A Review of the Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice (1995) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
3 BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
3 BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
Pages 39-52
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 39... ...
DOE's earlier study of classification policy, based on an extensive series of interviews throughout the DOE complex, concluded that "there is an almost universal belief that there is too much material to protect since some of it is now unnecessarily classified, or too highly classified. As a result, overcIassification interferes with the protection of truly sensitive information." In creating the new Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Congress reached a similar conclusion: The burden of managing more than 6 million newly classified documents every year has led to tremendous administrative expense, reduced communication within the government and within the scientific community, reducer!
|
From page 40... ...
are classified merely by virtue of their existence without anyone having to make a classification decision -- they are "born classified." Without some affirmative act, all such information remains classified indefinitely. Many believe that since the enactment of the AEA in 1954, DOE and its predecessor agencies have used this authority to maintain secrecy about many of their activities, with little or no balancing of the harm that might result from disclosure with the cletrimental costs -- to health, safety, scientific development, and democratic decision making -- that secrecy might create.
|
From page 41... ...
Balancing costs and risks Information should be classified only if the damage to the national security clearly outweighs both the public interest in disclosure of the information and the costs of attempting to prevent such disclosure. The Joint Security Commission noted, Security is a balance between opposing equities.
|
From page 42... ...
The criteria are described as "typical of those which must be evaluated in determining whether publication would present 'undue risk' to the common defense and security." These criteria provide a good start, but the Committee believes that they should be expanded to include explicitly the benefits of openness in enabling an informed public debate on public issues and, more generally, in enhancing the public's right to know what its government is doing. The Committee also believes that the public availability of information, which is included in DOE's current list of criteria, warrants careful consideration in declassification decisions.
|
From page 43... ...
program from the declassification action, including any significant technology commercialization potential. The extent to which the information would assist in the development of a nuclear weapon capability in nonnuclear weapon states or in improvements to the weapons in a nuclear weapon state.
|
From page 44... ...
DOE's goal should be "open policies openly arrived at." To the maximum extent possible, the debates about new information-control policies should be open to the public, with ample and credible opportunities for public inputs. DOE needs to provide for formal external input in the review process.
|
From page 45... ...
Such a Board could provide a means for informed and direct discussions between DOE and knowledgeable outsiders on a more continuing and intensive basis than is possible with single public meetings. It wouicI also facilitate direct discussion among the affected communities, which could provide useful insights about balancing different points of view in establishing the new policy.9 It couIct perform a variety of other functions as well, which are discussed in later chapters; for example, the Board could render nonbinding but public recommendations to DOE concerning the justification for classifying specific categories of information or for deciding not to declassify information in response to a request for declassification.
|
From page 46... ...
DOE should promptly release a final version of its report entitled "Public Guidelines to Department of Energy Classification of Information." The Committee commencts DOE's release of a draft of this report for public comment on June 27, 1994. The document should serve to relieve the concern that the public has been insufficiently informed about the boundaries between uncIassif~ecI and classified information, and that in fact much of the knowledge of these boundaries is in itself classified.
|
From page 47... ...
DOE shares with DOD the authority to remove some information primarily related to military use of atomic weapons from the category of RD if the agencies determine it can be adequately protected as national security ° Meridian Corporation, 1992.
|
From page 48... ...
, however, FRD cannot be transferred to any other country except as part of an agreement authorized as part of the AEA. Because this constraint appears needlessly confining, DOE should seek legislative authority to simply transclassify to NSl any RD that no longer warrant special protection as nuclearrelated information but still may be sensitive for other military or diplomatic reasons, thus permitting elimination of the entire category of FRD.~2 Elimination of the FRD category and transcIassification to MIST would eliminate some international complications caused by the requirements for controls over FRD.~3 It would also subject such information to Exec.
|
From page 49... ...
The Department points to the major cleciassification actions already taken by the Secretary as evidence that significant steps can be taken without any legislation.~4 The Committee notes that some of the specific amendments proposed by DOE can, and shouicI, be incorporated directly in DOE policy now. One important policy change would be establishing a systematic declassification review of existing documents containing RD, based on priorities reflecting public needs and interests, and on available resources.ii Exec.
|
From page 50... ...
12,958 Greatly forbids use of classification as NSI "in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or aciministrative error; prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrain competition; or prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security."~9 Essentially identical prohibitions are also contained in DOE's regulation concerning unclassified controlled nuclear information (UCNT) .20 However, there are no such prohibitions with respect to RD and FRD in DOE's basic order governing cIassif~cation.2~ Such prohibitions should extend to RD and FRD.22 Further, it should be made clear that delay of declassification of RD or FRD for any of the prohibited reasons is also an abuse.
|
From page 51... ...
While less permanent than legislation, such rules are not subject to the vagaries and delay associated with the legislative process; within the constraints of current law, DOE can proceed with rulemaking on its own initiative and schedule. Second, use of a rulemaking process is consistent with the goal of "open policies openly arriver} at." A rulemaking provides a welluncierstood and accepted mechanism for formal public input, which should increase understanding, and potentially acceptance, of DOE classification control policies.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.