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Future Nuclear Systems Technology
Pages 67-75

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From page 67...
... These are, first, and perhaps most important, toward a means of extending fissile resources through improvement of the efficiency of their use; second, improvements in nuclear safety; third, reduction in the environmental impacts of nuclear electric power generation, particularly water requirements; fourth, improvements in proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle; and, fifth, improvements in economics. And I would add as a sixth, and somewhat more speculative direction, the use of nuclear power for purposes other than the direct generation of electricity.
From page 68...
... for the extension of resources, sticking with the once-through fuel cycle: first, extending burnup; second, reducing tails assay from the present value of 0.25% to 0.05%, beginning in l988; and, third, replacing the present generation of light water reactors with heavy water reactors, TABLE l Alternative Uranium Conservation Strategies for the Once-Through Fuel Cycle Reference case (0) : All-PWR economy 0.2% enrichment tails assay Average discharge burnup= 30,l00 MWD/MT Capacity factor = 75% Reduce Tails Increase Disl00% PenetraUranium Conservation Strategy Assay to 0.05% in l988 charge Burnup to 50,000 MWD/ MT in l990 tion of l%-U Fueled HWR's by 2000 Capacity Factor (%)
From page 69...
... But you see in all of these cases that if the lower value for the uranium resources is the right one, one begins to be in trouble around the year 2000. This table is based on projections of nuclear power that give you a capacity of the order of 350 GWe around the year 2000.
From page 70...
... The base case, zero, would be compatible with the full national commitment case of uranium production, but that is rather deceiving; because you see the uranium supply rather abruptly disappears soon after the year 2000, because part of that national commitment to uranium production is achieved at the cost of depleting reserves very rapidly. Table 2 is an attempt to tie projections of needed nuclear power capacity to the actual scenarios that were used in the CONAES study, and I don't want to take the time to go into detail in these scenarios, except to say that they all represent cases of 3% assumed average economic growth between l975 and 20l0, and the Roman numerals represent a fourfold increase in real prices between l975 and 20l0, with very stringent mandatory conservation measures, in addition.
From page 71...
... With the lowest growth scenario, and optimistic assumptions about uranium supply, nuclear power might be extended well into the twenty-first century and then be gradually phased out in favor of alternative sources, but this could not be confidently anticipated today. Some critics of the CONAES study believed the predictions of electricity growth were low, given the fact that electricity generation is capital-intensive, so that much of the cost is at the front end, and hence less sensitive to rapidly rising fuel costs on a percentage basis.
From page 72...
... possibilities of resource extension by use of various advanced reactor cycles without reprocessing, really important extension into the twentyfirst century of the nuclear option is going to require reprocessing. And if electric power growth continues at any significant rate -- by significant, I mean by more than l% a year -- after the year 2000, it appears that the breeder option is really the only one that is compatible with the resource estimates that I have indicated.
From page 73...
... Certainly there are cheaper and easier routes to nuclear weapons than through diversion of fissionable material from civilian nuclear power. On the other hand, civilian power is a very good "cover" for clandestine weapons activities; a political leader with a nuclear power industry, including fuel recycling, could retain the option of developing nuclear weapons without committing himself in advance to dedicated production facilities -- at least that is the argument.
From page 74...
... No consensus has crystalized on this, and there is a real question as to whether the extra costs of more elaborate fuel cycles can be justified by the real additional insurance they might provide against proliferation. Unfortunately, this is probably not primarily a technical question, because the key parts of the issue involve beliefs about plausible political scenarios.


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