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1 Introduction
Pages 31-37

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From page 31...
... In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, blowout, and oil spill in April 2010, DOI restructured MMS by transferring its rev­ enue management functions to a new office and renaming the nonfiscal responsibilities of the agency the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) .1 On October 1, 2011, BOEMRE was further divided into two separate bureaus: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)
From page 32...
... The belief was that the inspection process would encourage owners and operators to develop a healthy and viable safety culture on offshore facilities and that, if potential problems existed, they would be identified during the inspection process and subsequently addressed, thereby reducing the likelihood of a major incident. Study Context In 1990, the Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continen­ tal Shelf Operations, under the auspices of the Marine Board, reviewed the MMS OCS inspection program and made several recommendations for improvement (NRC 1990)
From page 33...
... Ultimately, the committee hoped that MMS would collect sufficient information about each platform to allow for development of risk indices that MMS could use to allocate more of its resources to platforms at higher risk. In the main, however, the committee stressed that the private operator was the primary agent responsible for ensuring safe operations and that MMS should structure its program to reinforce that awareness among operators.
From page 34...
... In October 2010, BOEMRE issued a final rule requiring adoption of API RP 75 with minor revisions as defined in the rule and retitled "Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf -- Safety and Environmental Management Systems" (SEMS)
From page 35...
... .3 The revisions in the proposed rule pertain to • Developing and implementing stop work authority and ultimate work authority, • Requiring employee participation in the development and implementa­ tion of SEMS programs, • Establishing requirements for reporting unsafe working conditions, • Requiring independent third parties to conduct audits of operators' SEMS programs, and • Establishing further requirements relating to conducting job safety analysis for activities identified in an operator's SEMS program. Because SEMS II has not yet been adopted and is subject to modification, the committee did not specifically evaluate the audit requirements for each of these issues in this study.
From page 36...
... The committee will address methods to maximize the implementation effectiveness of indi­ vidual SEMS rather than the adequacy of the Final Rule of October 2010 requiring SEMS to mitigate safety and environmental risk of offshore platform operations. The committee's assessment of effective methods will focus on the safety and environmental risks of offshore production until after the release of the report of the NAE/NRC Committee for the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future, which is expected in June 2011 [but was actually released in December 2011]
From page 37...
... The chapter also includes a brief description of the potential role of the newly created Center for Offshore Safety. Chapter 5 discusses the role of BSEE in evaluating SEMS programs, including the use of inspections and audits, the training and qualifications of auditors, audit criteria and procedures, and the competence of inspectors and auditors in ensuring effectiveness.


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