Skip to main content

Aligning the Governance Structure of the NNSA Laboratories to Meet 21st Century National Security Challenges (2015) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

2 Governance Principles
Pages 19-23

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 19...
... contracts agreed to between DOE/NNSA and Los Alamos National Security, LLC, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and the Sandia Corporation, respectively. NNSA science and engineering programs conducted by these laboratories are formulated, funded, and overseen by the NNSA.
Read the entire page →
From page 20...
... There has not been any agreed upon definition of the mission boundaries or technical capabilities required, nor are the laboratories funded as national security laboratories; that is, DOE funds are not available for projects or facilities that primarily benefit other national security agencies. Several previous studies have commented on the need for a more clearly defined mission.2 1  This vision of a broader national security role for the NNSA laboratories was formally articulated by Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman in a letter entitled "Transforming the Nuclear Weapons Complex into a National Security Enterprise," signed on June 19, 2008.
Read the entire page →
From page 21...
... , March 1, 1999; Center for Strategic and International Studies, Commission on Science and Security, 2002, Science and Security in the 21st Century; Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, 2014, Interim Report, Washington, D.C., April, available from the Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Va. 5  This principle was also a key finding of the study NRC, 2013, The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
Read the entire page →
From page 22...
... In areas not closely related to nuclear weapons, there should be the continued expectation that the NNSA laboratories compete (as legally permissible within their status as FFRDCs) on a level playing field with other S&T providers for national security resources.
Read the entire page →
From page 23...
... PRINCIPLE 6: THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONTINUOUSLY EVALUATED FOR COST-EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF MISSION Organizations that perform well continuously evaluate their cost structures. The national security agencies perceive that the NNSA laboratories provide unique and valuable capabilities that further their missions, but they also find the NNSA laboratories to be significantly more expensive than other potential providers.
Read the entire page →

Key Terms

  • security agencies
  • security laboratories
  • governance structure
  • nnsa national
  • nuclear security

  • broader national
  • security challenges
  • nuclear facilities
  • sustained strategic
  • congressional advisory

  • stimson center
  • strategic engagement
  • evolving national
  • energy national
  • sandia national

  • advancing national
  • foreign nuclear
  • states nuclear
  • ized nuclear
  • defense nuclear

  • security resources
  • security threats
  • security enterprise
  • nnsa field
  • homeland security

  • nnsa headquarters
  • security site
  • maintaining nuclear
  • nevada nuclear
  • security role


    • This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
    More information on Chapter Skim is available.