Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

1 Background and Overview
Pages 11-18

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 11...
... The exacting skills required to design, engineer, and maintain the nuclear weapon stockpile have nurtured unique capabilities at the NNSA laboratories that can be applied more broadly. The most closely related applications involve nuclear weapons intelligence, such as nuclear forensics and assessment of foreign nuclear weapons programs, and nuclear non­ proliferation.
From page 12...
... physics and advanced computation, and they contribute significantly to the open scientific literature in many science and engineering fields. Work on materials, radiation detection, and sophisticated electronics similarly serve both the core nuclear weapon mission and broader societal and national security needs.1 The conduct of this broader national security work serves not only to provide valuable and often unique new capabilities to the various national security agencies, but also to keep the labora 1  National Research Council (NRC)
From page 13...
... Nevertheless, the committee commends DOE leadership for making this change. 6  Kathleen Alexander, NNSA, "Comments to The National Academies Committee on Assess­ ent of Governance Structure of the NNSA National Security Laboratories," presen m tation to the committee on May 5, 2014.
From page 14...
... 8 Several previous studies9 have found that WFO at the NNSA laboratories helps to promote the successful execution of the core nuclear weapons mission and provides interesting and challenging problems that are essential to attract and retain top scientific talent at the laboratories; indeed, this view was repeated in briefings of the three current laboratory directors to this committee.10 These same studies have also found, 8  Alexander, 2014, "Comments to The National Academies Committee." 9 See, for example, NRC, 2012, Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. (Phase I report)
From page 15...
... Some observers have described the approach of other agencies as "buying by the drink rather than investing in the vineyard." To address this recapitalization problem, several major recent studies have recommended that other agencies be given some shared responsibility and accountability for helping DOE/NNSA to maintain the capabilities of the laboratories on which they depend. The 2009 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States15 recommended that the President issue an "Executive Order formally assigning the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, State, and Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence joint responsibility for the health of these laboratories." For a similar purpose, the 2009 Stimson Center Task Force recommended as follows: "Create multi-agency sponsorship of the ­ eapons w labs and NTS [the former Nevada Test Site, now called the Nevada 11  Stimson Center Task Force, 2009, Leveraging Science for Security.
From page 16...
... In 2010, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by the Secretaries of DOD, DHS, and the Director of National Intelligence establishing a "Governance Charter for an Interagency Council on the Strategic Capabilities of DOE National Laboratories as National Security Assets," reprinted in Appendix F
From page 17...
... DOE is the sponsor of 16 national laboratories that are FFRDCs, including the NNSA laboratories.20 In approaching its work, the committee heard from current and former officials of DOE, NNSA, and the national security customer agencies mentioned in the statement of task (DOD, DHS, and the IC; see Appendix B)
From page 18...
... Although the NNSS is not a laboratory or an FFRDC, it is a partner in the laboratories' work and has a shared history with the NNSA laboratories. Moreover, the committee understands that the business case for NNSS is transitioning toward a business model featuring multiagency use.21 In FY2013, approximately 20 percent of NNSS funding was from WFO that came from non-DOE federal agencies and other sources.22 The committee also notes that certain non-NNSA DOE laboratories do substantial work on national security matters (e.g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.