Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants (2014) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix H: Nuclear Plant Emergency Procedures and Guidelines
Appendix H: Nuclear Plant Emergency Procedures and Guidelines
Pages 341-348
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From page 341... ...
H.1 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are "plant procedures that direct operators' actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents that have caused plant parameters to exceed reactor protection system set points or engineered safety feature set points, or other established limits" (USNRC, 1982, p.
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From page 342... ...
SAMG are much less specific than the EOPs because they cover a wide range of possibilities of the reactor damage state after significant fuel damage occurs. The phenomenology of severe accidents in light-water reactors is too complex and highly dependent upon the timing of mitigation actions to be fully predictable in advance.
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From page 343... ...
Another important difference is that SAMG anticipate that the engineering staff in the technical support center will be available to guide reactor operators in applying the guidance and evaluating trade-offs that inevitably occur in severe accident management, whereas EOPs enable control room staff to engage in immediate symptom-based responses. Transition points between EOPs and SAMG are defined, but some element of judgment is required to determine whether the transition criteria have been met.
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From page 344... ...
Order in 2002 modifying the operating licenses of all plants. Section B.5.b of that order directed plant licensees to take certain actions: Section B.5.b of the ICM Order requires licensees to adopt mitigation strategies using readily available resources to maintain or restore core cool ing, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities to cope with the loss of large areas of the facility due to large fires and explosions from any cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft impacts.
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From page 345... ...
driven AFW pump Makeup to condenser hotwell Manually depressurize SGs and use portable pump Makeup to CST Makeup to CST Maximize CRD Containment flooding with portable pump Procedure to isolate RWCU Portable sprays Manually open containment vent lines Inject water into drywell Portable sprays NOTE: AFW = auxiliary feed water, BWR = boiling water reactor, CRD = control-rod drive, CST = condensate storage tank, PWR = pressurized water reactor, RCIC = reactor core isolation cooling system, RPV = reactor pressure vessel, RWCU = reactor water cleanup, RWST = reactor water storage tank, SG = steam generator.
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From page 346... ...
The USNRC reviewed FLEX and ordered that each U.S. nuclear plant develop a sitespecific plan to mitigate severe accidents of the type experienced at Fukushima Daiichi using FLEX-type capabilities (USNRC, 2012d)
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From page 347... ...
New material addresses using seawater injection for reactor core cooling, common-cause failures due to external events, cooling spent fuel pools, setting priorities in multiunit events, containment isolation failure, and hydrogen combustion within plant buildings. The intent, as with the original report, is to guide owners' groups in developing new SAMG.
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From page 348... ...
. The descriptions of the equipment and capabilities are plant specific and designed to address the situations encountered at the Fukushima Daichi plant following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami.
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