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3 An Integrated National System for Addressing Foreign Animal Diseases and Zoonotic Diseases
Pages 35-66

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From page 35...
... Historically, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has addressed disease threats to the agricultural animal industries that may occur as a result of introduction of an FAD, and confronting the potential human health effects of zoonotic diseases has been the responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services.
From page 36...
... THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL LABORATORY FACILITY IN AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM Critical Core Functions The committee considered its task in the context of an integrated system in the United States for addressing FAD and zoonotic disease threats and the role of a national biocontainment laboratory in such a system. The ideal system would capture and integrate the substantial human and physical assets distributed throughout the nation to optimally address the threat of FADs and zoonotic diseases.
From page 37...
... Trained Workforce Integrated System for Disease Threats Diagnostic Laboratory Network FIGURE 3-1 Components of an integrated national system for addressing foreign animal disease and zoonotic disease threats. Laboratory infrastructure underlies all components.
From page 38...
... , and other technological means to capture and broadly disseminate training materials through electronic media, and engagement of the workforce in disease-control campaigns in regions that are endemic for animal diseases or that experience outbreaks of diseases foreign to the United States could reduce the need for hands-on training with experimentally infected animals and thereby reduce the need for training space in the proposed NBAF. BOX 3-1 Laboratory Biosafety Levels and Types of Pathogens Handled at Each Level as defined in The Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th Edition Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1)
From page 39...
... online re sources.2  The online FAD information and Emerging and Exotic Diseases of Animals (EEDA) course provided by the Center for Food Security and Public Health at Iowa State University.3  The Foreign Animal Disease Training Course at Colorado State Uni versity.4  The Foreign Animal, Emerging Diseases course at the University of Tennessee College of Veterinary Medicine.5 1 The designation "ABSL-4 large animal" is a terminology used by DHS to specify areas where biosafety level 4 research in large animals is conducted, but this term has not been codified by the BMBL.
From page 40...
... BOX 3-2 Training Courses Offered at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics Course The regular Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics (FADD) course is intended to train veterinarians employed by federal agencies (mostly USDA-APHIS Veterinary Services)
From page 41...
... The course includes classroom presentations for 3 days at Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine on diseases and their implications and 2 days of laboratory experience at the PIADC, where participants observe foot-and-mouth disease, African horse sickness, highly pathogenic avian influenza, and exotic Newcastle disease. The PIADC portion of the course coincides with the first week of a regular FADD course, and experimentally infected animals are shared by the two courses.
From page 42...
... , which is co-located with USDA-ARS and DHS at the PIADC, has been more limited in that it has focused on FADs, for which nonfederal laboratories were not allowed to perform diagnostic testing. The development of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)
From page 43...
... At the federal level, USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) laboratory units in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, New York (Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory [FADDL]
From page 44...
... Similar testing agreements for a wide array of animal diseases -- including foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, avian influenza, exotic Newcastle disease, chronic wasting disease and scrapie, swine influenza, pseudorabies, and vesicular stomatitis -- have been established with NAHLN laboratories nationwide. The NAHLN effectively demonstrates the value of collaboration between the federal government and state and university animal-disease diagnostic laboratories and may serve as a template for a new relationship among the Department of Homeland Security, USDA, and the NAHLN.
From page 45...
... The historical approach for control of an FAD outbreak has been to quarantine infected premises with diagnostic screening in surrounding zones followed by additional quarantine and diagnostic screening focused on new infected premises with slaughter of infected animals. That approach requires that new cases be rapidly identified with diagnostic assays that have a high level of diagnostic sensitivity and the capability of being performed in a high-throughput manner, particularly in the case of rapidly spreading diseases, such as foot-andmouth disease.
From page 46...
... Not all disease threats will require a vaccine-based approach, but for the ones that do, vaccine research will undoubtedly require animal biocontainment facilities at least for proof-of-concept studies. Continued assessment of diagnostic assays for FADs and zoonotic diseases also requires appropriate facilities, and newly arising variants of these diseases could require animal experiments for addressing transmission levels and shedding, both of which can affect analytic sensitivity and specificity of diagnostic assays.
From page 47...
... The recent incidental finding of Ebola Reston virus in a pig sample from the Philippines that was shipped to PIADC for assistance in diagnosing a disease outbreak demonstrates that a high level of biocontainment for newly emergent pathogens is necessary for safe handling and additional studies. A key question is the extent to which research with FAD and zoonotic disease agents must be limited to a central national laboratory.
From page 48...
... It would require that high-throughput extraction proce dures be optimized for a milk and cream matrix, that an internal control be used to indicate inhibition of the assay from factors in milk, and that analytical sensitivity, intra-assay variability, and repeatability be assessed. Recognizing that priority, the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)
From page 49...
... However, it could not be undertaken without appropriate biocontainment for some steps of the methods comparison. In the present example, the biocontainment space had to be at an FMDv-approved facility, and this remains a critical core function in an integrated national system.
From page 50...
... BSL-3, BSL-3Ag, and BSL-4 facilities. Courtesy of Alisha Prather, Galveston National Laboratory, University of Texas Medical Branch.
From page 51...
... , Ames, Iowa See information above None http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/vet_biologics/ National Animal Disease Center (NADC) , Ames, Iowa 17,024 ft2 (includes 2,432 ft2 for necropsy suite)
From page 52...
... http://www.utmb.edu/gnl/ National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory (NEIDL) ; None BSL-4 can accommodate 80 nonhuman primates, Boston, Massachusetts 5,000 rodents; not currently operational.
From page 53...
... marmosets, 36 guinea pigs, 24 rabbits, 360 mice. State and University Laboratories Animal Health Research Center (AHRC)
From page 54...
... . Australia Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL)
From page 55...
... Asia High Security Animal Disease India Laboratory has good infrastructural facilities for Laboratory (HSADL) http://www.hsadl.nic.in/ BSL-4 (animal pathogens)
From page 56...
... . The RCEs conduct research on NIH priority pathogens, some of which are agents of FADs and zoonotic diseases that appear on the OIE lists of animal diseases and top animal disease threats in the United States (see Tables 2-1 and 2-3 in Chapter 2)
From page 57...
... Choice of Animals Miniature goats, pigs, young lambs, and perhaps miniature horses could be used for experimental infections in existing BSL-4 facilities in the United States. Larger animals, such as horses and cattle, would present major hurdles and are probably not practical apart from true emergency conditions.
From page 58...
... Each facility has the ability to handle large domestic animals and some of these laboratories have experience working with agents that are not currently in the United States but are of research interest and could be newly introduced into the country (for example, Hendra and Nipah viruses at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong)
From page 59...
... . However, a survey of recent developments in biotechnology suggests that new, effective methods for diagnosing and tracking human diseases are available or on the near horizon, application to companionanimal diseases has already occurred, and further development for diseases of livestock will follow.
From page 60...
... Early stages of infectious diseases may have few organisms in accessible tissues. For example, early in Bacillus anthracis infection, few bacteria are in the bloodstream despite rapid replication because the bacteria are transported into the lymph nodes by dendritic cells (a subset of immune cells involved in early responses to infection)
From page 61...
... High biocontainment will be required in the near term for development, testing and validation of some of those approaches. Eventually, their application to plant and animal health will reduce, but not eliminate, the requirement for specialized laboratory space.
From page 62...
... . This vaccine was a product of PIADC and USDA-ARS research in cooperation with DHS and the private sector.14 Vaccine development for agents that are emerging as high-priority disease threats may also require high biocontainment.
From page 63...
... SUMMARY Despite the marked expansion of high-biocontainment space in the United States since 2001, there remains no national ABSL-4 large-animal facility. Similarly, although BSL-3Ag containment space has expanded through construction of several new facilities (for example, the Biosecurity Research Institute and the National Animal Disease Center)
From page 64...
... 2009. Sustaining Global Surveillance and Response to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases.
From page 65...
... 2012. National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)


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