Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

1 THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM
Pages 25-66

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 25...
... Marine traffic regulation is applied sparingly, but interest in this approach is growing. Technology already exists that could be used to better integrate and improve waterways management; an example is port-wide marine traffic regulation using vessel traffic services.
From page 26...
... But when marine accidents occur, close examination of navigation and piloting practices is sure to follow. INTRODUCTION The marine navigation and piloting system is a large-scale sociotechnical system comprised of several subsystems: navigation and piloting tasks, technology, human systems, and organizational cultures and structures.
From page 27...
... Consequently, the system can best be understood by examining not only its individual components, but also their interdependencies and interfaces: for instance, among the people, technology, and the tasks; or among actions and decisions in one subsystem producing effects, intended and unintended, in other subsystems. In the context oil marine navigation and piloting, subsystems of large-scale human systems include ship bridge-to-shore, bridge team, master-pilot, bridge-to-bridge, and vessel-port control interactions, among others.
From page 28...
... 26 thc 1asks, people, and prevaDiDg organizabona1 cultures. By examining the system's esscutia1 elements and tbeir relationships, tbis approacb reco~nizes tbat a ~5X" iD ODC p~ of tbe system may, iD ~Ct cause di~culhes aDd even dys~nchODS iD some of Rs otber pads.
From page 29...
... The primary elements of the system then are discussed and assessed: piloting tasks, vessel and waterways systems, technology, and organizational structures and cultures. Developments and trends that are expected to influence marine navigation and piloting over the next decade are identified as is the continuing controversy over pilotage, establishing the context in which this re
From page 30...
... Today, as in the past, vessels normally are required by maritime countries to engage independent marine pilots when entering or leaving ports or piloting waters. Piloting demands more than guiding a passage through a particular waterway; it requires a diverse mix of navigation and shiphandling skills (Armstrong, ....
From page 31...
... , ship navigation in piloting waters depends increasingly on the attentiveness and skills of marine pilots (Armstrong, 1980; Cahill, 1983, 1985; MacElrevey, 1988; Meurn, 1990~. Where pilotage is compulsory, a marine pilot normally has immediate charge of a vessel's navigation.
From page 32...
... Traditional aids to navigation such as lights and buoys, radio navigation systems, and vessel traffic services (VTS) are included, as are newer systems such as interactive electronic lights and buoys, and advanced vessel traffic advisory and management systems.
From page 33...
... Determining Obeyer vessels meet or exceed design crheha can be accomplisbed ~itbout ~ of accident using computer-based and physical-scale model shiphandling simulations. For example, tanker transits to Ad Tom Valdez, Alaska, were simulated in 1976, before oil shipments began, Ad several times tbereaher, leading to est~hshment of Tansy lanes and ship-assist tug needs (Jones, 1980; Amps ~ ~ 19821 Ho~, such Mace ~- ~ not s~d~ practice (NRC, 1992a It is much more common to kind that answers to these questions result Tom an initial system that depends on 1be expedence, experdse, and judgment of pilots usuaUy with the aid of Elba tugs and under the most Chorale operating conditions.
From page 34...
... The Coast Guard occasionally imposes transit restrictions, usually for ships carrying dangerous cargoes in bulk or during periods of heavy commercial fishing or recreational activity. But as a general rule, independent marine pilots by default often become the final arbiters of port and waterway design limits, with or without the benefit of engineering information or the results of simulation experiments to help guide decision making.
From page 35...
... However, extensive traffic regulation authority is available to the U.S. Coast Guard such as Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 6 and the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
From page 36...
... Such direction generally has been accomplished by independent marine pilots providing maneuvering instructions from shore stations (referred to as shore-based pilotage)
From page 37...
... Pilot associations also provide small-scale VTS information services for the entrances to the Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, and Southwest Pass in Louisiana and for Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors. A few vessel traffic centers including those for the Coast Guard VTS in New York, the Canadian Coast Guard VTS in Vancouver, British Columbia, and the pilot-operated VTS in Long Beach routinely provide marine pilots with navigation support for precision anchorage.
From page 38...
... The United States can also apply these measures to U.S.-flag vessels in fulfillment of its responsibilities as a flag state. Because shipping companies respond to profit and loss, imposed delays are a powerful, if indirect, influence on operating practices.
From page 39...
... As a consequence of the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989, and more recently the loss of the Aegean Sea in Spain and the Braer in the Shetland Islands, international support has been growing for increased port-state control. In the meantime, marine pilots are being called upon to detect substandard conditions as quasi-public officials responsible to their
From page 40...
... HUMAN SYSTEMS The safety performance of the marine navigation and piloting system depends on effective human performance. In the maritime sector, the factors that greatly influence human proficiency and performance are organizational cultures and structures, professional development, and applications of technology.
From page 41...
... However, insight gained through experience does not appear to be shared systematically among masters, mates, marine pilots, and vessel operators. The nature of marine operations keeps these individuals dispersed throughout the marine navigation and piloting system and relatively isolated from their colleagues.
From page 42...
... Emergency scenarios sometimes are included in this training. Marine simulation has not evolved into a standard element of piloting apprenticeships, although manned model and computer-based shiphandling simulations increasingly are used to support continuing professional development in many pilot associations.
From page 43...
... Masters regularly assigned to the same vessel can observe its maneuvering characteristics over a wide range of loading and operating conditions. Some masters also handle their vessels in piloting waters and during docking evolutions.
From page 44...
... However, U.S. federal pilotage requirements principally result in masters and deck officers piloting U.S.-flag ships in coastwise trade, rather than by independent marine pilots, although the use of marine pilots for even these vessels is growing, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
From page 45...
... Merchant Marine Academy 3 State University of New York Maritime College 6g Massachusetts Maritime Academy Maine Maritime Academy ~3 California Maritime Academy to Texas A&M ~ Great Lakes Maritime Academy :~_ ,.... ~ ;~ : ~ ;~ :-~5;::-~;::-~; ;~:35i:1 / / ~ ELF // FIGURE 1-2 Undergraduate enrollment at the federal and state maritime academies, November 1992 (MARAD, unpublished data)
From page 46...
... Cal 200ct o 1 00 OMINDING THE HELM 73 U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Texas A&M, Galveston SU NY Maritime College Massachusetts Maritime Academy Maine Maritime Academy · Great Lakes Maritime Academy California Maritime Academy /~ / .
From page 47...
... Additionally, for vessels with reduced manning, there may be no flag-state requirement for a full watch team, although unilateral requirements might be imposed by a port state as a condition of entry. Manning practices for junior deck officers usually mean little continuity with individual vessels, so it is difficult to establish a consistent frame of reference for building shiphandling knowledge.
From page 48...
... Data are not available to confirm or refute reports by marine pilots that this trend is fueling a general decline in the overall level of qualifications among deck officers. Marine pilots also report that, aboard many ships in international trade, there is no such thing as a fully functioning bridge team: only the master and a helmsman4 may be present.
From page 49...
... Despite the availability of advanced technology, basic technology dominates aboard the world's merchant fleets (see Box 1-3~. Furthermore, marine navigation and piloting remain heavily dependent on effective performance by human operators masters; vessel officers and bridge teams; marine pilots; and in some port complexes, shore-based navigation support personnel.
From page 50...
... The ship's specific behavior relative to the channel's hydrography and prevailing operating conditions had not been observed previously. The incident illustrates the importance of proving a system's effectiveness and building operator familiarity, trust, and confidence in system performance through operational experience (see Chapter 61.
From page 51...
... 111111 1 11111111111~1111 11 (-llll{#I#Ii#1~I 1111111111111111~ llllll~lllll~lllll~#Ib111111111~11111111 ~7 ~betber me stoic of 1bc ~ of maDcuvchng systems teas advanced to the point labors coDEdcDcc and Must can be applied uDiVCrS8HyiD actual operadoDs iS8D Open qucs~oD. Custody, cacb DC~ iDtcCrated bUd~c system must be provCD aboard ship.
From page 52...
... Performance of individuals following simulation training has not been tracked. Furthermore, lessons from human performance research in other sectors have not been routinely applied (see Elkind et al., 1990; NRC, 1988, l991b, 1992b, 1993)
From page 53...
... Exercise of the command prerogative to countermand a pilot's orders rarely occurs and then only for cause; masters are expected to be capable of identifying obvious errors in piloting but often lack sufficient local knowledge to determine subtle deficiencies that may contribute to more serious maneuvering problems during a transit. A similar decision-making structure exists aboard smaller vessels such as tugboats, although the number of individuals in the pilothouse is usually less than aboard a large ship; pilots may or may not be required by regulation, but independent marine pilots are usually not taken.
From page 54...
... The safe passage of ships in ports and waterways is aided by the use of local experts, the marine pilots. Marine pilots are the first representatives of port-state interests to board an inbound vessel.
From page 55...
... . Similarly, the regulation of marine traffic by port-level marine safety authorities has not been guided by statistically valid risk assessments although the Coast Guard has applied statistical measures in assessing the need for VTS systems (Maio et al., 19913.
From page 56...
... Although understanding the causes, consequences, and implications of marine accidents that result in major pollution incidents is important, an understanding of the navigation and piloting of all categories of merchant vessels is needed in order to identify and correct systemic problems. The continuing, polarized debate over pilot roles, performance, and licensure, for example, lacks precision.
From page 58...
... The following sections present various perspectives on the changes affecting marine transportation, along with a summary of the debate over pilotage. Marine Industry Issues Rapid developments are taking place in technology, competition, and public concern, accompanied by increases in operating costs and, especially for tankers, in the costs of marine accidents.
From page 59...
... These developments have heightened safety awareness within the marine industry. They have also increased the incentives for improving navigation and pilotage to reduce the economic risk for oil spills resulting from marine accidents (NRC, 1990a, l991c; OSIR, 1993e,k)
From page 60...
... However, recent tanker accidents have motivated some European countries to consider unilateral action to protect their waters from oil spills. Although such action is a potentially powerful means to improve safety, it must be implemented very carefully to avoid economic conflict with other countries.
From page 61...
... Substantial material deficiencies have been detected by Coast Guard inspections of some foreign-flag merchant ships of all types and by pre-charter inspections. Both the Coast Guard and the IMO have alleged substandard oversight by some classification societies that inspect and certify vessel seaworthiness (Bangsberg, 1992; Fairplay, 1992a; Irvine, 1993; Kime, 1992; OSIR, 1993d; Porter, 19941.
From page 62...
... . However, the Coast Guard reports that too many deficiencies are being detected in foreign-flag tankers through its boarding program and that "alarming discrepancies" are being found with regard to the International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
From page 63...
... Particular credit is due the independent marine pilots who play a distinct role in providing expert navigation and piloting services for vessel masters and bridge teams unfamiliar with local ports (Armstrong, 1980; MacElrevey, 1988; Nautical Institute, 1991a; Plummer, 1966; Ramaswamy and Grabowski, 1992; Reid, 1986~. Yet, despite the considerable care and sound judgment exercised by the many reputable mariners and operating companies, a substantial number of marine accidents occur nationwide.
From page 64...
... The available data provide only a limited sense of the causal relationship of pilotage to marine casualties; moreover, the data typically focus on individual vessels rather than on ship, shore-based, or human systems. The Coast Guard is developing a prototype exposure database for multidimensional risk analysis of causal relationships in marine accidents (Abkowitz et al., 1985; Hantzes and Ponce, 1991; USCG, 1993c)
From page 65...
... Whether the differences between federal and state pilotage have translated into unequal safety records also is debated; study results are mixed and are open to question because of the lack of standard methodologies for gathering and assessing safety data. Two analyses of the Coast Guard's casualty data indicate that safety levels of federal pilots are equal to or better than those of various state groups (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1991; USCG, 1993c)


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.