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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pages 1-10

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From page 1...
... The primary concern of protecting information related to nuclear weapons has shifted to stemming the threat of nuclear proliferation. This complicates some aspects of maintaining the classification system.
From page 2...
... No foreseeable new nuclear state would pose a threat to the United States and its allies comparable to the threat from the former Soviet bloc. Thus, information that could have helped Soviet bloc war planners, such as the size and composition of fissionable materials inventories or data on most past nuclear weapons activities (but not designs)
From page 3...
... Minimizing the areas that are classified. Classification is clearly necessary when uncontrolled release of sensitive information could threaten national security.
From page 4...
... Information should be ciassif~e~i only if the damage to national security demonstrably outweighs both the public benefit from the disclosure of that information and the costs of attempting to prevent such disclosure. Such a balancing test should be based on an agreed-upon set of criteria for declassification review that has been developed with adequate opportunity for public input.
From page 5...
... , the authority to remove some information primarily related to military use of atomic weapons from the category of RD if the agencies determine it can be adequately protected as national security information. This category of information is called formerly restricted data (FRD)
From page 6...
... The DOE has taken important but only initial steps toward declassification of information that will help inform the public debate about nuclear weapons policy. One example is nuclear weapons tests.
From page 7...
... Over the years the uses of UCNI have broadened to controlling a wide range of proliferation-sensitive information, such as data with both technical and nuclear weapons-relatec} applications. But the legislative base for UCNT was never updated to reflect this expander!
From page 8...
... Portion marking ofthose areas containing classified information should be required, as well as segregating the classified portions whenever possible. For documents containing information of significant interest to the public, preparing unclassified versions could help where segregation is not practical.
From page 9...
... Without such sustained effort, the inertia of traditional practice and the sheer size of the challenges that must be overcome to achieve meaningful change will needlessly delay reform efforts. Secretary O'Leary and DOE have undertaken important initiatives to achieve greater public access to information anti greater departmental accountability for the information DOE controls.


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