Challenges for the 1990s for Arms Control and International Security (1989) / Chapter Skim
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7. Vitality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime
7. Vitality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime
Pages 64-71
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From page 64... ...
I The United States has opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1945. Over the years, however, the priority given to this policy has varied when it came into conflict with over U.~.
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From page 65... ...
It is a danger, since formal proclamation of their nuclear capabilities could initiate a domino effect of declarations by other closet nuclear weapons states at this time, breaking down the current international norm against nuclear proliferation. Opportunity exists, since the United States, working with most of the rest of the world community that has accepted the present nonproliferation norm, has increased leverage in preventing this confrontation.
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From page 66... ...
The Latin America Nuclear Free Zone, created by the Treaty of TIateloico, which was signed in 1968 though not fully in force, has served to help exclude nuclear weapons from Latin America. A protocol to this treaty, which has been signed by alB five nuclear powers—the only such document in existence—commits them to respect the nonnuclear nature of the zone.
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From page 67... ...
Fours, and often overlooked, is the fact that over the years the United States has exerted quiet pressure, which has often been quite effective, on various states not to pursue the nuclear weapons option. The most successful examples were South Korea and Taiwan, which in the 1970s were persuaded to abandon some nascent nuclear weapons ambitions.
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From page 68... ...
I would observe that both countries officially insist that they do not possess nuclear weapons. Both countries also clearly have made a major effort to develop nuclear weapons programs and have engaged in extensive programs of espionage over We years to accomplish this objective.
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From page 69... ...
But this is still a very significant capability. I also do not believe the evidence supports the claims that the Israelis are stockpiling untested thermonuclear weapons, in the sense that we would define a thermonuclear weapon.
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From page 70... ...
Third, the United States should intensify work with other suppliers, including the Soviet Union and China, to tighten export controls on sensitive nuclear equipment and on delivery systems, such as long-range ballistic missiles, which make absolutely no sense except with nuclear warheads. Fourth, and I would pursue the suggestion made by Roaid Sagdeev, the United States and the Soviet Union should seek to expand the nonproliferation regime by negotiating a multinational comprehensive test ban and/ or a cutoff of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons.
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From page 71... ...
But above all, in a practical sense, we must be certain that our actions, particularly in connection with the early completion of the START treaty, ensure that the NPI is extended in 1995, either indefinitely or for a prolonged period, so that the framework on which the nonproliferation regime is based win survive.
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