Developing Manpower Legislation A Personal Chronicle (1978) / Chapter Skim
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ACHIEVING MANPOWER REFORM--THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT
ACHIEVING MANPOWER REFORM--THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT
Pages 1-44
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From page 1... ...
These programs were designed to assist unemployed and underemployed persons in obtaining and retaining unsubsidized employment. Both pieces of legislation provided broad authority for varied programmatic approaches to alleviate structural unemployment, including classroom training, on-the-job training, work experience, supportive services, and transitional public service employment.
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From page 2... ...
First, every bill consolidated the existing authorities of the MDTA and EOA into one act. Second, each bill decentralized the manpower delivery system so that state and local governments were given much of the authority to plan and operate manpower programs.
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From page 3... ...
Beginning with the debate over manpower reform in l969, the proponents of public service employment began to argue that training and related services were not enough for a well-rounded, federal manpower effort and that specific legislative authority should be granted for the creation of public jobs both to provide useful on-the-job training in periods of full employment and to increase the supply of jobs when there was a deficit of employment opportunities in the private job market during cyclical downturns. The debate over public job creation has always had an overstated ideological ring.
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From page 4... ...
It emcompassed not only a general revenue sharing program for the states and the cities but also a series of what were termed "special revenue sharing" programs, in which broad functional areas of federal activity, including manpower, would largely be turned over to the state and local governments through major decentralization. This new bill for manpower reform was significantly different from the administration bill submitted in l969.
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From page 5... ...
The administration's bill failed to receive any serious consideration in Congress but was successful in planting a new concept called "revenue sharing." To the Democratic majority in the Congress, "revenue sharing" meant that, to use the colloquial expression, "the federal government would just put the money on the stump and run." Unemployment rates began to rise early in l97l and the Democratic Congress saw this rise as another opportunity to push public service employment. Instead of giving any consideration to the President's "special revenue sharing" proposal, the Congress instead passed a categorical program of public service employment -- the Emergency Employment Act of l97l.
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From page 6... ...
This was to be a general strategy, to cover not only the manpower programs but also housing programs, education programs, and other major areas of federal activity in which the President had hoped to devolve power to the states and localities. The leadership in the Department of Labor and the White House had been at odds over the concept of special revenue sharing for some time, and the new general strategy decision on the part of the White House was not conveyed to the Labor Department.
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From page 7... ...
Manpower programs were to be no exception to this cutback. The efficacy of manpower programs had been under attack in the administration during l972, and doubts about the programs were shared by certain top officials of the Labor Department.
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From page 8... ...
In addition, starting in l969 the Manpower Administration had been giving grants to governors and to mayors of major cities for manpower planning activities. It should be emphasized that, starting in l969 and continuing through the passage of CETA in l973, the strategy of the Manpower Administration was to develop a clientele of state and local officials who would support the goal of decentralizing manpower programs.
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From page 9... ...
The actions that had already been taken to set up the Community Manpower Programs seemed very sensible and important, and we decided to move ahead on that front as rapidly as we possibly could. In addition, we needed an overall framework within which all our actions and developing policies could be spelled out.
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From page 10... ...
It was clear from our review of MDTA and EOA that those laws precluded our moving to the full concept of revenue sharing with its minimal federal direction and accountability, but we did believe that a form of limited federal accountability would be possible. We believed that this limited federal responsibility would allow state and local sponsors to plan and design manpower programs and, therefore, would achieve the basic purposes of decentralization and decategorization, and yet would maintain the legal requirements of the basic legislation regarding the
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From page 11... ...
We arrived at a compromise on this issue in drafting the regulations that could be characterized as a "limited federal role," but the basic issue and its ramifications reappeared constantly throughout the entire process of developing and passing CETA. The second issue concerned the size of local political jurisdictions that should be eligible to be "prime sponsors" and, thus, manage their own manpower programs.
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From page 12... ...
During the debate over the l969 manpower reform legislation, the governors took little interest and played a very weak role, whereas local governments, particularly the major cities, played a very strong role. The resulting legislation, which was ultimately vetoed by President Nixon, had given the states a relatively weak role of general coordination and some minimal statewide planning but had provided direct funding to local prime sponsors and gave them maximum latitude in planning and carrying out their own programs and dealing directly with the federal government.
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From page 13... ...
The state employment service agencies had traditionally served as a labor exchange to all and had been involved to a greater or lesser degree in most of the manpower programs starting in the l960s. The manpower revenue sharing plan of l97l, however, had contemplated that local prime sponsors would not be required to use the employment service in the delivery of even the traditional services of client screening, counseling, selection, referral, and placement.
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From page 14... ...
Going Public in the Senate Washington in May l973 was an almost hopeless environment within which to conduct government business. The President and his key White House staff were enmeshed in Watergate, his domestic program was stalled in the Congress, and the administration was thus trying to move toward the President's objectives without seeking legislative authorization.
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From page 15... ...
Senator Nelson had the reputation of being moderate, constructive, and desirous of avoiding unnecessary political confrontation. He was basically in sympathy with decentralizing federal programs to state and local governments and was generally in favor of decategorizing manpower programs.
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From page 16... ...
His background on manpower matters and his general policy stance on manpower was very similar to that of Senator Nelson. (If anything, Senator Javits was a stronger believer in public service employment than was Senator Nelson.)
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From page 17... ...
I began my statement before the Committee by summarizing, for the first time publicly, the general characteristics of manpower revenue sharing we planned to implement administratively: • Approximately 70 percent of the available funds in the combined MDTA and EOA accounts would be distributed to states and localities by formula; • Eligible prime sponsors would be states, cities and counties, or similar units of population of l00,000 or more; • Governors would receive separate funds to provide for coordination of statewide planning and priority projects; • State and local officials would have maximum discretion to plan and operate programs in their areas, within the existing provisions of the MDTA and EOA; • There would be no presumptive deliverers of service, although we would expect nearly all state and local officials to choose to use the services of the established and experienced agencies, such as the employment service and the vocational education system, when their local plans include activities traditionally associated with those agencies;
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From page 18... ...
In the ensuing questioning by the Committee, Senators Nelson and Javits stated their positions on several important issues that, in retrospect, were important portents of their actions over the coming months. In responding to my criticism of the Committee bill for being overly categorized, Senator Nelson first emphasized his l5-year commitment to returning responsibility for manpower programs to state governments: ...we ought to return to the state and local governments every single function performed by the federal government that can, in fact, be performed effectively at the local level.
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From page 19... ...
In response to a question from Senator Javits as to whether the federal government, under current laws, would take the ultimate underwriting responsibility for delivering services, I said, "categorically yes," that we certainly would have to do that under the current laws. After some further colloquy, Senator Javits expressed his fear that under a special revenue sharing approach, the government might not underwrite the continuation of the manpower programs.
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From page 20... ...
I noted that Senator Javits had pushed very hard on a strong federal role to ensure that manpower funds would be spent on the clientele groups needing the most help and that prime sponsors would conduct an effective manpower program. I said I had attempted to assure Senator Javits that the federal government would certainly not tolerate "gross malpractice" but that under manpower revenue sharing we would be removing as many of the federal strings, reports, oversight visits, and monitoring as we reasonably could.
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From page 21... ...
The issue centering on the rule had more to do with intraparty disputes than with the language of EEA." The general feeling at that time, however, was that a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had served to make it clear that there was hardly a majority in favor of continuing a major public service employment program, let alone the two-thirds that would be necessary to override a certain Presidential veto.
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From page 22... ...
It was this bipartisan effort which ultimately led to the drafting of CETA." On May 4, l973, the day after my appearance before the Senate Committee, I received a call from Congressman Daniels asking me to meet with his Select Labor Subcommittee on May 8 in an informal, off-the-record discussion of manpower legislation. Before finally agreeing to this appearance, I checked it out with the Republican members of the Subcommittee, Congressmen Quie, Esch, and Steiger.
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From page 23... ...
I had not known Congressman Esch prior to my assuming office but was immediately impressed by his grasp of the issues in manpower reform and his confidence that compromises could be worked out that would result in an acceptable bill. By the time of our first meeting, he had already developed a productive and trusting relationship with Chairman Daniels, and they were quietly working together to try to write compromise legislation.
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From page 24... ...
In the negotiations on CETA and in succeeding negotiations on other pieces of legislation, he was always the balance wheel that kept things on a steady course. The staff of the House Committee, like those of the Senate Committee, were highly knowledgeable on manpower matters.
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From page 25... ...
On June l, just prior to the annual Governors Conference to be held at Lake Tahoe, Nevada, Secretary Brennan wrote to each governor to report on the status of our work on the regulations and indicated that we planned to publish proposed regulations soon in the Federal Register and provide a 30-day period for review and comment. The letter transmitted an attachment that summarized the basic elements of our plan and characterized the plan as providing a "significant role for the Governor's office in the state manpower planning process." At an earlier point in this narrative, I described the role of governors and the state government that had been included in the l97l manpower revenue sharing legislation.
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From page 26... ...
They were incensed that we would propose giving grants directly to major cities and counties -- despite the fact that the l970 bill vetoed by President Nixon and the l97l revenue sharing bill had done exactly that, and that the bill that was about to pass the Senate had done the same. In essence.
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From page 27... ...
Laird and Nelson had many conversations on the subject of manpower reform in the ensuing months, and these conversations were another chance but important factor in moving manpower reform out of a deadlocked position. While Melvin Laird assumed the top White House domestic post, the post under him as director of the Domestic Council was filled by Kenneth Cole.
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From page 28... ...
On June l8, the House Education and Labor Committee reported a simple one-year extension of the MDTA, but it was clear that the bill could not be acted on by the time the MDTA expired by July l. Of more significance to the process of developing reform legislation, however, was the inclusion in the one-year MDTA extension bill of an express prohibition against implementation of manpower revenue sharing through administrative means during fiscal l974.
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From page 29... ...
On the morning of July 25, the day after the Senate vote on Sl559, Senator Javits placed a telephone call to Secretary Brennan that constituted a key turning point in the political infighting over manpower reform. Senator Javits proposed and Secretary Brennan agreed to meet that afternoon at Javits's Capitol office to discuss ways of moving ahead with compromise manpower legislation.
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From page 30... ...
It was helpful in this situation that Secretary Brennan and Senator Javits had known each other well for many years in New York City and that they enjoyed an easy and trusting relationship. As is now clear in this story, as in most legislative stories, the chance accidents of personal relationships, personalities, and trust play an unseen but ofttimes crucial role in major policy events.
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From page 31... ...
In response to the President's request at a meeting on July 3l, the Secretary on August l, l973, sent a memorandum to the President outlining our plans for manpower programs over the coming year. As a result of conversations on the Hill during the preceding week, we were able to speculate in the memorandum for the first time about the possible shape of a compromise on manpower reform and public service employment.
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From page 32... ...
6. In addition, transitional public service employment, largely limited to the disadvantaged, would be an authorized activity for regular manpower programs and funds for this purpose would be distributed among all state and local government recipients.
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From page 33... ...
Cavanaugh asked me to reach Congressman Quie immediately and inform him of the situation. Pursuant to an agreement he had made with Quie, I was to inform Quie that, without some show of progress in the House, we would be forced to publish our manpower revenue sharing regulations.
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From page 34... ...
Following a particularly acrimonious meeting with O'Neill and Cavanaugh on Saturday morning of that week, I sent off a detailed memorandum summarizing my position that formally publishing the regulations at that time was a bad strategic move. I noted that a tentative bipartisan coalition had been put together in both the House and the Senate, which brought a real possibility for achieving meaningful manpower revenue sharing reform by way of legislation within the next several months.
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From page 35... ...
A joint memorandum dated September l2, l973, from OMB and DOL to the President posed the key question: "If an otherwise acceptable manpower revenue sharing bill can be negotiated with the Congress, would you be willing to accept a limited public service employment program as a separate component? " The possible shape of the limited public service employment (PSE)
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From page 36... ...
On the particular issue of public service employment, Melvin Laird remembers personally carrying the September l2 OMB-DOL memorandum to President Nixon, discussing it with him, and obtaining his initials of concurrence on the memorandum. In mid-September, the President sent a message on human resources to Congress that included further indication that the administration was softening and was now willing to accept a legislative solution.
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From page 37... ...
First, he wanted to explore again our intentions in carrying out the strong federal role that was now written into the draft compromise bill. He knew,
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From page 38... ...
After getting these preliminary concerns out of the way, we turned, third, to the major issue at hand -- Congressman Daniels's position that we could move no further on the compromise manpower reform bill until the administration gave assurances that $500 million would be made available in fiscal l975 for PSE. It quickly became clear that the reason that the AFL-CIO and, therefore, Congressman Daniels were holding out for this provision was their fear that the administration would agree to the program, would fund it at a beginning level for fiscal l974, and would then not provide any funds for the program, thus effectively killing PSE.
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From page 39... ...
The Daniels release stated: "...the bill does not establish manpower revenue sharing which the Nixon administration has advocated. While these bills decentralize planning and operations of manpower programs to state and local governments, the federal government will retain the responsibility to assure that federal dollars are spent consistently with federal policy objectives." Esch's release said the bill intended to "reform federal job training programs and replace categorical grants with a
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From page 40... ...
I pointed to a number of minor problems that we had with the bill, but the major problems centered on the bill's definition of the federal role, and the continuing disagreement over the level of funding for public service employment in fiscal l975. The compromise bill still contained the strong federal role that the Democrats had insisted upon.
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From page 41... ...
The big surprise in the Conference was the proposal by Senator Javits and the agreement by the Conference to increase the agreed-upon $250 million to $350 million. (I have subsequently learned that there was much behind the scenes jockeying on this point.
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From page 42... ...
On December 28, l973, the President signed the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act into law, saying that he did so "with great pleasure, as it is one of the finest pieces of legislation to come to my desk this year." He went on to remark that this was the "first legislation to incorporate the essential principles of Special Revenue Sharing" and that "this long-overdue shift in intergovernmental responsibilities is now a reality in one key area of government domestic programs -- manpower." That day, Melvin Laird, Secretary Brennan, and I met with the press in the White House pressroom to explain and comment on the bill and answer questions. Secretary Brennan' s prepared comments paid specific tribute "to those in the Congress who worked so actively and constructively to bring forth this important piece of legislation": Senators Nelson and Javits, Congressmen Daniels, Esch, and Quie, and Chairman Perkins.
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From page 43... ...
The credit for coining the title, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act -- CETA -- goes to Dick Johnson of Senator Nelson's staff. The Senate bill had been titled, "Job Training and Community Services Act," and the House bill had been titled "The Comprehensive Manpower Act." Dick Johnson correctly concluded that the term "manpower" was destined to have some negative connotations and, therefore, changed the title of the bill to what I believe is a more descriptive set of words.
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From page 44... ...
Third, on the issue of public service employment: the strong proponents of public service employment succeeded, for the first time, in having a separate, identifiable program for public service employment included in a comprehensive bill. However, those wishing to provide curbs on public service employment succeeded in targeting the program to areas of high unemployment, in lowering the average wage cost, and in other ways trying to ensure that the program remained a transitional employment effort with the ultimate purpose of moving individuals toward private unsubsidized jobs.
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