Skip to main content

Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

5 Identification of R&D for Improving Assessments
Pages 48-50

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 48...
... Additionally, the committee observes that policy makers have shown little interest in using them, and few examples could be found in which they informed decision making. Policy makers and decision makers prefer using multidisciplinary teams to provide technical analysis of proliferation risk coupled with their own knowledge to address specific nonproliferation issues (NRC 2011a, Bedell 2012, Goorevich 2012, Owens-Davis 2012, Stratford 2012)
Read the entire page →
From page 49...
... As was shown with nuclear safety risk assessments in Chapter 4, details can strongly affect the final risk. Because proliferation resistance assessments for potential future fuel cycles have limited information on technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements, and safeguards measures, the cost and time of executing a predefined framework is difficult to justify.
Read the entire page →
From page 50...
... Therefore, the committee recommends that DOE-NE and NNSA jointly decide upon a set of high-level questions comparing the proliferation resistance of proposed future fuel cycles to the current once-through fuel cycles to determine as early as possible in their development whether the former have significantly different intrinsic proliferation resistance (either for the better or for the worse)
Read the entire page →

Key Terms

  • fuel cycles
  • fuel cycle
  • predefined framework
  • proliferation risk
  • predefined frameworks

  • future fuel
  • nuclear fuel
  • existing predefined
  • safeguards measures
  • framework assessments

  • technical design
  • framework methodologies
  • institutional arrangements
  • operational modalities
  • design features

  • current predefined
  • include proliferation
  • future nuclear
  • unknown proliferation
  • determining proliferation

  • current proliferation
  • nuclear proliferation
  • proliferation issues
  • address proliferation
  • particular fuel

  • proposed fuel
  • final proliferation
  • proliferation assessment
  • intrinsic proliferation
  • evaluating proliferation


    • This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
    More information on Chapter Skim is available.