Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix G
Appendix G
Pages 308-320
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From page 308... ...
Moreover, the three major dimensions of the policy national security, foreign policy, and (the much less important) short supply controls are distinguished only in those cases in which their purposes or implementation has diverged, or in some cases conflicted.
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From page 309... ...
export control policy began for the first time to assume significant peacetime dimensions. The war had created major worldwide shortages of many critical matenals, including chemicals, raw materials, and food.
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From page 310... ...
national security.2 The act did not specify the particular national security concerns it was intended to address, but the accompanying Senate report stated that: Equally important is the close scrutiny which is thus made possible over shipments of industrial materials which may have direct or indirect military significance. In the light of growing concern of democratic nations over the policies of the Eastern European nations, it is quite clear that our national security requires the exercise of such controls to complement export controls over arms, ammunition, and implements of war.3 Two important principles were embodied in the 1949 legislation and have survived virtually intact through multiple revisions.
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From page 311... ...
That is, the United States controlled many items unilaterally, particularly those technologies in which it held a virtual monopoly. Although Congress continued to hope that export restrictions could be removed eventually, increasing tensions within Europe-including, for example, the Berlin blockade and the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, left little doubt as to the need to renew the Export Control Act in 1951.4 At about the same time, the Congress enacted the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, also known as the Battle Act.5 The Battle Act allowed the United States to embargo shipments of arms, ammunition, implements of war, nuclear materials, and other strategic items to nations that posed a potential threat to U.S.
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From page 312... ...
Thus, the NATO decision in the early l950s to rely on a strategy emphasizing technology lead also inevitably locked the alliance into a parallel policy of technology denial, a situation that has continued to the present day. The Export Control Act subsequently was extended several times, in most cases without amendment, through 1965.*
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From page 313... ...
to shorten the license processing time by setting stricter time limits for the Department of Commerce's review of license applications. Also during this period, in 1976, Congress revised the Arms Export Control Act, which regulates the import and export of defense articles (i.e., arms, ammunition, and implements of war)
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From page 314... ...
foreign policy objectives and reaffirmed continuing concerns about the short supply of certain strategic materials. In the act Congress also explicitly endorsed and incorporated the recommendations of the 1976 Bucy task force report to the Defense Science Board,8 which called for a shift in the focus of controls away from end products to arrays of know-how, keystone equipment, and turnkey manufacturing facilities.
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From page 315... ...
In fact, it was subsequently revealed that much of the information contained in the white papers was based on the so-called "Farewell affair," which was the code name for a Soviet double agent who provided the French intelligence service with the actual Soviet shopping list for Western technology from 1979-1981, including targets and ruble allocations for each targeted item. On this basis, the administration contended that the West had indeed been "selling the Russians the rope" and that, until such time as there were definite and
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From page 316... ...
Accordingly, a variety of actions were taken, mostly by executive order,~° to expand the range of technologies and end products subject to control, to bolster the role of the Department of Defense in export licensing decisions and to restrict the flow of technical information and, in some cases, people. In addition to its tightening and increased use of foreign policy and national security controls, the administration also moved to shore up and reinvigorate CoCom, which had become semi-moribund during the detente era, by pouring substantial human and financial resources into modernizing CoCom headquarters in Paris and by using its political resources to pressure the other CoCom countries into abiding more closely by the Industrial List of controlled items.
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From page 317... ...
Second, it reinforced and amplified the long-standing opposition in most other CoCom countries to extraterritoriality in general, with the effect that no other country has subsequently agreed to undertake intrusive end-use checks on dual use technology exports or to impose reexport authorization requirements. Finally, it "poisoned the well" (so to speak)
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From page 318... ...
The Toshiba-Kongsberg affair, so named as a result of the illegal sale of a nine-axis, numerically controlled machine tool to the Soviet Union by the Toshiba Heavy Machine Corporation of Japan and the Kongsberg Vaapenfabr~kk Corporation of Norway, neutralized the political pressure for meaningful change in the policy, while playing directly to the rising antiJapanese sentiment in the Congress and among the general public. At its nadir, the drama was played out on the television nightly news, with members *
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From page 319... ...
But the United States has continued to drive the vehicle of export control policy while "looking in the rearview mirror." That is to say, the U.S. approach namely, agreeing to incremental change in national and multilateral export control policy only under severe pressure from its allies is based on a set of assumptions about American economic, technological, and political influence that, while certainly true for the first two decades or so following the Second World War and perhaps even as late as the mid-1970s simply no longer reflects prevailing global circumstances.
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From page 320... ...
National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (Report of the Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy) (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987)
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