Challenges for the 1990s for Arms Control and International Security (1989) / Chapter Skim
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2. Introductory Remarks: From INF to New Agreements
2. Introductory Remarks: From INF to New Agreements
Pages 13-27
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From page 13... ...
In previous seminars we emphasized this diversity by including such topics as offensive versus defensive strategic armaments, the management of international crises, as wed as specific discussion of anns control issues. Since our last seminar two years ago, the world has changed drastically in respect to national security affairs.
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From page 14... ...
Neither increased arms nor increased arms control will ever be without perceived benefits or without costs and risks. We are hearing many voices today urging the Bush Administration to go slowly on arms control, because, indeed, wrong moves can be made in the name of reducing arms.
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From page 15... ...
Contrary to its public image, START will neither cut the total number of nuclear strategic delivery vehicles in half nor win it reduce the number of nuclear weapons of intercontinental range by that amount. The START draft treaty, as it stood by the end of last year, fans significantly short of that goal.
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From page 16... ...
USSR SALT START SALT START Counting Counting Counting Counting Type Rules Rules Rules Rules START Proposed Total warheads 14,637 99789al 11,694 lO,S95a/ 5 oooc 1 0,585b 1 0,4556 Heavy bombers 5,608 1~784a/ 1,620 805a/ l,loob 2,580b 665b BM total 9,029 8,005 10,074 9,790 4,900 ICBM 2,373 2,373 6,412 6,4i2 3,000 3,300a SLBM 6,656 5,632 3,662 3,378 3,3005 SLCM 400 Nuclearb 600 Nonnuclearb NOTE: Numbers of warheads are agreed upon values unless otherwise noted.
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From page 17... ...
To summarize, we have agreed on two warhead totals, with some disagreement on counting rules and on sublimits. In addition to that, however, there are three major disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union: the matters of mobile strategic ballistic missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
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From page 18... ...
Stability is enhanced if the survivability of the strategic forces of both nations is improved. So long as the Soviet Union continues to deploy a much smaller fraction of its strategic forces in submarines and strategic bombers, overall strategic stability would be enhanced if landbased mobile missiles were permitted.
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From page 19... ...
Moreover, I consider He evolution of nuclear SLCMs to be highly undesirable, in the long run, both to the interests of arms control and to the security interests of the United States. The Soviet Union has a much smaller concentration of important military and industrial facilities near its coast.
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From page 20... ...
Purely arguing as a technician, one can maintain that linkage between constraints on ballistic missile defense and Me strictures of START is not required. One can argue and, for instance, Academician Sakharov has done so on earlier occasions—that the promise of SDI activities beyond the strictures of the ABM Treaty is so limited and the reductions proposed for START so moderate that for the next decade any feasible ABM deployment would make little difference strategically.
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From page 21... ...
Financial savings may or may not accrue, depending on separate unilateral decisions on modernization of the strategic forces. But this remark does in no way make START less important.
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From page 22... ...
It is argued that the credibility of having the nuclear forces controlled by the United States come to the aid of Europe in case of a threatened defeat of NATO forces would be undermined by START. Critics claim that the impact of the INF Treaty and the rhetoric on the total elimination of nuclear weapons at Reykjavik have already diminished European faith in the United States' nuclear commitment.
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From page 23... ...
Thus, making a settlement of the European balance a precondition to START would doom this next step in strategic nuclear force reduction for a long time. There is no technical or military necessity for holding rapid action on nuclear strategic force reductions hostage to a settlement of the conventional balance in Europe.
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From page 24... ...
The INF Treaty has broken new ground in reaching agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, initiating highly intrusive verification measures by which compliance with the INF Treaty can be policed. We will hear details of the initial success of implementing the INF agreement in this respect from General Lajoie.
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From page 25... ...
To summarize, with mutual goodwill between the Bush Administration and the Soviets, a clear path exists to negotiating the remaining obstacles to START, and I see no validity to any of the go-sIow arguments counseling against speedy conclusion of that treaty. It is clear that START is not the end of the road as far as desirable strategic arms reductions are concerned.
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From page 26... ...
Although there is increasing doubt concerning the credibility of the United States' nuclear umbrella, it is clear that a conservative interpretation of U.S. national security interests would not permit shifting from the current extended deterrence doctrine until threats to European security from Soviet attack by conventional forces are no longer considered feasible.
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From page 27... ...
The afternoon session of this seminar will be devoted to those forthcoming arms control moves, other than those dedicated to the central problem of controlling strategic arms, which I have outlined. In rum, should those additional arms control moves prove fruitful, then modifying current strategic doctrine to reduce the role of strategic nuclear weapons solely to deter a nuclear attack, not nuclear and conventional attacks, should become feasible.
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