Development Planning A Strategic Approach to Future Air Force Capabilities (2014) / Chapter Skim
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1 Historical Context Regarding Planning for Future Air Force Capabilities
1 Historical Context Regarding Planning for Future Air Force Capabilities
Pages 9-22
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Army Air Service were marked by mere halting steps in technological development, as the United States fell far behind the powers 1 Dik A Daso, Architects of American Air Supremacy: Gen.
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Few high ranking Army officers seemed aware of the close relationship developing between these specialists and the little Air Corps -- a relationship that was to grow to such importance in World War II that civilian scientists would work side-by-side with staff officers in our overseas operational commands, frequently flying on combat missions to increase their data. Once, after George Marshall became Chief of Staff, I asked him to come to lunch with 3 Ibid., pp.
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Through the 1950s, while operational field commanders like General LeMay focused on improving current systems like the B-52, visionaries like General Schriever used alliances among scientists, tech nologists, manufacturers, and acquisition leaders to create a series of powerful missile systems -- Navajo, Bomarc, Thor, Atlas, Titan, Minuteman -- at an almost unimaginable pace. (For a long time, General LeMay, by then Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, was notably unimpressed, referring to ICBMs and their thermonuclear warheads as Schriever's "firecrackers."8)
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For years, the Army -- and the Army Air Forces while a part of it -- was hamstrung in its procurement programs by governmental shortsightedness.9 Around the time that General Arnold was writing these words, the newly es tablished Air Force was creating the Ridenour Committee to study the Air Force's R&D activities.10 The Ridenour Committee recommended the creation of a new organization, separate from the Air Materiel Command, to control all of the Air Force's R&D. By the mid-1950s, there was recognition that formal channels were needed to connect combat commands, the science and technology (S&T)
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From page 13... ...
The second piece was called "devel opment planning," and it was technology based, coordinating all research and d evelopment in the Air Force, focusing on Exploratory Development (budget category 6.2) and Advanced Development (budget category 6.3)
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projects sup ported directly by Air Force funds have a clear trace directly to some existing and officially recognized technology shortfall which, if filled, would enhance the ability of the Air Force to perform its mission? • Can assurance be provided that technology work accomplished or under way by the Air Force laboratories is not duplicated in contracts issued to defense contractors by Air Force program offices?
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4. Note: SAC, Strategic Air Command; MAC, Mobility Air Com mand; TAC, Tactical Air Command.
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were instituted by product center and laboratory commanders to carry on the old Vanguard mission of integrating warfighter requirements with acquisition priorities and laboratory efforts (see Figure 1-2)
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(later known as the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, AFSAB) was formally commissioned by G eneral Arnold in 1944 to advise him and to guide the technological strategies of the Army Air Forces.
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1981, Congress slashed funding for the Air Force's development planning work.19 But, despite the reduction of congressionally appropriated funds, AFSC's spending on development planning climbed from less than $1 million in 1982 to more than $20 million in 1984.20 To support development planning efforts, includ 15 U.S. Army Air Force Scientific Advisory Group, Toward New Horizons, multi-volume report to General of the Army H.H.
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In periods where funding plummeted, Air Force leaders were forced to adapt and inno vate, in attempts to keep development planning alive. The committee's research revealed that there were at times major differences between development planning funding, and actual spending on de velopment planning.
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However, some product center com manders urged program directors under their command to carve out a portion of their appropriated funds to look at future capability modifications that could enhance their individual programs in the future. For example, the F-16 System Program Office had the authority and funding to look into the future for tech nologies and architectures to keep the F-16 platform relevant into the 21st century.
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From page 21... ...
Finally, the location of AFMC at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base had the sec ondary effect of removing a "four-star" champion for development planning from the crucial, time-critical decision-making apparatus of the Pentagon and Congress. All of these factors helped define a perfect storm of circumstances that contributed to the decline of development planning within the Air Force.
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From page 22... ...
But countervailing pressures have also always existed -- the immediate demands of wartime operations, financial constraints driven by domestic economic conditions, or changing political powers and priorities are just some examples. The results of all this -- a variety of attempts by subordinate commanders to keep development planning alive and a fragmented development planning system that is well intentioned but lacking in clarity, consistency, and coherence -- will be described in Chapter 2.
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