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2 Workshop Discussions and Key Themes
Pages 9-20

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From page 9...
... CURRENT TECHNOLOGICAL AND GOVERNMENT POLICY CHALLENGES Current Department of Defense (DoD) policy guidance pertaining to secure and reliable microelectronic components is covered by DoD Instruction (DoDI)
From page 10...
... In add dition to DoD 4140.67 and DoDI 5200.44, DoDI 5000.02 req DI a quires govern nment and ind dustry program managers to em m mploy system security engi m ineering and p prepare and m maintain a proggram protection plan (PPP) throoughout the accquisition life cycle of a we e eapon system 6 According to the speake from OSD, a PPP m.
From page 11...
... Lastly, embedded systems were noted by multiple participants to be the next big policy issue in the area of secure and reliable microelectronics. The issue is that third-party providers who supply the embedded systems are not scrutinized by the DoD program protection policies being imposed on the discrete component providers.
From page 12...
... either had under way or was starting to ensure the provenance of future integrated circuit parts. For example, the Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD)
From page 13...
... A key re equirement of the DARPA SHIELD prog S gram is adopti of this tag ion ggant techniq by the bro que oader commer rcial industry. This is a necessary requirement to re n each the cost targets and uultimate integr ration of this technology innto the integrated circuit su upply chain.
From page 14...
... With these two options in consideration, this participant suggested evaluating the scenarios highlighted in Box 2-1. A second challenge related to current acquisition processes for acquiring secure and reliable microelectronic components are relationships between government and industry program offices.
From page 15...
... H , ms Engineering Committee, Na ational Defense Industry Asso ociation, prese entation to the workshop o n March 17, 2 e 2016.
From page 16...
... This participant believed that it is important in any formal assessment of component acquisition that one include considerations as to the trust associated with the test equipment employed over the life of a given system and its components. Key Theme 4 -- Acquisition System Implementation of DoDI 5200.44 Multiple speakers and participants (e.g., Kristen Baldwin, Brian Cohen, Harriet Goldman, and Daniel Marrujo)
From page 17...
... f om ed split fabri ication is bein reviewed by SMC as a possible alter ng b rnative to los of the curre trusted foundry ss ent model. Anoth possible business model for acquiri secure and reliable mic her b ing d croelectronic components is the approach taken by the KCNSC under the Depart tment of Ener rgy, as summ marized in Figu 2-6.
From page 18...
... A rep presentative f from OSD rem marked that th plan to re on hey ely their test and verification skills to va a alidate the tru of their mi ust icroelectronic components c s. Other approaches for managing security and reliability ri sks include th following: (1)
From page 19...
... NOTE: SCRM, Supply Chain Risk Management. SOURCE: Kent Devenport, Technical Manager, NNSA Kansas City National Security Campus, p g p , g , y y p , presentation to the workshop on p March 17, 2016.
From page 20...
... Key Theme 7 -- New Fabrication Methods to Replace Trusted Foundry Model Multiple participants (e.g., Kristen Baldwin, Kerry Bernstein, Brett Hamilton, Carl McCants, and Daniel Marrujo) noted that one common vision to secure trusted components is to develop fabrication methods that ensure the microelectronics can be protected from alteration, controlled, and verified.


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