Skip to main content

Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

Conceptual Approaches to the Problem of Dual-Use Technologies
Pages 111-116

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 111...
... The other pertains to the possibility that states of the FSU may, for understandable economic reasons, become the source of export for many dual-use technologies to third countries seeking the means to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Both of these concerns remain very real today in the United States and other Western countries, and they continue to figure prominently in the approach which these nations have taken towards assisting in the conversion of defense industries in FSU.
Read the entire page →
From page 112...
... There also has been a series of potentially important proposals discussed within the context of the new COCOM Cooperation Forum in Paris. Before describing and commenting upon what has been proposed there, let me note that the licensing of sensitive dual-use exports to the FSU in the United States has already improved substantially.
Read the entire page →
From page 113...
... From reports ~ have received from those who attended on behalf of the United States, the meeting met or exceeded expectations. The Russian delegation was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berder~nikov, who also held bilateral discussions with the United States while in Paris.
Read the entire page →
From page 114...
... Most of this money would go to the Russian Federation and to the other three republics of the FSU that produce or possess nuclear weapons and advanced dual-use technologies that contribute to weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the United States has offered to conduct workshops and tutorials, both in these countries and in the United States, to explain how to set up the necessary licensing procedures, and so on.
Read the entire page →
From page 115...
... At the same time, the United States and the other COCOM countries must work to speed up the favorable consideration of licenses and help in other direct arid indirect ways to facilitate defense conversion and economic development in the FSU. These steps, together with the bureaucratic measures outlined earlier, should create the possibility of a substantial fisher reduction, if not the virtual elimination, of the These regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the London Suppliers' Group, the Australia Group (for chemical weapons control; soon to be replaced by the Chemical Weapons Convention)
Read the entire page →
From page 116...
... restrictions on technology transfer that have for so long constrained trade and interaction between East and West.
Read the entire page →

Key Terms

  • sensitive technology
  • cocom countries
  • mass destruction
  • proliferation concern
  • nis republics

  • warsaw treaty
  • russian military
  • border controls
  • chemical weapons
  • technology exports

  • weapons convention
  • export control
  • demonstrable evidence
  • western countries
  • russian academy

  • sensitive technologies
  • indigenously produced
  • third countries
  • formal admission
  • improved substantially

  • control policy
  • produced technology
  • look reckless
  • russian delegation
  • control measures

  • bilateral discussions
  • continuing political
  • competent bureaucracy
  • weapons control
  • minister grigory


    • This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
    More information on Chapter Skim is available.