Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
7 Elements of a New Response: U.S. Policy
7 Elements of a New Response: U.S. Policy
Pages 106-117
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 106... ...
and the People's Republic of China to militarily relevant technology was a natural, politically accepted extension of the postWorld War II Western security arrangement. Second, the feasibility of this policy depended substantially on the fact that the most advanced technologies were being developed almost exclusively by the Western allies (principally the United States)
|
From page 107... ...
national security interests, which included an assessment of residual Soviet military capability and of new and growing dangers in other parts of the world, demonstrates the need to reexamine and reshape export control policy. In reality, although all of the CoCom countries are interested in eliminating restrictions on trade in dual use items with Eastern Europe and, to the extent that it is prudent, with the Soviet Union, no country in the Western alliance has expressed any willingness to see the capabilities of the Soviet military particularly its strategic nuclear forces-enhanced through unrestricted exports.
|
From page 108... ...
To encourage this evolution and to ensure that institutional momentum does not maintain the use of export controls longer than prudence requires, the United States should work with the other CoCom countries to develop an explicit multilateral policy statement that outlines the circumstances under which dual use export controls can and should be terminated.
|
From page 109... ...
national emergency or when Examples: embargoes of imposed pursuant to United Vietnam, Libya, Iraq under Nations or other broad the Trading with the Enemy international effort Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act Selective export Certain items barred for When supplier countries agree prohibitions export to target country. on items for denial and Examples: no-license policies cooperate on restrictions for the Soviet bloc under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
|
From page 110... ...
Example: Export Administration Regulations §787. 1 3 Although the panel did not consider itself qualified to specify the circumstances in detail, some candidate criteria for determining when export controls should be terminated follow: · Effective and verifiable conventional arms control agreements in Europe beyond those already agreed to in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
|
From page 111... ...
Under a new export control policy based in large part on verifiable end use, moreover, measures such as government assurances of civilian end use and restricted resale build confidence between trading parties and are useful tools in managing the security risk inherent in the export of advanced goods. Predicating the sale of advanced, and previously embargoed, end products on guarantees against military end use and unauthorized resale allows for economic progress while limiting military risk.
|
From page 112... ...
NEW TARGETS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS The reduction of East-West tensions and increased trade opportunities are political and economic goals held not only by the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by the other members of NATO, Japan, Australia, and the East European countries. Moreover, these countries also share mutual security concerns that can be translated into mutually beneficial collective security measures.
|
From page 113... ...
· Agreement by participating countries on accountability to each other and on sanctions for violations. Despite the daunting problems inherent in the conditions listed above, multilateral consensus on the goals, targets, and mechanisms of export controls is essential and should be a critical foreign policy priority for the United States.
|
From page 114... ...
LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES AND USES OF EXPORT CONTROLS Serious discontinuities exist between export controls on the commercial sale of munitions under the Arms Export Control Act and the implementing International Traffic in Arms Regulations on the one hand and the transfer of munitions on ~ government-to-government basis on the other. The problem of how to impose reasonable limitations on foreign military sales extends well beyond the United States, and it is being exacerbated by the overcapacity of arms production worldwide.
|
From page 115... ...
In contrast to national security controls, which have been applied relatively consistently over an extended period of time to a consistent group of countries, foreign policy controls may be applied in almost any situation in which another country is seen to be conducting its affairs in a manner not to the satisfaction of the United States. Moreover, because the need for the application of foreign policy controls cannot be anticipated by industry, they can affect virtually any transaction in international trade.
|
From page 116... ...
Given the close relationship between national security export controls and controls based on foreign policy considerations, the panel makes the following recommendations: a * Foreign policy controls maintained to prevent the proliferation of missile delivery systems or nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons should be reclassified under the rubric of "proliferation controls" to differentiate them appropriately as an element of U.S.
|
From page 117... ...
The criteria for the imposition and retention of national security and foreign policy controls set forth in Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, should be reviewed and made more explicit. To the extent that the President chooses to invoke export control measures through the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the criteria for its application should be reviewed and modified so that they are similar to the conditions that Congress has specified in Sections 5 and 6 of the EAA with respect to controls imposed for national security or foreign policy reasons.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.