Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994) / Chapter Skim
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Basic Trends in the Development of Mechanisms for Controlling the Export of Dual-Use Products
Basic Trends in the Development of Mechanisms for Controlling the Export of Dual-Use Products
Pages 139-146
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From page 139... ...
Eight nations, including the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain, agreed in 1974 to establish controls on exports of nuclear materials. In connection with this agreement, the signatories drew up a list of controlled materials, equipment and other components used for the creation of nuclear weapons.
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From page 140... ...
In April 1987, the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy established a committee for the control of missile proliferation and agreed to basic control principles, which were set forth in a document entitled the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
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From page 141... ...
A total of 97 private companies from Germany sold modern weapons and military technologies to Iraq, along with 3 ~ companies from Great Britain, 23 from Austria, 22 from the United States, and ~ 9 from France. Firms from other Western European countries, Japan, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt also became involved in this profitable business.
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From page 142... ...
For instance, on the initiative of the United States. and Japan, 26 nations organized the Group of Nuclear Materials and Dual-Use Equipment Suppliers in March 1991.
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From page 143... ...
Therefore, it is envisioned that a fully justifiable insertion be made in the text of the treaty on economic cooperation within the CIS calling for unified export control over shipments of weapons and the technologies used in their manufacture. Within the new framework and on the basis of critical consideration of accumulated export control experience in the West, it is also essential that we improve our own control services charged with ensuring the nonproliferation of strategic weapons.
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From page 144... ...
This body, which would include primarily such countries as the United States, the CIS, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, and Italy, would be charged with coordinating the activities of existing systems for the control of nuclear, chemical and missile weapons and facilitating communications with national control systems, including at the enterprise level. In discussing the future nonproliferation mechanism, Western research studies often express opinions on the participation of COCOM in the process of strategic regulation aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
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From page 145... ...
They are not always focused on goods and technologies which can be directly and productively used to create weapons of mass destruction. Existing export controls have been unable to prevent the increasing transfer of technologies for the production of nuclear missiles and chemical weapons, primarily from large Western European or American military-industrial companies to the developing countries.
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From page 146... ...
Finally, we must remember that the West and particularly the United States will be closely monitoring the actions of the CIS in this area and modifying their own policies in accordance with what they observe. This being the case, an insufficiently responsible approach to the question of strategic regulation will ultimately hinder the integration of our country into the world economy.
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