Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: A Joint Statement of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences
Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: A Joint Statement of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences
Pages 3-32
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 3... ...
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA A Joint Statement of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences April I, 1993
|
From page 5... ...
Previously, the principal concern of the United States and the former Soviet Union were the weapons each possessed in large quantities to use against the other. Today, however, there is growing concern in both the United States and the Russian Federation about the proliferation of SDAs among other nations and sub-state actors (including terrorist organizations)
|
From page 6... ...
Petersburg. During the course of the three meetings, four closely related issues were identified as the principal focus of concern with respect to dual-use technology: export administration, defense conversion, "brain drain," and the need to sustain Russian science and technology development through additional funding and joint activities.
|
From page 7... ...
If defense conversion in the Russian Federation does not proceed expeditiously and comprehensively, the financial pressure on Russian defense industry to export technology and weapons to whomever will buy them will continue to grow and thus undercut efforts to limit destabilizing transfers of arms and dual-use technologies. This development will make it much more difficult to agree upon or harmonize export administration measures on dual-use technology for the purpose of controlling proliferation.
|
From page 8... ...
This phenomenon is often referred to as the "brain drain." While the scope of this discussion was not intended to cover the entire range of issues associated with the problem, one aspect does strongly impinge upon the consideration of sensitive dual technology-namely, the brain drain of scientists and engineers possessing expert knowledge on the design, testing, and construction of SDAs who move to countries of proliferation concern. Controlling this highly dangerous type of brain drain, the extent of which is not accurately known, must be a high priority of both countries.
|
From page 9... ...
These issues focus both on the residual problem of diversion of dual-use end products and process technology to military applications within the Russian Federation and on the possibility that technology, end products, and/or know-how could be made available to countries of proliferation concern. 4 This section was written by the members of the NAS delegation, and its inclusion in the Joint Statement does not necessarily imply that the Russian delegation endorses or shares the viewpoints presented below.
|
From page 10... ...
At the same time, the revelations about the proliferation of SDAs resulting from the recent war in the Persian Gulf and from the activities of certain other countries, have resulted in a substantial upgrading of this problem, relative to the old challenges of the Cold War era, as a priority national security concern. There are, however, two key differences between the new security threat posed by SDAs and the old Cold War concerns.
|
From page 11... ...
In Russia, the structure of the technology base is currently quite different from that of the United States, but the end result may be the same. The Russian defense technology and industrial base historically has been clearly dominant, while the commercial base, in many cases an offshoot of the defense base, has not succeeded in producing affordable and quality consumer goods to any significant degree.
|
From page 12... ...
Confidence Building The United States continues to maintain a number of significant concerns regarding the willingness and actual ability of the Russian Federation, as the largest republic of the former Soviet Union, to control militarily sensitive dual-use technologies. Foremost among these concerns is the prospect for a Tong-term, stable situation in which a market economy and a politically open democracy can take root and grow.
|
From page 13... ...
Third, the establishment of sovereignty in the new states of the former USSR is unfortunately being accompanied by the weakening of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, a rise in crime, and the formation of organized crime syndicates which include civil servants. The problem of non-proliferation is also exacerbated by the unification of organized crime structures on an international level.
|
From page 14... ...
Russia must now find a compromise between prescriptions for economic growth and necessities for economic survival. This process also will be influenced by trade restrictions due to both Western, and primarily American, export administration concerns and the legitimate national security interests of the Russian Federation.
|
From page 15... ...
This process, as discussed above, may raise several concerns about the proliferation of sensitive dual-use technologies, and the successful and safe transfer of these technologies is largely dependent on two issues: defense conversion and the efficacy of Russian export administration structures. The conversion of Russian defense industries may have both positive and negative impacts on Russia's economy and national security and the building of trust between Russia and Western partners.
|
From page 16... ...
(Note: the Presidential decree on Dual-Use Technologies was passed a few days after the end of the NAS-RAS meeting in December, 1992.) Expert scientific support for Russian export administration activities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, is provided by the RAS council on export control.
|
From page 17... ...
and Western Europe and to join the various international regimes related to export administration. It also believes that Western countries must be sensitive not to use a double standard against Russia in regard to international weapons and technology sales.
|
From page 18... ...
a pressing need to effectively implement export administration 18
|
From page 19... ...
and Western export administration policies in the wake of recent revelations concerning the capabilities of certain states to develop SDAs. In the Russian Federation, the government must strive to complete the establishment of an export administration legal authority, effective licensing mechanisms, and enforcement capabilities.
|
From page 20... ...
Given the sensitivity of this technology, however, the Russian Federation will need to fully implement existing export administration laws, and demonstrate its ability to enforce those laws, before the U.S. government will permit the export of a supercomputer.
|
From page 21... ...
Such programs might be modeled, for example, on the Mexican National System of Researchers or similar Japanese programs which provide supplementary support to outstanding scientists and engineers. The Russian and United States governments and scientific and technical communities should seek to ensure that the various centers and programs which support Russian scientists are fully and effectively utilized to help prevent the sale of sensitive technology and brain drain.
|
From page 22... ...
2. After the point is reached when Russian export administration laws are fully implemented and enforced and as initial experience with sensitive cooperation proves reassuring, the two countries may want to consider eventually conducting audits of each other's export administration reporting, in some instances, in place of on-site inspections.
|
From page 23... ...
7. The two countries should participate in a variety of international fore, both governmental and non-governmental, that address issues related to dual-use technologies and export administration (e.g., UN, CSCE, SIPRI, IISS, etc.)
|
From page 24... ...
Although the dissolution of the USSR left Russia with approximately 80% of the capacity of Soviet defense enterprises and about 90% of its engineering-design and scientific potential, the 20% and ~ 0% of the respective remaining potentials that are located in other former republics do include unique production facilities and laboratories. Consequently, certain states of the CIS, including the Russian Federation, will have to coordinate their lists of restricted dual-use technologies.
|
From page 25... ...
With the increasing globalization of economic relations, this process is clearly influenced by both the requirements and the restrictions imposed due to Western, and primarily American, export administration concerns and the legitimate national security interests of the Russian Federation. These contradictions are focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the following issues: The crisis in the Russian economy and barriers to Western, including American, investment that are caused by the non-convertibility of the ruble, differences in business management, etc.
|
From page 26... ...
The establishment of these agreements is particularly needed so that technologies imported from the West are not uncontrollably transferred into the Russian military industrial complex and, more importantly, are not re-exported. Similarly, these agreements are also needed so that technologies which result from Russian defense conversion are not diverted to military applications armor re-exported to third countries.
|
From page 27... ...
Access to Technology of Proliferation Concern Defense research and industries virtually never received any "spin-on" technologies from the civilian sector of the economy in the former USSR, and it should be noted that Russia has inherited the more or less destroyed Soviet economic structures, which operated neither efficiently nor productively and constantly experienced shortages of resources. New technologies were, however, "spun-off' to civilian industries from the military, and the state's central planning bodies did stipulate that a certain percentage of military production had to be dedicated to civilian goods.
|
From page 28... ...
This situation exists because the basic principles of Gorbachev's policies, and the Union structures which supported them, involved blocking the development of Russian ~nv~r~i ~rntv anti thwarting the formation of Russian state structures to the greatest extent possible. Thus the Connation of these Russian institutions really began only after August 1991, and the creation of an export administration started only in the summer of 1992.
|
From page 29... ...
Expert scientific support for Russian export administration activities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, is provided by the RAS council on export control, augmented as a result of the previous RussianAmerican interacademy meetings by a special RAS Presidium group on dual-use technologies and related issues. To accelerate the convergence of Russian export administration policies with international standards in effectiveness and reliability, it is necessary to address the following issues: .
|
From page 30... ...
At the same time, Russia must consider the alliance obligations of the United States and its own European interests at a time when a number of states -- both former republics of the USSR and former Warsaw Pact members -- plan their defense doctrines based on potential confrontation with Russia. The Russian Federation thus has an obvious interest in developing political and economic relations with West European countries and building trust in all spheres, including military-strategic cooperation.
|
From page 31... ...
First and foremost are the following international regimes: COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS (COCOM) It is necessary to consider the changed international situation which places the need for a transformation of COCOM on the agenda.
|
From page 32... ...
If Russia leaves the international weapons market for economic reasons or in accordance with political agreements, its place will immediately be taken by arms merchants from other countries, including the United States., and often in contravention of the laws of these countries. In the absence of adequate economic compensation, such a situation is economically and politically unacceptable for Russia and constitutes an unhealthy factor hindering the establishment of trust.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.