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2 Key Problems and Solutions
Pages 30-43

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From page 30...
... In addition to the many specific causes of cost growth identified in the primary references, the integrated effects of these causes also leads to cost and schedule growth. Therefore, the committee recommends that NASA develop an overall strategy for dealing with the issues that cause cost and schedule growth.
From page 31...
... In contrast, the process used within NASA to generate cost estimates based on detailed engineering assessments does not provide a statistical confidence level and, in retrospect, has generally been less accurate than parametric cost models have been.1 Parametric cost models implicitly assume that the cost of current projects will be influenced by the same factors that influenced the cost of past missions, which generally seems to be the case with NASA Earth and space science missions. Parametric cost models automatically include allowances for many of the technical and programmatic problems that NASA development projects encounter (e.g., schedule delays, requirements changes, unforeseen technology challenges, and so on)
From page 32...
... as the first official cost commitment to stakeholders, there continues to be considerable confusion regarding what cost and schedule estimate should be considered the baseline from which future cost and schedule growth should be mea sured. As detailed in Chapter 1, different reports and studies reach different conclusions regarding the magnitude of cost growth experienced by NASA Earth and space science missions, in part because they define baseline costs differently.
From page 33...
... As noted in Chapter 1, the primary references indicate that extensive cost growth exists in many -- but not all -- NASA Earth and space science missions. In addition, cost and schedule growth have made it more difficult to accomplish those missions.
From page 34...
... Managing AO missions primarily by program line item rather than by mission can thereby accomplish the overall goal of limiting cost growth in the NASA science budget while still achieving valuable science missions. A similar argument does not hold for the directed missions, which are much more expensive and each of which forms a single line item.
From page 35...
... The extent to which a relatively small number of missions run up the total cost growth of NASA Earth and space science missions would be even worse if some missions currently in development, such as the Mars Science Laboratory (cost growth of approximately $660 million) and the James Webb Space Telescope (cost growth of approximately $1.5 billion)
From page 36...
... Concurrent with efforts to improve management processes for AO and directed missions, NASA should establish incentives for PIs, project managers, and program managers to minimize costs and avoid cost growth throughout mission life, while still meeting or exceeding minimum mission requirements, including science return and mission duration. For example, NASA might encourage mission managers to minimize cost growth by estab lishing a policy that some percentage of unexpended reserves would routinely be made available for extended mission operations.
From page 37...
... NASA should initiate instrument development well in advance of starting other project elements and establish a robust instrument technology development effort relevant to all classes of Earth and space science missions to strengthen and sustain the nation's instrument development capability. Recommendation.
From page 38...
... In addition, decadal surveys should also prioritize science mission areas that could be addressed by future AOs and the instruments needed to carry out these missions. As noted above, AO mission concepts are generally selected with a much lower level of instrument technological maturity than for directed missions, and develop ment of instrument technology has been a particular problem for some AO missions.
From page 39...
...  KEY PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS BOX 2.1 Optimizing U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense Review of Air Force Acquisition Programs The National Research Council's 2009 report Optimizing U.S.
From page 40...
... Recent changes by NASA in the develop ment and management of Earth and space science missions are promising. These changes include budgeting
From page 41...
... Internal Factors A consistent approach for defining cost and schedule growth and applying rigorous independent parametric cost and schedule estimates is necessary for a clear and consistent understanding of how individual projects are performing. Cost estimates become more accurate as risks and uncertainties are reduced through the maturation of critical technologies for instruments and other key systems, subsystems, and components.
From page 42...
... A comprehensive, integrated approach to control cost and schedule growth is also essential. The primary references include dozens of specific causes, dozens of specific recommendations, and dozens of findings concerning this problem (see Table 1.6 and Appendix C)
From page 43...
... Externally, NASA has the opportunity to collaborate with other federal agencies, OMB, and Congress to sustain and improve critical capabilities and expertise in the industrial base and the nation's science and engineering workforce, to address cost and schedule risk associated with launch vehicles, and to improve funding stability. Successful implementation of a comprehensive, integrated strategy for cost and schedule growth of NASA Earth and space science missions will benefit both NASA and the nation, while enabling NASA to more efficiently and effectively carry out these critical missions.


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