Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) / Chapter Skim
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4 Evidence on the Acquisition of Sensitive Western Technology
4 Evidence on the Acquisition of Sensitive Western Technology
Pages 26-38
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From page 26... ...
, and it provided only a limited basis on which to describe how patterns of behavior might now be changing, particularly among those countries that have turned * The intelligence community is a collective term denoting the director of central intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence elements of the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and the Treasury, and the counterintelligence element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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From page 27... ...
SOVIET AND WTO TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION EFFORTS PRIOR TO 1990 Since 1981, the collection and analysis of intelligence pertaining specifically to decision making on national security export controls has been the responsibility of the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC)
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From page 28... ...
, the Soviet acquisition program satisfied more than 3,500 specific collection requirements for hardware and documents for the 12 Soviet industrial ministries. Of the items acquired in the West, the Soviets estimated that approximately 70 percent were subject to national security export controls.
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Neither the intelligence community nor export licensing officials have precise information on the frequency of illegal sales in recent years, but it appeared that the advent of improved export licensing practices (including increased penalties) in the major CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)
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From page 30... ...
bilateral agreements, to convince third countries to cooperate with CoCom export control policies by preventing reexports of CoCom-controlled items. However, evidence reviewed by the panel, which was corroborated by information collected during the panel's fact-finding missions in Asia and Europe,*
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From page 31... ...
Because so much of the modern technology and equipment needed by the Soviets is now dual use, by 1990 diversions and legal sales in third countries had become the predominant acquisition methods and accounted for the majority of successful acquisition efforts. The role of diversions and legal sales is likely to increase, relative to espionage, in the future.
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From page 32... ...
loss of human intelligence sources as a result of the dissolution of the formerly Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, some of the disruption in human intelligence channels, to the extent that any has occurred, may be offset by the increase in and ready availability of information provided by emigres from the Soviet Union and the East European countries.
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From page 33... ...
It is also likely that the opening of the Soviet economy to Western investment may facilitate more transfers of technology to Soviet military industries. In general, however, the Soviet effort to acquire Western technology has not succeeded in reducing the West's technology lead, according to Defense Department and intelligence community estimates.
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From page 34... ...
In modernizing either strategic or conventional forces, however, the Soviet Union will for the foreseeable future continue to remain dependent on certain Western technology that it cannot produce itself or could produce only at inordinate expense.
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ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN Within recent years, the intelligence community has begun to devote in creased attention to monitoring and analyzing the acquisition of proliferation technologies namely, advanced conventional weapons, missile delivery systems, and technologies associated with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by countries considered to represent potential national security threats to the United States and to international security. In some respects, the development of such data is even more difficult than in the case of Soviet acquisition efforts due to (a)
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THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE EXPORT CONTROL POLICY PROCESS Intelligence has played an important continuing role in the export control policy process since the early days of the effort after World War II, and particularly since the 1981 founding of the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee. In this regard, one of the most valuable contributions of the intelligence community has been to develop "red side" methodological approaches that have made it possible to examine Soviet technology acquisition efforts from the standpoint of Soviet, rather than Western, military needs and capabilities.
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From page 37... ...
Today, however, because the Soviets may seek to acquire technology for commercial as well as military reasons, there is a need for more thorough assessments of Soviet requirements so that the West can differentiate between various motivations for technology acquisition and can apply more appropriate policy responses. · The demands on the intelligence community in the "new era" regarding acquisition of Western technology by traditional and new potential adversaries have increased and are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
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From page 38... ...
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update (intelligence community white paper)
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