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A Review of the Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice (1995) / Chapter Skim
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1 CONTEXT
Pages 15-22

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From page 15...
... Because the former Soviet Union had a sophisticated nuclear weapons capability, extreme measures were not necessary to prevent its access to old designs or out~atecl production techniques for the simple reason that Soviet technologists already possessed such information. The new priority given to nonproliferation requires keeping information from nations or parties that are less technically sophisticated than the former Soviet Union.
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From page 16...
... consequences of the facilities; and the public acknowledgment of past activities, some of which were wholly at odds with current requirements. While DOE's stewardship for the nuclear weapons complex remains an important responsibility, the Secretary has correctly decided that the Department cannot restore the confidence of the public that it is forthrightly confronting its past without a policy of greater public access to information.
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From page 17...
... Although considerable information concerning the design and construction of nuclear weapons is in the public domain, access to a portion of it must be severely restricted because it could be exploited by a terrorist or by a state seeking to develop or improve nuclear arsenals. DOE would fail in its responsibilities if it did not protect such information.
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From page 18...
... Making information available that in part has been kept cIassifiec! -- ES&H effects of the weapons complex on the public; the numbers, kinds, or disposition of existing nuclear weapons; and the verifiability of nuclear testing -- would illuminate the debate on and scrutiny of important public issues.
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From page 19...
... Although the Iraqis do not appear to have gained access to U.S. classified information relating to nuclear weapons, numerous instances of outright criminality by people with access to classified information can be cited.
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From page 20...
... Another obstacle is the fact that any change in Department-wide policy may have only limited and delayed practical impact at the level at which classification actions are taken. All government programs have a certain measure of "momentum," by which we mean that changes in actual behavior occur slowly and only with the application of significant public, political, or other force.
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From page 21...
... As discussed in the next chapter, DOE must coordinate policies and procedures for certain types of nuclear weapons information with other departments, particularly DOD. Achieving interagency consensus on greater openness and public access to information can be clifficult.
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Key Terms

  • weapons complex
  • weapons information
  • classification policy
  • public access
  • soviet bloc

  • security measures
  • public domain
  • existing nuclear
  • potential adversary
  • restricted data

  • nuclear weapon
  • former soviet
  • adversary access
  • foreseeable proliferator
  • keeping information

  • total capability
  • workable world
  • personnel allowed
  • fissionable materials
  • capability greatly

  • trivial undertaking
  • outright criminality
  • personnel security
  • direct financial
  • growing concern

  • growing collection
  • greatly exceeds
  • behavior occur
  • classify information
  • production techniques


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