U.S.-Japan Strategic Alliances in the Semiconductor Industry Technology Transfer, Competition, and Public Policy (1992) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix A: Case Studies of U.S.-Japan Technology Linkages in Semiconductors
Appendix A: Case Studies of U.S.-Japan Technology Linkages in Semiconductors
Pages 91-112
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From page 91... ...
The strategic orientation of the firms appears to hold out the promise of further mutually beneficial interaction in semiconductors and in other areas. Historical Background: Motorola's Approach to the Japanese Semiconductor Market From Motorola's viewpoint, the conclusion of its alliance with Toshiba should be seen in the context of the company's effort over several decades 91
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From page 92... ...
In 1962, Motorola set up a sales office in Japan, but it soon became clear that this approach would not lead to significant participation in the Japanese market. At that time, Japan's formal trade barriers were substantial: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
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From page 93... ...
Nippon Motorola made a major effort to meet the needs of the Japanese market, but progress was slow and difficult. Some marketing staff perceived that in a number of cases in the early 1980s, clients bought devices from Japanese companies after Nippon Motorola had done the application work.
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From page 94... ...
industry policy toward the U.S.-Japan semiconductor talks, the political atmosphere did not have a direct impact on negotiations with Toshiba. Initial Structure of the Linkage and Technology Transfer The basic elements of the partnership were set in laying the groundwork for the manufacturing joint venture, and reflected both Motorola's need for access to the Japanese market and Toshiba's desire for microprocessor technology.
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From page 95... ...
The strategies and capabilities of Japanese companies have, over the past decade, made the manufacture of DRAMs a "game" that depends on high capital investment expenditure in order to incorporate the latest developments in process technology and reach high volumes of production quickly. The firms that are ahead of the curve
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From page 96... ...
From the viewpoint of the U.S. industry, access to the Japanese semiconductor market has been an inherently political problem.
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From page 97... ...
Helping Motorola crack the Japanese market also helps Toshiba increase the U.S. semiconductor content of its own products and those of group companies; it can show the U.S.
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From page 98... ...
semiconductor company that had long-established linkages with Japanese partners. They were interpreted as being partly motivated by the Japanese government's desire to increase the share of foreign semiconductors sold in Japan in the face of the rapidly rising trade surplus.
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From page 99... ...
Plans for a Motorola-Toshiba European fabrication facility have been canceled. It now appears that Toshiba, rather than build its own European fabrication facility or build one jointly with Motorola, will assemble and test devices fabricated at Motorola's European facility for the time being.
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From page 100... ...
semiconductor industry during negotiation of the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement in 1991 was seen as evidence of this dependence by some.42 For Motorola itself, however, autonomy of action does not appear to have been impaired. For example, Fisher's call on MITI concerning HDTV chips in 1989 came several months after the resolution of a contentious dispute in which the United States Trade Representative tangled with the Ministry of Posts and Carmichael Borrus, "Chips of State," Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1990, p.
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From page 101... ...
companies can leverage Japanese components, manufacturing, and distribution channels to establish worldwide market share. The Sun-Fujitsu strategic alliance has been crucial to Sun Microsystems' success in the highly competitive workstation market.
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From page 102... ...
chip maker. LSI Logic was selling 10,000-gate arrays and had designed a 50,000gate array, but it would not ship silicon until 1986 too long for Sun to wait in the highly competitive workstation market.
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From page 103... ...
Katashiba felt that producing SPARC chips for Sun could position FMI in the highgrowth technical workstation market. However, convincing Fujitsu's top management in Tokyo, which Katashiba described as having a "mainframe mentality," was difficult.
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From page 104... ...
for the Japanese market. January 1991 Through its newly acquired British subsidiary, JCL, Fujitsu reconfigures its 68000-based "A series" around the SPARC chip and UNIX System V, Release 4 operating system.
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From page 105... ...
While these alliances put Japanese companies into the workstation market, they help Sun against its immediate competitors: Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Sony Microsystems, and MIPS Computer (ACE)
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From page 106... ...
(FMI) Toshiba Matsushita Computer Systems Morisawa Tatung-DTK Computer Japan Fujitsu, Toshiba, Matsushita Electric Responsible for developing and producing SPARC chips for Sun Procures SPARC processor from Sun for its laptop workstation Marketing Sun workstations under its own brand name Technical tie-up for workstation font development Sun negotiating over Japanese version of Sun operating system with both companies, which plan to ship Sun-compatible workstations Sun negotiating separately with Japanese companies to develop multimedia workstation technologies for ISDN
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From page 107... ...
Recently, Hewlett-Packard licensed its Precision Architecture to Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Samsung, which will supply workstations on an OEM basis to Hewlett-Packard. Intel Japan has teamed up with six companies in the United States and Japan to promote its i860 RISC processors.
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From page 108... ...
Thus, the computer industry is likely to see a proliferation of strategic alliances in the incipient R&D phase, which gradually expand into global consortia when the technology has carved out a market niche. U.S.-Japan alliances are becoming increasingly important because Japanese companies dominate many leading-edge technologies, such as LCDs, memory chips, IC cards, thin packaging, and mass manufacturing.
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From page 109... ...
chip makers to divert from their mainstream businesses may still force U.S. computer makers to seek Japanese partners as a shortcut to global market success.
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From page 110... ...
Stardent Computer Minisupercomputers 7/86 19 22 8/88 25 9/89 24 MIPS Computer RISC workstations 10/87 25 18 1/90 10 Akashic Memories Thin-film media 12/87 16 100 1/88 10 Maxtor/Maxoptics Magneto-optic drives 3/89 12 25 Rasna Mechanical CAD 6/89 10 15 and software Exabyte Computer magnetic O Board storage C-Cube Microsystems Image processing 3/90 6.25 39.5 video compression Teknocom CAD software 1/91 0.23 37.5 Allied Information Software 6/91 Tricord Systems Computer servers 6/91 3.4 representation 2. Kubota had sole marketing rights in the Pacific Rim.
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From page 111... ...
In 1991, Kubota was commissioned by MIPS Computer to produce RISC workstations in order to reduce production and distribution costs and shorten delivery time for MIPS products in Japan and Asia. In mid-1990, Kubota joined MIPS' ACE consortium, whose members will develop advanced 64bit RISC workstations based on the MIPS R4000 microprocessor.
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From page 112... ...
Alliances are designed to help Kubota build new technical competences in support of an integrated diversification strategy. Even when ventures fail, Kubota and other Japanese companies pursuing similar strategies retain the competence and ability to use the technology.
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