STAR 21 Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (1992) / Chapter Skim
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6 Technology Implications for Force Structure and Strategy
6 Technology Implications for Force Structure and Strategy
Pages 240-255
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From page 240... ...
The STAR Committee agrees that it is appropriate to consider not only the evolution of capability through technology but also the influence of new capabilities on future strategies for their use and on force structure requirements. However, the forecasting of future strategy and force structure consequences is at best an uncertain art.
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From page 241... ...
Levels of Technological Impact Many of the technologies and system applications reviewed by the STAR panels will require a time frame of a decade or two before their influence can be felt. The STAR Committee expects that major nearterm changes to both military strategy and force structure are more likely to be forced by the profound changes now occurring in geopolitical and economic realities.
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From page 242... ...
force structure and strategy in the near term: · the demands of new contingencies the potential for sudden crises that involve diverse adversaries, resulting in rapidly implemented joint operations of U.S. forces; · anticipation of enemy responses to the Persian Gulf the responses of potential adversaries to the capabilities they see as responsible for the overwhelming U.S.
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From page 243... ...
information and IFFN (identification of friend, foe, or neutral) , through better automated data fusion and application of software network control technologies; and · improved concurrent joint battle operations through joint battle modeling, simulation, and training exercises.
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From page 244... ...
forces will refrain from retaliation to avoid large numbers of noncombatant casualties; · improved methods for use of chemical and biological warfare agents; · low-flying cruise missiles to attack rear-echelon infrastructure; · advanced, but available, tactical ballistic missiles capable of surmounting our current defenses; · tanks with more recent technology than those used by Iraqi forces during the Persian Gulf war, as a means to avoid being outranged and outgunned; · intense jamming of battlefield identification in hopes of causing excessive fratricide; and · attacks on initially deploying U.S. forces before U.S.
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From page 245... ...
In conclusion, the STAR Committee suggests a near-term Army strategy that assumes a vigorous attempt by potential adversaries to deny the United States the low-casualty successes of the Persian Gulf war. This strategy focuses the Army scientific community on coun
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From page 246... ...
As one example, U.S ground forces engaged in contingency warfare can expect to have overwhelming air superiority, whereas Warsaw Pact air power in the central European theater formerly outnumbered NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) planes.
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From page 247... ...
LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY Although the immediate changes in the Army's force structure and strategy will be driven largely by the previously discussed external political and economic factors, the STAR Committee foresees technology exerting a far greater influence in the longer term. The Committee expects that technology will reinforce the trend toward a smaller but more capable and highly transportable force.
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From page 248... ...
In addition, the adoption by other nations of stealth techniques for air vehicles, which the STAR Committee anticipates will occur, may allow opposition air reconnaissance despite overall U.S. air supremacy.
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From page 249... ...
For example, the intelligence war fought in the Persian Gulf in 1991 was an electronic war, and an entire reinforced Marine division suffered 24 killed in action. By contrast, the earlier contingency operation in Lebanon was much more of a HUMINT intelligence war, and in that operation a single reinforced Marine company had 239 killed in action.
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From page 250... ...
In practice, both approaches will probably be needed if sufficient strength in these medium forces is to be attained. The basic principle underlying the medium force concept is simply the requirement to concentrate forces in space and time, applied in a context of rapid response to a range of potential ground warfare contingencies located far from bases in the continental United States.
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From page 251... ...
By then it may no longer be possible to rely on the overwhelming air superiority achieved during the Persian Gulf war. In addition, advanced tactical ballistic missiles of considerable capability may well be available to any opponent with the resources to buy them.
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From page 252... ...
The STAR Committee expects that, within a decade, well-financed opponents will have procured cruise missiles and aircraft that use at least first-generation stealth techniques. By the latter part of the STAR time horizon, advanced forms of low-observability probably will have proliferated widely.
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From page 253... ...
The STAR Committee anticipates that in the far future the scouting role can be adequately performed by UAVs, which offer better survival against strengthened enemy air defenses without risking crews and expensive man-rated machines. The substantial obstacles to developing low-observable rotary wing vehicles, and their probably considerable cost, are further arguments for a long-term emphasis on UAV development and implementation of the force structure to support UAV operations.
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From page 254... ...
The STAR Committee also predicts that civilian contractors working as technical representatives will increasingly replace Army repair and maintenance personnel because of the substantial cost savings involved. The cost effectiveness of using contractors, whose productive working careers are several times longer than their uniformed counterparts, appears to the Committee to be eminently sensible for the expected period of reduced resources.
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From page 255... ...
A continuing commitment to improve the training of total Army personnel, reserves and actives alike, and the technology used in that training, will not only improve existing Army forces but also create the capacity to "surge" production of well-trained soldiers in a wider emergency.
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