A Review of the Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice (1995) / Chapter Skim
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4 ISSUES IN CLASSIFICATION POLICY
4 ISSUES IN CLASSIFICATION POLICY
Pages 53-66
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From page 53... ...
Examples include declassification of information relevant to development of civilian reactors, information on reprocessing, and recently, most information relating to inertial confinement fusion. Significant issues remain to be addressed, however, especially regarding nuclear weapons information.
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From page 54... ...
The Committee agrees with the view of President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management: One of the national security responsibilities of DOE leadership is to make available sufficient information to allow informed public debate on nuclear weapon issues. The Task Group urges that DOE review its classification procedures to ensure that criteria are based upon current requirements rather than historical precedent.4 DOE has only taken initial steps toward the declassification of information that will help to inform the public debate about nuclear weapons policy.
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From page 55... ...
More aggressive declassification would greatly aid historical reconstruction of crucial actions regarding nuclear weapons policy, research, development, testing, and production and would be of invaluable assistance to scholars and policy analysts seeking to learn the lessons of the Cold War. While the declassification of documents containing recently classified information, at least on a large scale, is a substantial and timeconsuming undertaking, it should be possible to release information of major interest in summary form.
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From page 56... ...
2. Transparency vis-a-vis the Russians At their summit meeting in January 1994, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the goal of ensuring the "transparency and irreversibility" of the nuclear arms reduction process.5 In addition, the United States is currently engaged in negotiations with Russia to persuade it to strengthen controls over the management of special nuclear material, as well as over spent nuclear fuel from the commercial fuel cycle.
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From page 57... ...
The 1992 Senate resolution-approving ratification of START ~ included the "Biden Condition," which required the President to seek arrangements to monitor stockpiles of weapons ant} fissile materials in the United States and the former Soviet Union using "reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures."7 The Defense Authorization Act for FYl993 permitted declassification of stockpile information in the context of an agreement between the United States and Russia for release of such data.8 As a further step in this directions the Defense Authorization Act for FYI995 allows a one-year period (unti! December 3 I, 1995)
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From page 58... ...
DOE should continue to pursue reciprocal exchanges of information with Russia. Specifically, the Department should explore arrangements in which each party to the exchange retains the right to allow or prevent the public release of the information that it is providing to the other party, so that disagreements about whether information should be publicly released do not obstruct mutually beneficial exchanges.
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From page 59... ...
B The Special Case of UCNI In 1981 Congress gave the Secretary of Energy authority, un(ler section 148 of the AEA, to prohibit the unauthorized dissemination of a category of information designated unclassified controlled nuclear information or UCNI.
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From page 60... ...
The concept of information control beyond classification runs counter to the objective of focusing resources on protecting truly sensitive information. Moreover, the application of UCNI over the years seems to have drifted some distance from the language of the AEA and DOE's implementing regulation.
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From page 61... ...
15,818 (1985~. 20"Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information," a two-page paper dated February 3, 1994, and subtitled "Unclassified but Sensitive Information" (no author identified)
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From page 62... ...
None of the studies addressing UCNI that were provided to the Committee contained any quantitative analysis that supports the argument that it is impractical to control security-related information about facilities through classification as NSI.23 The Committee recommends that DOE evaluate the costs and feasibility of treating sensitive information related to facility security either as a special category of national security information (NSI) or, alternatively, as unclassified information not subject to special controls.
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From page 63... ...
DOE's study of classification policy raises questions about its authority to extend UCNI controls to proliferation-related information. The AEA focuses on "illegal production of nuclear weapons." This phrase does not clearly apply to production of weapons by sovereign nations or even by subnational groups outside the Unitecl states.25 Moreover, the definition has important areas of ambiguity; the reference to "the design of production facilities or utilization facilities" could be interpreted as applying only to information about existing facilities that could be useful to a terrorist in planning an attack, not to snore abstract information that could help a proliferator construct and operate such facilities.26 If UCNI 24 Meridian Corporation, 1992, p.
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From page 64... ...
In apparent recognition of this, DOE proposes an amendment to the AEA to allow classification of new information in areas that have been previously declassified.28 Before seeking an amendment to the AEA, however, DOE should carefully reexamine the "traditional interpretation" that the AEA precludes such action. If a reinterpretation is possible, the proposed regulation dealing with RD cliscussecI below should include a section providing for classification of new information in broad areas of information that have been decIassifiecl, based on a clear demonstration that uncontrolled release of this new information would cause an "undue risk" to national security.
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From page 65... ...
Since Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information is less sensitive than classified information, its protection and access requirements are also less stringent... If the only option to protect sensitive information were to classify it, much information of lesser sensitivity would be overprotected and denied to those who have a legitimate need to have it" (U.S.
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From page 66... ...
It is difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider, even with some diligence, to obtain a clear picture of the scope, application, and rationale for UCNI from available documents. The legally required quarterly reports on UCNI decisions provide little insight into the underlying rationale for the decisions.
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