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3 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Pages 24-44

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From page 24...
...  Give multiple national security agencies, including the Depart ment of Defense [DOD] , the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]
From page 25...
... These agencies are eager to use the DOE/NNSA laboratories in areas that are critical to their own missions, but as a general matter are not interested in committing their own budgets to pay for recapitalization of major NNSA laboratory facilities and equipment. They are generally pleased with the quality of the services they receive from the NNSA laboratories, although they uniformly perceive the laboratories to be expensive in comparison to other research providers.
From page 26...
... 6  Kathleen Alexander, NNSA, "Comments to The National Academies Committee on As sessment of Governance Structure of the NNSA National Security Laboratories," presentation to the committee on May 5, 2014. 7  Jill Hruby, SNL, "Perspectives on Governance of 21st Century National Security FFRDCs," presentation to the committee on April 8, 2014.
From page 27...
... As sponsor of the national security laboratories, DOE/NNSA has overall responsibility for managerial oversight and funding for the laboratories' core operations and investments, which are focused on nuclear weapons. As strategic partners,8 the national security agencies would have the responsibility to help the laboratories, and their DOE sponsor, to understand the larger national security agenda and enable the laboratories and sponsor to meet future national security needs beyond those of 8  The partnership envisioned here is among DOE and the other national security agencies in the execution of their national security missions through their use of the laboratories in appropriate ways.
From page 28...
... a collaborative approach to meeting future financial and capability needs. The national security agencies' strategic partnership function should be pursued by way of an enhanced role for the Mission Executive Council (MEC; see below)
From page 29...
... The foundation for strategic planning should be a crisp and clear mission statement that articulates the role that the national security laboratories should play in supporting the national security agencies. Indeed, according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation section 35.017-1, one of the responsibilities of the sponsor of an FFRDC is to define the scope of its mission in the sponsor agreement.
From page 30...
... THE ROLE OF THE MISSION EXECUTIVE COUNCIL Finding 3.2. The four-party Governance Charter and the MEC it established are significant beginnings to implement the national security agencies' strategic partnership role in the governance of the national security laboratories.
From page 31...
... The Mission Executive Council should become the primary vehicle to define and implement the national security agencies' governance role. It should develop and pursue an agenda focused on identifying strategic priorities and critical capabilities to deal with ongoing and upcoming national security challenges, coordinate approaches for supporting needed invest ments in the laboratories, and provide coordinated guidance and processes.
From page 32...
... The DOE Office of Science laboratories have to operate under the same DOE orders as DOE/ NNSA laboratories, but appear to do so more smoothly and cost-effectively. The committee received briefings from the DOE Office of Science,13 a site 11  Dori Ellis, LLNL, "Enabling Interagency Work at the NNSA National Security Labora tories," presentation to the committee on May 6, 2014.
From page 33...
... MEC 2.0 would provide a forum for two-way strategic communication be­ tween the laboratories and the national security agencies. In one direction, the specific science and engineering capabilities of the individual laboratories would be identified and promulgated among the participating national security agencies, as well as the laboratories' views of strategic S&T trends and the national security challenges that may flow from them.
From page 34...
... Aligned with this mission-focused partnership, the site offices of the Office of Science laboratories are nominal in size in comparison to those of the DOE/NNSA laboratories. The committee received comments that this approach, culture, and attitude about governance in the Office of Science contributes to less complexity, reduced cost, and greater productivity at the Office of Science laboratories.
From page 35...
... The committee did not find any DOE- or NNSA-wide standards for risk assessment or broad agreement for WFO projects that would be acceptable at an NNSA laboratory. Thus, the decision to approve is largely up to the contracting officer, who is generally not a domain expert, but becomes the risk acceptance official in cases where there is no clear benefit to DOE in allowing the laboratory to conduct the work.
From page 36...
... One apparent difference is that the Office of Science headquarters takes an active role with the laboratories and site offices in annual planning for WFO, with the intention of approving a broad scope of work within which each laboratory may accept WFO projects. In recognition of the above, NNSA has communicated with the DOE Office of Science to better understand its WFO process.
From page 37...
... The committee is not suggesting that there should be one set of WFO procedures for all non-DOE national security agencies, but rather one set for each partner (one for DHS, one for DOD, one for the IC, etc.) This would accommodate unique requirements while still expediting and simplifying the process.
From page 38...
... Committee interviews with the leadership of the PNNL site office and the management of PNNL and ORNL -- the two DOE Office of Science laboratories that perform a considerable amount of WFO -- found less controversy and inefficiency around approval of WFO at these DOE Office of Science laboratories than at the NNSA laboratories. One apparent difference is that the Office of Science headquarters takes an active role with the laboratories and site offices in annual planning to include WFO, with the intention to approve a broad scope of work and core competencies within which each laboratory may pursue WFO projects.
From page 39...
... reviewed and commented on the quality of science and engineering at the NNSA laboratories, and emphasized the important role of interagency engagement, including WFO, in helping both to sustain the critical nuclear weapons capabilities and to attract and retain top talent. This committee agrees with the previous committee's findings on the value of WFO and believes that its recommendations on recognizing and operationalizing the strategic partnership responsibilities of other national security agencies (Recommendation 1.2)
From page 40...
... The committee did not have the time or resources to evaluate all of the many laboratories (DOD laboratories, various FFRDCs associated with national security agencies, or even all of the DOE national laboratories) that do national security work for others.
From page 41...
... The committee concludes that the optimal course is to build on and improve the existing governance structure. The implementation of a multi­ gency FFRDC governance structure such as that implied in item A a of the statement of task would likely involve extensive modification of existing arrangements with multiple agencies.
From page 42...
... , although DOE and the other national security agencies will need to enhance their commitment to -- and participation in -- the MEC. THE IMPACT OF MULTIAGENCY ENGAGEMENT ON PEER REVIEW The committee addresses item E from the statement of task below: (E)
From page 43...
... The recommendations in this report are designed to create a sustainably successful collaborative relationship among DOE, the other national security agencies, and the national security laboratories. Furthermore, the committee believes that everything recommended here is within the authority of the Secretary of Energy to implement.


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