. While nation-states generally implement longer-term strategies that leverage technological advances, individual adversaries (and insurgents)
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There was a general view that the 5- to 10-year time frame is very important, and that ignoring it leaves the United States very vulnerable to technology surprise. -- Longer-term forecasts are also important when considering initiation of major procurement efforts.
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Wide availability of increasing computational capabilities will continue and will enable more surprises. Participants described this phenomenon in terms of "lego blocks": today the United States invests great resources in creating technology that very soon will be packaged into plug-andplay components for use by the general public, including future adversaries.
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