Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) / Chapter Skim
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12 Summary of Recommendations of the Panel
12 Summary of Recommendations of the Panel
Pages 181-198
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From page 181... ...
Ensure that export controls do not impede the permanent conversion (or closure) of Soviet military industrial facilities to the manufacture of products for civilian consumption.
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From page 182... ...
For this reason, the panel recommends the following: The intelligence community should expand its efforts to develop reliable assessments of changes in the nature and pattern of current Soviet technology acquisition efforts and current patterns of Soviet utilization of the technology it acquires and should make this information available to the relevant agencies of the U.S. government and to the countries participating in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom)
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From page 183... ...
Foreign Policy Controls Given the close relationship between national security controls and controls based on foreign policy considerations, the panel makes the following recommendations: Foreign policy controls maintained to prevent the proliferation of mis sile delivery systems or nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons should be reclassified under the rubric of "proliferation controls" to differ entiate them appropriately as an element of U.S. national security policy.
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From page 184... ...
The "sunset" provision for foreign policy controls should be enforced in order to ensure that, as in the case of more traditional national security controls, restrictions do not remain in force long after the political, military, or technological rationale for their enactment has ceased to exist. Proliferation Controls: The Need for Collective Security Export controls are not universally effective in slowing proliferation, but if multilaterally applied and enforced, they can help to constrain the proliferation of weapons and the technical capability to produce them.
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From page 185... ...
As part of a broader strategy of managing proliferation risks, seek to strengthen and coordinate existing proliferation control regimes with the long-term goal of eventual consolidation. Prepare both a U.S.
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From page 186... ...
by private inspection companies certified by CoCom. BORDERLESS TRADE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY In light of the changing operational environment for export controls within the European Community, the United States should press CoCom to take the following steps: Adopt a license-free system of trade in CoCom, to be implemented consistently and in accord with "common standard" compliance in order to ensure effective controls and to avoid disadvantaging those countries that make the effort to comply.
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From page 187... ...
The executive branch must formulate an efficient and coherent policy development framework and provide an appropriate administrative structure to ensure that policy is properly executed, particularly because the absence of such guidance in the past has led to deficiencies in the policy process. To accomplish this, the executive branch should undertake the following: Providle Explicit Presidential Leadership Since the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent legislation give the President authority to provide detailed instructions on key components of export control policy, a national security directive (NSD)
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From page 188... ...
The guidance regarding process methodology should cover at least the following areas: · Establish interagency methodology for list construction, including criteria or standards for determining military criticality, economic costs, and other factors. Specify agencies responsible for assessing the national security im portance of controlled items and clarify priorities (or burden of proof)
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From page 189... ...
To ensure objective evaluation of disputes reaching this level and the immediate attention of the National Security Council as necessary, the EC/PCC should be chaired by the national security advisor or the deputy advisor. National security export control interagency groups Interagency working groups should be established as necessary to consider the appropriateness of export controls as a means of addressing overall U.S.
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From page 190... ...
To this end, the U.S. government should take the following steps: Consolidate Administration in a Single Agency In order to achieve a more rational and effective export control process, the U
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From page 191... ...
The goal of the reorganization is to consolidate administration of controls based on an internally consistent set of regulations while keeping broad policymaking and final dispute resolution in the hands of the President and the responsible cabinet secretaries in the National Security Council and the Export Control Policy Coordinating Com mittee.
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From page 192... ...
· A rank ordering and weighting of items in terms of the national security risks posed by an adversary's acquisition and use of each item, with careful consideration given to the controllability of items. An approximate rank ordering and weighting of items in terms of the economic and foreign policy costs of restricting trade in each .
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From page 193... ...
. Questions the GAO study should address include the following: What are the requirements for enforcement in the various export control laws and how do they differ for the Export Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act, Atomic Energy Act, Nuclear NonProliferation Act, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act?
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From page 194... ...
With regard to administration of enforcement, uniformity of administrative procedures should be part of the single administrative agency recommended by the panel. The existing Commerce Department enforcement procedures appear to be appropriate.
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From page 195... ...
that are sufficient to provide technical staffing by the Institute for Defense Analyses and to pay the travel expenses of industry members. · The activities of the technical advisory committees and working groups should be coordinated through the Institute for Defense Analyses to ensure the committees an adequate level of technical support.
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