Improving Risk Communication Working Papers (1989) / Chapter Skim
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A Case Study of the 1980/82 Medfly Controversy in California
A Case Study of the 1980/82 Medfly Controversy in California
Pages 1-28
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From page 1... ...
Although it is not unusual to cast complex public policy problems in teens of multiple risks, what makes the 1980/82 California medfly controversy of particular interest is its detailed documentation. This case study draws on the recollections of a number of the key participants in the controversy, recorded at a seminar series sponsored by the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley.
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From page 2... ...
A ground program was initiated eventually consisting of fruit-tree stripping, localized application of pesticides, and the release of sterile medflies (known as the Sterile Insect Technique [SIT] whereby young male medflies are sterilized through irradiation, released as adults, and mate with wild female flies to produce nonviable eggs)
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From page 3... ...
The ground program appeared to be effective throughout the winter, but June 1981 saw a fresh outbreak of medflies in Santa Clara County. On July 8, Governor Brown made the politically controversial announcement that the ground spraying program would be greatly expanded in order to deal with the re-emergence.
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From page 4... ...
In sum, multiple risk perceptions were associated with both the medfly infestation and its eradication efforts. Such risks, in turn, were realized and communicated in several specific, ultimately overlapping, ways -- namely, scientific and technical uncertainties of medfly monitoring, organizational and group conflict, politics, the role of the media in the controversy, and the public's reaction to the various alternatives -- which are discussed below.
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From page 5... ...
In the opinion of one informed source, the local officials who had not treated the original medfly finds as a matter of priority "didn't know the true meaning" of the flies they had trapped6. So too for CDFA's initially slow response to these finds, at least according to its principal staff entomologist: "We didn't realize the significance of those two flies combined with that low a top density in Santa Clara...so we didn't take the action we should have"7.
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From page 6... ...
In short, the outbreak criteria, computer model, and protocol allowed a number of the key participants who were not averse to spraying with malathion to take action as if they knew whether or not the empirical meets of situation warranted that spraying. Those who were averse to aerial spraying and in favor of the ground program had a much more difficult time in reducing informational uncertainties and assessing medfly-related risks.
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From page 7... ...
The Project's sampling techniques provided trap information in a form that was of more use to the supporters of aerial spraying that it was to the supporters of SIT. Bait spray programs, such as that of aerially spraying of malathion, rely on discrete data that are demonstrably measurable, while sterile fly release programs are based on continuously variable data, having probability limits that are much less well-defined.
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From page 8... ...
Supporters of aerial spraying pointed out that these methodological concerns did not disprove the DHS report's basic conclusion about the relatively low risk associated with malathion spraying (added to which, the supporters of the ground program seem not to have undertaken their own risk assessment of the chemicals used in that program, some of which -- particularly diazinon and fenthion -- were potentially far more hazardous that malathion)
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From page 9... ...
·nter~epartmer~tai Conflict. Departmental battles over turf colored the perceptions of risk associated with the two principal eradication alternatives of ground or aerial spraying.
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From page 10... ...
One example from many illustrates how the interorganizational tension arising out of the Project's co-management influenced the way various parties perceived the risk associated with the various eradication proposals. Once aerial spraying began in July 1981 USDA took steps to prevent any recurrence of disputes such as that arising when members of the TAC had disagreed with USDA over the utility of the proposed 1980/81 winter spraying with malathion.
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From page 11... ...
The impact of such organizational differences on risk perceptions is well-illustrated in the dispute that arose over the aborted USDA proposal for winter spraying of malathion, where a well-known ARS entomologist on the TAC questioned the efficacy of this APHIS-originated proposal without first proving that the SlT-based ground program had been ineffective29. (APHIS officials were to later complain that had winter spraying taken place, the mid-1981 outbreak could have been avoided as well as many of the costs associated with it.)
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From page 12... ...
For example, while the public advisory process frequently involves some compromises on the part of science experts, what was particularly troublesome to several of the scientists on the TAC was the specific committee procedure requiring them to vote and come to some kind of consensus on matters of science, principle and uncertainty, which they felt were by their very nature not votable. According to one of the TAC entomologists, such a procedural requirement meci to make mealy detection and e~icadon more certain than it was or could be: ...voting unplies two things that are counterproductive to management and public understanding.
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From page 13... ...
Similarly, environmentalists had political and organizational imperatives that complicated their support of the ground program and opposition to aerial spraying with malathion. For example, members of the main environmental action group involved in the controversy disagreed over whether or not to continue their support of the ground program after the mid-1981 medfly outbreak.
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From page 14... ...
At that time supported dropping our opposition to aerial sprays; however, the organization decided to continue to oppose aerial treatments, and we encouraged the Governor to go with the intensified ground program, even after the threatened federal quarantine which would have entailed substantial use of EDB [ethylene dibrom~de, the much more toxic and potent carcinogen used to fumigate potentially infested fruit for export] ....Of course, [the many other members who opposed aerial spraying]
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From page 15... ...
think Jetty, above ah people, wanted eradication as soon as possible, because this was to his political gain. He knew he had an albatross around his neck if the ground program didn't work, but he didn't want aerial spraying because he felt that 90% of the people in the Santa Clara area would react negatively to helicopters flying over them....l Wink JetTy knew that he was going to have to order the helicopters into the air, but he wanted to cover himself and make it look like President Reagan forced hun because they were going to quarantine the whole state.45 By this time, Brown had not endeared himself to the Reagan administration.
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From page 16... ...
Picket lines and sabotage of spraying operations were headline news, as well as intentional transportation of flies to uninfested areas. Coupled way this view of public response, we were reading how the mecIfly was out-smarting the entomologists and other scientists charged with ridding our state of the sneaky little pest..5U A brief flavor of these highly spiced events can be gotten from the headlines of a regional California newspaper during the two days it gave the most column inches to the 1980/82 medfly infestation: "Mighty Med -- sneaky, persistent medfly juggernaut with a head start," "Motherhood and malathion," "All I can do is trust experts -- and hope," "Resilient Medfly has broken all the rules," and "Human error made it easier"5~.
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From page 17... ...
The decision of Project's state co-manager to allow the media open access to Project staff proved to be one of the decisive reasons why some members of the press were considerably less critical of the Project's first aerial spraying efforts in July 1981 than they could have been. According to the newspaper reporter mentioned earlier, the Medfly Project was in great turmoil on the day before aerial spraying commenced.
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From page 18... ...
What indeed were the public's perceptions of the risks associated with the ground and aerial spraying programs and how did these perceptions influence the public's actual behavior? Two researchers at the University of California, Davis, undertook a telephone survey of 126 randomly selected persons in a town within Santa Clara County that had been subject both to the earlier ground program and the later aerial spraying with malathion.
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From page 19... ...
The two basic alternatives to handling the medfly infestation met with a high degree of acceptance in the community: Of those responding, 86% agreed with the pesticide spraying component of the ground program (only 56% were in agreement with the sterile fly method) , while 81% agreed with the aerial application of pesticides.
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From page 20... ...
This suggests that political ideology operates only indirectly in influencing the perc,e~,tion of environmental risk, perhaps by influencing confidence In experts and perceived benefit... The researchers found that several variables explained variations in the respondents' acceptability of risks associated with the spraying programs.
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From page 21... ...
Nonetheless, both health and environmental risk perceptions contained variance unaccounted for by these other variables and both remained predictive when all other predictors were statistically controlled.61 Last but not least, only a few in the researchers' sample attributed illnesses to the chemical spraying, at least at the time of the surrey. Some 2% and 6% of the respondents said they had become ill from the exposure to chemicals used In the ground and aerial spraying, respectively (the commonly reported symptoms were respiratory difficulties and nausea [25% each of those reporting ill]
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From page 22... ...
Indeed, no one can prove that the expanded ground program would not have worked and that it was the Project's aerial spraying of malathion, and that alone, which led to the medfly's eradication, if indeed eradication was what actually happened. But for all that, the organizational capacity of the federal, state and county agencies to respond to the infestation, often on very short notice, was realized on an impressive scale.
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From page 23... ...
December CDFA agrees to hold off on aerial spraying in order to see if intensified ground program will Mid-December Eradication achieved in LA County. The California State Department of Health Services publishes its report on health risks associates!
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From page 24... ...
Instead, the Governor announces an expanded ground program to handle the new outbreak. 9-10 July US Secretary of Agriculture John Block threatens to quarantine the entire state of California if aerial spraying is not begun immediately.
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From page 25... ...
4. In reality, the eradication alternatives were not stocky either/or in nature: The aerial spraying program had a ground component and the ground program, some contended, should have had a preliminary aerial spraying phase, a point discussed later in die paper.
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From page 26... ...
, The President as Policymaker: limmv Carter and Welfare Reform, Temple University
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From page 27... ...
, "Assessment of the Health Risks from the Proposed Aerial Application of Malathion in Santa Clara County," pp.
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