Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents A Brighter Line (2010) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix L: Near-Term Milestones for Consideration
Appendix L: Near-Term Milestones for Consideration
Pages 207-214
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From page 207... ...
While the system could have advantages over the current system, there are also potential negative conse quences that require careful deliberation. It is not the role of our committee to recommend specific implementation plans, nor are we properly constituted to do so.
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From page 208... ...
As previously mentioned, advisors for the yellow flag system would be charged to review biological data and make determinations as to whether a sequence raises sufficient concern to merit a yellow flag, needs further study, or should be removed from the yellow flag list. This panel would offer advice regarding whether a sequence construct merits consideration for Select Agent designation.
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From page 209... ...
Representatives from the federal agencies with a responsibility for funding, conducting, or overseeing select agent research would serve in an ex officio capacity. Among the responsibilities of this advisory committee should be the following: Promulgate guidance on the implementation of the Select Agent Program; Facilitate exchange of information across institutions and sectors; Promote sharing of successful practices across institu tions and sectors; Provide oversight for evaluation of the Select Agent Program; Provide advice on composition/stratification of the list of select agents and toxins; Convene regular meetings of key constituency groups; and Promote harmonization of regulatory policies and practices (NRC 2009b)
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From page 210... ...
However, it does not seem wise to make special plans for an advanced effort in predicting the sequence of would-be bioweapons.6 information across institutions and sectors; Promote sharing of successful practices across institu tions and sectors; Provide oversight for evaluation of the Select Agent Program; Provide advice on composition/stratification of the list of select agents and toxins; Convene regular meetings of key constituency groups; and Promote harmonization of regulatory policies and practices (NRC 2009b)
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From page 211... ...
This would surely be impractical; the nature of modern biology routinely involves innumerable modified or synthetic DNA constructs. But if we don't run the black box on all new or modified genome sequences, then we would need to define, with the clarity of a criminal statute, exactly who is required to run the black box and when.
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From page 212... ...
In much the same vein, a determined bioterrorist can obtain isolates of a select agent from the wild. The SAR can only raise the difficulty bar for acquiring cultures of proven highly virulent agents, and provide law enforcement with tools to prosecute for possession of variants of such agents; because natural biological organisms are widely available, readily engineered, and increasingly easy to create, it is unrealistic to try to design the SAR to preclude acquisition completely.
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From page 213... ...
APPENDIX L to a biological threat, whether natural or man-made." Therefore, it is worth considering that, even in the context of national security, resources may be better used toward understanding infectious disease and developing response capabilities.
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