Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
5 The Changing Calculus of U.S. National Security Interests
5 The Changing Calculus of U.S. National Security Interests
Pages 39-60
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 39... ...
national security export control regime, and indeed the entire multilateral control framework embodied in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) , is an artifact of the Cold War, which has now ended.
|
From page 40... ...
as manufacturers have moved their operations off shore, or in some cases have left the sector entirely. A second result has been a blurring of the specific national identity of technologies and multinational firms, thereby potentially raising additional complications from the standpoint of nationally based export controls.
|
From page 41... ...
Japan's high rate of industrial innovation, emphasis on process technologies to nurture manufacturing, and a tax system and import control regime that encourage long-term growth over short-term profits have brought it rapidly to the status of an economic superpower. The May 1989 report of the Department of Defense on critical military technologies stated that the United States had fallen behind Japan in key areas of semiconductors and microelectronics.3 Indeed, the involvement of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the SEMATECH semiconductor consortium reflects, in part, concerns about U.S.
|
From page 42... ...
producers of manufactured goods. The United States is becoming nearly as dependent on exports as its major competitors, and therefore, its economy is becoming more vulnerable to the negative effects of export controls.
|
From page 43... ...
, if implemented in good faith, mean that forward-based Soviet forces in Europe will be reduced to conditions of rough parity with those of the NATO countries. Moreover, the political context within the Soviet Union surrounding these residual strengths no longer bears any resemblance to the earlier circumstances of the Cold War, and trends under way promise further reductions in the external power and influence of the Soviet military, although it is likely to remain a substantial factor for some time to come.
|
From page 44... ...
From the arms control agreements it has concluded (and others that are under negotiation) , to the cooperation it has provided in dealing with regional conflicts, the Soviet leadership appears to be approaching the core issues of the historic East-West conflict in a fundamentally different and more constructive fashion.
|
From page 45... ...
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the movement within countries of certain dual use items, such as microcircuits, the Soviet need for Western help in converting some military plants to civilian production a trend the West should encourage may well provide an opening to test various mechanisms for end use assurance. Preventing war, primarily by political means, is now said to constitute the central objective of Soviet security policy.9 This new formulation both requires and enables a substantial reduction, disengagement, and restructuring of Soviet military forces.
|
From page 46... ...
Soviet Defense Doctrine and Military Force Deployment A separate concern from the broad societal changes sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the philosophy and doctrine that underpin Soviet military planning and their impact on current Soviet force deployments.
|
From page 47... ...
Because the WTO is no longer functioning as an effective military alliance, current analyses compare NATO forces with Soviet forces in Europe, excluding the East European countries that are still nominal members of the WTO. At the same time, although current Soviet capabilities remain great, the rapid pace of change in the Soviet politico-military posture has led to substantial and ongoing alterations in force deployments.
|
From page 48... ...
Since these basic deterrent and extended deterrent capabilities are not likely to be decisively affected by technical improvements or changes in deployment levels, and since trade in directly associated technology is not contemplated at any rate, the strategic balance has relatively minor immediate significance for export control policy. On the basis of the announced reductions in Soviet and East European military forces assuming that they are completed in good faith the apparent dissolution of the WTO as a military alliance, and the emerging, defensive Soviet military posture in Asia, the panel accepts the conclusion
|
From page 49... ...
Even before the recent dramatic changes, the East European and Soviet countries were becoming increasingly vulnerable to the pressures of the international economy, and recent developments will make them even more susceptible to external economic forces. Most of the East European countries are attempting to transform themselves into market economies.
|
From page 50... ...
integration with the West and a greater Western stake in the success of the economic and political reforms now under way in these countries. At the same time, debate will continue over where to draw the line in imposing East-West export controls.
|
From page 51... ...
But it is also in the interest of the United States to nurture a deeper and more cooperative relationship with the current Chinese regime, including further efforts to convince China to participate more fully in the major nonproliferation regimes. Ultimately, establishing a certain degree of symmetry between the export control regime for China and the new rules that are under de
|
From page 52... ...
and CoCom export controls for the PRC is likely to be governed by the stated foreign and domestic policies and actual practice of the Chinese government. Summary Findings and Recommendations on the Traditional Threat The threat presented by Soviet military capabilities has fundamentally changed.
|
From page 53... ...
allies on the coordination of further liberalization of export controls on trade with the Soviet Union. Move progressively toward the removal of export controls on dual use items to the Soviet Union and the East European countries for commercial end uses that can be verified.
|
From page 54... ...
danger that terrorists could acquire weapons of mass destruction or smart/advanced weapons from countries that do not have well-developed mechanisms to protect their stockpiles of such weapons, or whose national politics supports the goals and objectives of terrorist violence, or that are seeking simple monetary gain. Regional Instability The end of the Cold War has led to a greater focus on regional conflicts potentially threatening to U.S.
|
From page 55... ...
With the substantial improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and with the decrease of military and financial support for certain Arab states by the Soviet Union and the East European countries this particular specter has diminished considerably, although conflict in that region remains a major security concern. The fruits of this change were evident in the close consultation and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the early part of the Persian Gulf crisis.
|
From page 56... ...
Proliferation of Nuclear, Missile, and Chemical Technologies During the past 15 years, technologies useful in the construction of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons, and missile delivery systems have been diffused to a number of additional nations. There is substantial evidence that India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa may now or soon possess nuclear weapons capabilities.
|
From page 57... ...
The widespread use of chemical weapons in that conflict highlighted the growing global diffusion of these weapons. Allegations that Libya used chemical weapons in Chad and the revelation of involvement by West German companies in Libya's Rabta chemical facility also focused worldwide attention on the problem.23 More than a dozen nations besides the United States and the Soviet Union are thought to have access to chemical weapons.
|
From page 58... ...
Summary Findings and Recommendations on the Proliferation Threat During the past two decades there has been a continued proliferation of nuclear weapon related technology and missile delivery systems around the world, as well as a relatively rapid diffusion of capability to produce chemical weapons. Taken together, the growing capacity of many nations to develop and employ weapons of mass destruction poses new security threats to U.S.
|
From page 59... ...
as possible. Some of these regimes are likely to rely, at least in part, on properly fashioned export controls.
|
From page 60... ...
, p. 62; Soviet Military Power, 1990, p.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.