The Eruption of Nevado Del Ruiz Volcano Colombia, South America, November 13, 1985 (1991) / Chapter Skim
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5 The Warning Period
5 The Warning Period
Pages 58-64
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From page 58... ...
Social scientists have found (Perry, et al., 1981) that individual responses depend on the following factors: what type of message they get—formal or informal, environmental or from humans, specific or vague; what type of confirmation of the message they get; whether or not they view the threat as real; whether or not they think the threatening event is likely to affect them personally; · whether or not they visualize the potential impact of the threatening event as serious enough to warrant a particular personal protective action; · whether or not they can devise a "plan" for how to protect themselves and can execute that plan of action for themselves and their families.
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From page 59... ...
To facilitate this, the warning period for the Nevado del Ruiz November 13 eruption and lahars is described here in terms of the sequence of events related to the decision by responsible officials that an evacuation warning should be given, and the sequence of events in Armero that preceded the arrival of the A brief sketch is provided here of the warning communication system and major decision-making points on November 13, 1985. This is based on information obtained during the team visit to Colombia, as well as some written accounts (Herd, 1986; Lima, 1986~.
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From page 60... ...
in Ibague received information about its occurrence over the CD radio.2 He made contact with the regional director of INGEOMINAS in Ibague, who considered the event to represent a serious threat to the vulnerable populations and recommended that preparations for evacuation be made. The regional CD director also contacted the national CD director in Bogota, who instructed him to alert CD stations in northern Tolima.
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From page 61... ...
There is another account of a river observer above Armero also being unable to make radio contact with the CD office in Armero to report the mudflow. Around 10:30 p.m., approximately the time a lahar destroyed part of Chinchina on the west side of the mountain, the regional CD director overheard various other radio transmissions directed at Armero.
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From page 62... ...
Some interviewers reported that the mayor of Armero was talking with someone over his ham radio and saying that he did not think there was much danger when he was swept away. Also, a Red Cross staff person in Ibague reported that he was discussing the situation by radio with the Red Cross in Armero only to have the conversation abruptly cut off when the mudflow overran the office.
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From page 63... ...
Even with eyewitness information about the mudflow, there apparently was not sufficient understanding of what the eruption meant to the town, with the consequence that responsible officials discounted the extreme nature and imminence of the threat and took insufficient action. Although some public information materials had been distributed, it is not certain that a large proportion of the population had received information about the hazards associated with the volcano.
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From page 64... ...
The study team did not have the objective nor the resources to verify every detail of the warning decision process. Enough accounts exist that this sequence is believed to be, in general, what occurred.
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