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8 Elements of a New Response: Multilateral Control Regimes
Pages 118-137

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From page 118...
... the objectives and operation of traditional, multilateral security export controls and (2) emerging multilateral security export control regimes.
From page 119...
... License review would still be necessary, but once standard and uniform end-use conditions for the approval of the remaining Industrial List items were established, the focus of the control program would be to ascertain compliance with those conditions. Although CoCom partners have always been opposed to extraterritorial application of export controls, the end-use verification practices envisioned in this proposal would not be universally applied to all transactions and need not be adversarial.
From page 120...
... To this end, CoCom should take the following steps: * Approve the sale of Industrial List items to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for civilian end uses when acceptable safeguards can be demonstrated to CoCom.
From page 121...
... The EC Commission has passed two resolutions related to collective export controlsone banning EC export of chemical weapons precursors and one restricting trade with South Africa. Neither of these resolutions signals EC intentions to displace individual EC member's roles in CoCom; in fact, they may presage increased EC attention to proliferation controls rather than East-West controls.
From page 122...
... Third Country Cooperation Recognizing that CoCom controls could not be effective if comparable goods were available from third countries, the United States urged its CoCom partners to undertake a "Third Country Initiative," now called Third Country Cooperation (TCC) , with a number of European neutrals and newly industrializing countries (NICs)
From page 123...
... But third countries in Asia have taken very few concrete steps to establish export control programs. The notable exception is Hong Kong, which, while it remains a Crown colony, administers an extensive export control program with the United Kingdom.
From page 125...
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From page 126...
... Seek multilateral agreement to control the reexport of controlled goods out of noncooperating third countries. Offer extension of the license-free system of trade as a CoCom wide benefit to cooperating countries that have operational export control systems.
From page 127...
... on licensing decisions for controlled goods above the general exception level is inconsistent with the concept of uniform treatment among all members and the limitation of controls to critical items. In short, national discretion translates into unilateral export controls.
From page 128...
... PROLIFERATION CONTROLS: THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY The review of evolving U.S. national security interests in Chapter 5 made clear the large and growing international security problems posed by the militarization of a number of regions and the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction in those regions.
From page 129...
... 3. The three proliferation control regimes do not cover all the proliferation issues of greatest security concern.
From page 130...
... Perhaps the most important distinction between East-West and proliferation controls, however, is that the United States is not in a position to exercise the same level of influence over the suppliers of goods related to nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation. Indeed, some of the potential suppliers of these weapons of mass destruction also are the targets of current control regimes.
From page 131...
... In principle, it is desirable to integrate the existing international export control regimes to manage nuclear proliferation, the proliferation of missile technologies, and the proliferation of chemical weapons. The resulting single, integrated framework also could address the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and related systems.
From page 132...
... Such analysis should be an important factor in the implementation of proliferation controls. Whatever mix of policy tools is adopted to manage proliferation risks, and whatever role export controls play within that mix, one lesson from the history of East-West controls is very clear.
From page 133...
... Seek active, specific, and operational coordination on proliferation controls among the major players, including at least the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Japan, and China. As part of a broader strategy of managing proliferation risks, seek to strengthen and coordinate existing proliferation control regimes with the long-term goal of eventual consolidation.
From page 134...
... It is also important to step up discussions with other Zangger Committee members to control the export of critical dual use items. Missile Export Controls Although the Missile Technology Control Regime has had some success, several major impediments to real effectiveness remain.
From page 135...
... Chemical Export Controls The Australia Group has been operating as an interim mechanism in anticipation of completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
From page 136...
... Several problems are associated with controlling the export of chemical weapons precursors. For example, the fungibility of chemicals and the ease with which civilian manufacturing plants can be converted to chemical weapons plants limit the effectiveness of export controls.
From page 137...
... In negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, explicitly con sider collective export control responses (sanctions) to nonsigna tories that develop or possess chemical weapons.


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