Purposeful Jettison of Petroleum Cargo (1994) / Chapter Skim
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Part III Considerations in Making Time-critical Decisions
Part III Considerations in Making Time-critical Decisions
Pages 143-174
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From page 143... ...
Proceedings of the Symposium on the Purposeful Jettison of Cargo PART 111: CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING TIME-CRITICAL DECISIONS
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From page 144... ...
It is almost always the cumulative effect of a series of unique events which finally trigger a disaster. An 80,000-ton tanker is enroute from Mexico to a refinery on the Delaware River with a cargo of 7S,500 tons of Isthmus crude oil.
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: :~ : : ~: ~ ~ ~ : ~ : I:: ~ ~:~ FIGURE 2. Track of ship and hurricane.
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FIGURE 3. Area of grounding.
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This was the shortest time in which a lighter~ng vessel or a tug could be on scene. Based on data in their files and sounding information from the captain, the owner's technical experts and the class society naval architects calculated that the vessel could not be refloated by internal transfer of cargo.
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: - ~ : : ~FIGURE 4. Two-thousand tons spilled.
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~ hope this scenario and the proposed decision process wait provide the basis to determine if a jettison decision could ever be the right decision; and if it could, how do you reach that conclusion. Captain Kenneth Fullwood is Manager of Maritime Relations7 Environmental Affairs Safety and Nautical Services for Mobil Shipping & Transportation Co.
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In this case, the approaching hurricane makes these criteria of paramount importance. 1 The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone, and should not be construed to reflect the views of the United States Coast Guard7 the Department of Transportation or any government entity.
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Based on the spill trajectory, would consult the vulnerability index maps for the outer banks and determine resources at risk. ~ would ask my NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator to head up this task and report to me any extraordinary environmental, economic, or political resources at risk that would require special consideration prior to making a decision.
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From page 155... ...
~ would consult the local area contingency plan that has been developed by local, state, and federal government agencies to determine if there are any particular considerations for the Cape Hatteras Outer Banks area that ~ should consider in addition to the above criteria before making a recommendation to jettison. In making and implementing the decision to jettison, ~ would receive recommendations from my staff, the master, and the qualified individual (as required by the OPA 90 vessel response plan)
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From page 156... ...
Another good prevention strategy, a good response strategy, would be to have lighter~ng and salvage capability closer to areas of high risk, such as Cape Hatteras. In really looking closer at this scenario and considering ways to facilitate jettison, ~ fear that we may create a disincentive for shippers to secure lighter~ng and salvage services through contract and to ensure that those contracts are readily available on their shipping routes.
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From page 157... ...
Department of the Interior, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, and the National Audubon Society, before joining the staff of the National Wildlife Federation, in 1987. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Ms.
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From page 158... ...
and why or why not? If we accept the scenario as fact and if the owner's technical experts, the class society, our own evaluation, and the vessel's master all believe that if the vessel is not refloated prior to the hurricane she will break apart, then we would advocate discharging some oil to save both the vessel and the environment from greater danger.
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From page 159... ...
Additional considerations when contemplating a purposeful jettison of cargo (oil) Determination of location, likely path, and/or destination of the product should it be jettisoned.
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While it may be argued that the salvor can avail itself of the responder immunity provisions of OPA 90, we would like to see this section amended to specifically include salvage, along with care and assistance. Regarding the area committees, unless tough issues such as jettison can be recognized and addressed by these committees in their local port area contingency plans prior to the incident, procedural avenues established by OPA 90 become too cumbersome and contain too many adverse interests to allow for a timely decision in an emergency.
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From page 161... ...
He has a bachelor's degree in finance from the University of Texas and a law degree from the South Texas College of Law. He is a member of the Maritime Law Association of the United States, the Houston Mariners Club, and the Propeller Club, Port of Houston.
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assume that this vessel also has a fair amount of ballast space. ~ would ask the salvage masters and naval architects if there is some way we could break the ground suction and get the vessel off by either pumping water from one side to the other very 162
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Roger Gale is manager of shipping and logistics for BP Oil Company. He was educated at the Worthing High School in the UK, then went on to the Royal Thames Nautical Training College, from there to King Edward Vll Nautical College, and then to Sir John Cass College in the UK.
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From page 164... ...
When the salvage engineer comes to a scene, he or she and often doesn't have many facts as to the exact condition of the vessel, the weather conditions, lay of the land, and so on. For this panel discussion ~ presumed that the only facts available to the salvor and salvage engineer are the ones presented in Captain Fullwood's scenario.
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From page 165... ...
He has been working exclusively as a salvage engineer since 1983. He has a bachelor of science degree in engineering and naval architecture and a master's degree in .
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From page 166... ...
Identification of lightering equipment within specified time frames based on a distance from shore is now going to be required in contingency planning. The contingency planning process specifies that you must be able to show that you have identified, although not yet contracted for (contracting is about five years off, according to the Coast Guard's current program)
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From page 167... ...
From my standpoint, the answer would be not to jettison because ~ do not have clearcut legal authority to do so. However, if the National Contingency Plan is amended to create the potential for authorization (this would require the blessings of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Coast Guard)
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From page 168... ...
~ am hopeful that the Marine Salvage Committee, with input from this symposium's deliberations, might provide guidance to the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency, and others about what elements of the National Contingency Plan should be scrutinized to formulate the checklist of minimum alternatives that must be reviewed prior to making a jettison decision. Peter Bontadelli is administrator of the Office of Oil Prevention and Response and California's on-scene coordinator for all spills of 100,000 gallons or greater.
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What would be the state of spill response today if the Coast Guard took the same attitude in the regulations for spill response that they did with salvage? Would there be a Marine Spill Response ~_ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ v ~ ~ ~ 1619
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MR. BONTADELLI: Effectively, most states have provisions within their statutes that require that state programs not be in conflict with the National Contingency Plan.
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Are we being negligent by saying in five years we will have something more than we have today? Two years ago we didn't have the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC)
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WILLEAM GRAY, SKAARUP OIL CORPORATION: Pete Bontadelli alluded to the fact that the decision not to have to precontract for salvage and firefighting capability came out of the Coast Guard's negotiated rulemaking for vessel contingency plans. Is this a recognition that you cannot force people to do things that cannot be done because those capabilities don't exist in the way we want?
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From page 173... ...
The minute it goes aground, you are in deep hockey, and it goes from bad to worse from that point on. ~ honestly believe that jettisoning has a place.
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MR. BERNS: ~ just wanted to let you know that in the Exxon VaZclez situation, the Exxon Baton Rouge was coming up Prince William Sound.
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