Minding the Helm Marine Navigation and Piloting (1994) / Chapter Skim
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D. A REVIEW OF STUDIES COVERING U.S. NAVIGABLE WATERS
D. A REVIEW OF STUDIES COVERING U.S. NAVIGABLE WATERS
Pages 360-396
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From page 360... ...
The reports reviewed have been grouped by general topic headings, although many topics and reports overlap. The topic groupings in this appendix include state and federal pilot issues, port-level safety analyses, pilot governance and administration, vessel safety, piloting practice, and analyses of marine accidents and incidents.
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From page 362... ...
. 1942 Coast Guard Study The 1942 Coast Guard study delineated the following assets and liabilities of the state and federal pilotage systems: Assets of the State Pilot Systems · It has withstood the test of time.
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From page 363... ...
State pilots were those designated in Coast Guard casualty data as holding a state license, or both a state license and a federal license; non-state-pilots were those performing similar pilotage functions, but "not qualified" for a state license. The report examined comparative performance as represented by pilot-caused accidents for each pilot group during the conduct of equivalent pilotage tasks.
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From page 364... ...
Findings Based on the key factor analysis, the report found that non-state pilot groups had experienced 10 to 20 times the number of pilot-caused accidents as had state pilots. Because of the definition of key factor ratios, this result suggested that, for equivalent task exposure (i.e., an equal number of similar trips in the same environment with equivalent ships)
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From page 365... ...
Inclusion of this data would have favored the federal pilots, increasing the number of tons carried, with no change in the number of accidents. The report assumes that pilot task demands involved in movement of an average ton of cargo are the same for both state and non-state pilots.
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From page 366... ...
Data were not available that would permit a more definitive allocation of tonnages or trips between federal pilots and state-licensed pilots operating on a federal license. Docking-master exposure was estimated based on tonnages and operating practices in pertinent East Coast ports.
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From page 367... ...
By 1988, a dynamic vessel casualty involving a pilot aboard a self-propelled vessel occurred once every 10.5 million tons of cargo moved, or once in every 1,700 vessel trips, which accounted for the reported 40 percent safety improvement. · Over the study period, the relative safety levels of the federal pilots were found to be greater than those of state pilots.
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From page 368... ...
However, the report noted that 50 percent of the dynamic vessel casualties in the Gulf Coast were attributed to state pilots acting on federal licenses, thus doubling the number of dynamic vessel casualties in the federal pilot group and skewing the findings. Analysis The report provides a general baseline for assessing pilot performance and reasonably establishes that marine-pilot performance is improving and that federal and state pilots have comparative safety records.
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From page 369... ...
1993 U.S. Coast Guard Rebuttal to National Transportation Safety Board Petersfield/Bayou Boeaf Recommendations The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1988a)
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From page 370... ...
ETherefore, a] pilot operating under one license type is not inherently safer than a pilot operating under another license type." Thus, this report uses CASMAIN data to support the argument that there is no difference in safety performance between state- and federally licensed pilots.
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From page 371... ...
101-3803; the report satisfied a requirement in the act for a study "to determine and prioritize the U.S. ports and channels that are in need of new, expanded, or improved vessel traffic service systems...." The report analyzes historical vessel casualties and their consequences and projected future vessel casualties and consequences for 23 study zones.
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From page 372... ...
Navigational risk was represented by the number of "VTS addressable" casualties per 100,000 vessel transits, by vessel type and size for each study zone. Using these measures, the report developed national average casualty rates for "VTS addressable" casualties, estimated by vessel type and casualty type.
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From page 373... ...
The findings were divided into a variety of topical areas (that is, avoided vessel casualties, avoided human injuries and death, and avoided hazardous commodity spills) , and aggregate findings were presented that summarized the best sites for maximized NITS cost-benefit ratios.
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From page 374... ...
Usefulness Although not all ports were addressed, the report provides a strong basis for identifying port regions that would benefit from marine traffic regulation in the form of VTS. In addition to its serious treatment of risk analyses, attention to TABLE D-1 VTS Benefits Rank Port Net Benefit ($000)
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From page 375... ...
PILOT GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION The committee observed that the issues surrounding pilot governance and administration have not changed much in the past 50 years. Several deficiencies in state and federal pilot administration and governance were noted in 1942, and several of these same issues were cited as contributory causes in recent National Transportation Safety Board marine accident reports (NTSB, 1986, 1988a, 1989a,b, 1990, l991a,b, 1993)
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From page 376... ...
8503(b) to require that a federally licensed pilot control the movements of foreign vessels and vessels sailing under registry, unless they are required to have a state-licensed pilot aboard the vessel." In response, the Commandant re-ignited the issue of a superior federal license with the following reply: State pilot commissions are strongly urged to exercise disciplinary authority against pilots operating under the authority of state-issued licenses.
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From page 377... ...
The Henn Report agreed with these opinions, concluding that "docking pilots should be subject to either federal or state licensing requirements" and that "all pilots should be subject to Coast Guard disciplinary action if they hold federal licenses." The Commandant of the Coast Guard replied (Kime, 1990) to the Henn Report recommendation with the dictum that: A vessel should be under the control of a state or federally licensed pilot, as appropriate, at any time when it is in pilotage waters and is not anchored or moored.
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From page 378... ...
The report found that U.S. Coast Guard oversight of the Great Lakes Pilotage Program was inadequate, ineffective, and insufficient.
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From page 379... ...
It is composed of five, active, licensed state pilots and five non-pilots appointed by the governor. Of the five non-pilots, two must be actively involved in shipping.
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From page 380... ...
Also interviewed were representatives from the Florida State Pilots Association and the Coast Guard. To compare information about harbor pilot regulation in Florida with that of other states, legislative reports from other states were reviewed; staff responsible for harbor pilot regulation in Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, and the Coast Guard were also interviewed.
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From page 381... ...
The DPR dissented, maintaining that "economic regulation was the least restrictive and most efficient method of regulating the profession...." The regulation issue was not resolved in the report. VESSEL SAFETY The safety of vessels, especially tankers, has been the subject of a number of reports, many examining groundings and collisions and many in reaction to National Transportation Safety Board studies analyzing those collisions and groundings.
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From page 382... ...
, the report found that tank vessel safety was a composite of both material vessel condition and operational safety factors, including watchstanding qualifications, manning levels, crew fatigue, automation, bridge design, information displays, and economic pressures exerted by owner/operators. The study found that "no single factor, or specific combination thereof, could be used to determine the potential risk posed by a tank vessel." Further, the report found that Increased vessel size, sophisticated automation systems?
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From page 383... ...
Consequently, the report recommended that the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers be signed, as it would "insure minimum competency." A similar recommendation was made by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1991 when it recommended that the Coast Guard .
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From page 384... ...
Marine accidents, controversy over pilot safety performance, and the tension between traditional and innovative technologies and operating practices have resulted in a number of related studies. The major studies are reviewed in the following sections.
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From page 385... ...
The group reviewed Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation and National Transportation Safety Board actions connected with pilotage or navigation in confined waters without a pilot. The group studied the efforts of various other groups within the Coast Guard headquarters that were examining any aspect of piloting in confined waters.
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From page 386... ...
The study group received numerous telephone calls, over 200 letters, three studies, and two videotapes in response to the notice. The majority of these responses were from state pilots and federal pilots.
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From page 387... ...
in length be required to carry a pilot when underway in pilotage waters. The study group also recommended that regulations be further amended to clarify the status of docking pilots, specifying that docking pilots be required to have a pilotage endorsement for the appropriate route.
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From page 388... ...
(USCG, 1989) Proper Roles for Federal and State Governments The study group did not concur with the National Transportation Safety Board in its recommendation to make the federal pilot license legally superior to any state license or commission.
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From page 389... ...
The study group recommended that consideration be given to amending the regulations in 33 CFR 164 to make at least some of them applicable to tug-barge combinations of 1,600 gross tons and over. Additional Issues During visits to Regional Examination Centers and in discussions with Coast Guard officers serving as an OCMI, the study group found that the local knowledge questions in pilot's examinations were usually based solely on information contained in the Coast Pilot.
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From page 390... ...
In comparing safety records of tug captains and state pilots, the AWO report cited an analysis of navigational safety on the Hudson River, conducted by AWO in October 1991, comparing the safety performance of state-licensed pilots and federally licensed vessel operators (towing vessel captains and federal first class pilots) on the Hudson River between 1981 and 1989.
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From page 391... ...
was retained by Sonat Marine to evaluate casualties of large (over 5,000 gross registered tons EGRTjJ oceangoing tank barges, compared with those of ships over 1,000 GRT moving within U.S. harbors.
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From page 392... ...
Findings of the report were divided into four categories: casualty data, incident rates, costs of incidents, and costs of pilotage. Casualty Data The report found that oceangoing tank barges over 5,000 GRT were involved in a total of 30 collisions and groundings between 1972 and 1982.
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From page 393... ...
Further, the report found that the $117,253 average cost for incidents of tank barges between 5,000 and 10,000 GRT is nearly equal to the $120,764 average cost for ship incidents. The $26.58 average cost of incidents per port sortie for tank barges greater than 10,000 GRT is one third the $83.79 average cost per port sortie for ships.
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From page 394... ...
ANALYSES OF MARINE ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS As early as 1972, the National Transportation Safety Board identified a number of factors that have played a role in collisions in the navigable waters of the United States (NTSB, 19723. Although human error is frequently cited as a probable cause in collisions, the board found that the underlying reasons for the error, the causal factors, are of greater importance when prescribing preventive measures.
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From page 395... ...
They include a systematic approach to identifying human error elements and interactions in accident reporting; near-miss reporting requirements; new approaches to files and records, as well as to the management of casualty information; and use of standard methodologies and checklists, as well as distributing "best practices" case studies. 1972 National Transportation Safety Board Report Analyses of marine accidents and incidents, and recommendations for preventive measures, have been proposed and pursued for as long as ships and people have been going to sea.
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From page 396... ...
Solutions to the problem that were offered by the board, therefore, focused on attempting to eliminate or significantly reduce the number of collisions, the potential losses involved, or both. This report provides a useful primer for the committee for two reasons: it provides an overview of the committee's tasks, and it demonstrates that these issues, and approaches to their solution, have not changed dramatically in 20 years.
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