Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
1 Deterrence: An Overview
1 Deterrence: An Overview
Pages 10-38
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 10... ...
And yet, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence still loom large, because of the weapons' vast and instantaneous destructive power. In addition, the slow but apparently inexorable spread of those and other weapons of mass destruction raises issues that cannot be ignored.
|
From page 11... ...
interests by states using powerful conventional forces or chemical and biological weapons; Active defense against ballistic missiles attacking the United States; and Assessments of the extent to which less-than-vital U.S. interests might justify the use of military force, with attendant casualties, in the eyes of the American public.
|
From page 12... ...
Military force used in some form and to some degree underpins all types of deterrence. In the context of an overall policy, however, military force is likely to be only one tool among many diplomatic, economic, political, and military responses or anticipatory actions designed to guide development of an international interaction in directions that will prevent an outcome inimical to our interests.
|
From page 13... ...
Creating this understanding is an essential underpinning for U.S. and allied deterrence policy and action, and yet it is sometimes neglected to the detriment of those policies.
|
From page 14... ...
The possibility of attack by weapons designed to produce mass casualties might be an entirely different matter. As discussion below makes clear, it is not always apparent what the promised means of response should be, and deterrence of such attacks may be deemed to require means, such as theater missile defense, that entail both tangible and intangible costs that we have yet to face squarely.
|
From page 15... ...
The likelihood that the United States may become involved in warfare using conventional forces, initiated by states other than the major powers, in matters involving less than national survival, has increased, while the relative roles of nuclear and conventional weapons have changed. In connection with the nuclear threat we now must place more emphasis on issues of proliferation, while conventional forces are becoming increasingly important for deterrence in the strategic sense.
|
From page 16... ...
Steps in this direction often involve military forces because they are well organized, they are disciplined, they can act quickly and with unique ability to focus resources, and the activities often need protection. After Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the humanitarian mission for the U.S.
|
From page 17... ...
survival for the foreseeable future, may take on increasing political significance for Moscow as one of the few residual military supports for its status as a major power, after the serious deterioration of other Russian military capabilities. A more immediate danger is posed by the possible loss to outside forces of Russian nuclear warheads, or nuclear materials and expertise that would enable others to make nuclear weapons in a relatively short time.
|
From page 18... ...
A second problem, which the experience of the Gulf War has led us to associate closely with the so-called rogue regimes, is the role of active defense against delivery of weapons of mass destruction by long-range ballistic missiles. Through a series of arms control agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union limited their defenses against ballistic missiles, and as a mutually agreed result both remained vulnerable in the interest of deterring a nuclear war.
|
From page 19... ...
Examples of the last include the Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Tel Aviv during the Gulf War, and the significance for Japan of the prospect of North Korean long-range missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. The problems entailed in stopping or even slowing proliferation will tax our ability to craft consistent and effective deterrence policies.
|
From page 20... ...
This demonstration has value in deterring major attacks with conventional forces, but as noted above that value might become less certain should another opponent, or Iraq in a future action, have nuclear weapons at the outset. Thus, one is led to the conclusion that both are necessary: powerful conventional weapons that we are willing to use in a strategic sense, and a nuclear deterrent that nobody would challenge by using nuclear weapons against us.
|
From page 21... ...
Had that happened, the same area would clearly have come to be of vital concern to the United States as well as to the others involved, and it was that risk that induced the United States to lead a strong effort, including military action, to terminate the ongoing war there. It was also argued that the need, on purely humanitarian grounds, to prevent mass murder of genocidal proportions offered sufficient reason for intervention.
|
From page 22... ...
However, several adversaries have not been deterred because they judged that the United States lacked the political will to incur casualties, sustain costs, take risks, and deepen its involvement when vital interests were not at stake. Also, many potential adversaries probably doubt that the United States will use nuclear weapons short of responding to a major nuclear attack on the United States or U.S.
|
From page 23... ...
Strategic games, such events as movements of British forces to Kuwait in 1961, and apparently the prelude to the Gulf War and the October 1994 U.S. deployment to the Gulf to counter threatening Iraqi troop movements, all suggest that movement of forces when a crisis appears Penitent, perhaps together with verbal communications, has a more powerful effect than forces that remain in their precrisis posture, however powerful the latter may be.
|
From page 24... ...
If the deterrent effort will require a substantial commitment of resources over a sustained period especially the lives of soldiers-then the stakes must be very high. In a related area, civilian casualties inflicted on an opponent also raise humanitarian concerns that affect the severity of punitive actions we will be willing to take, given the stakes.
|
From page 25... ...
Coupling of Nuclear Weapons with Other Forces The discussion about whether to separate or integrate nuclear and conventional forces to deter war takes on a different significance and orientation under current circumstances. During the Cold War, the issue was resolved in favor of integration in both Europe and the Pacific, mainly on the grounds that such integration helped offset the unfavorable conventional balance.
|
From page 26... ...
Chemical weapons effects, deadly though they may be locally, would not be widespread enough to call forth a devastating nuclear response. Response to the use of biological weapons, if used against our own or allies' civilian populations, could face the difficulty of identifying the source, as well as the considerable time delay that might occur between the distribution of agents and the appearance of mass casualties.
|
From page 27... ...
Humanitarian concerns about opponents' civilian casualties will also figure in selection of targets, since if the weapons of mass destruction are used by a "rogue regime" that is seen as not representing the will of its people, there will be U.S. public resistance to inflicting severe punishment on civilians who might be viewed as the regime's additional innocent victims.
|
From page 28... ...
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Precision-Guided Munitions At the core of the concept of deterrence is the known ability to inflict damage that the opponent will view as unacceptable. Therefore nuclear weapons have come to be closely associated with deterrence because of their well-known ability to cause mass destruction and casualties.
|
From page 29... ...
Extended Deterrence "Extended deterrence" refers to the umbrella we extend over our allies to protect their homelands, as well as our own, from attack. In the Cold War, extended deterrence referred mainly to nuclear attack, although as this chapter's authors note, nuclear attack and conventional attack in NATO Europe were, by design, not decoupled from each other in deterrence policy.
|
From page 30... ...
Applying Deterrence Policy Existential Deterrence "Existential deterrence" simply means the existence of powerful forces that a potential challenger knows can be brought into action if the need arises. There is always hope that when the United States expresses a desire to influence the outcome of a situation in which the use of military force may be involved, the sheer power we bring to the table by virtue of the existence of the strongest military forces in the world will weigh heavily in leading to a resolution of the issues.
|
From page 31... ...
Parallel actions of reassurance must clearly be part of the arsenal of tools at our disposal when military force alone will not resolve undesirable situations. Declaratory Policies This discussion notes at several points (e.g., in the above section titled "Communications")
|
From page 32... ...
Moreover, the United States has been increasingly less willing to use its military forces with inherent risks of large casualties without acting in cooperation with others. Therefore U.S.
|
From page 33... ...
The * trategic Signif cance of Ballistic Missile Attacks The capacity to launch ballistic missiles is spreading to over 40 nations, large and small, in different parts of the world, and some number of these nations will use such missiles for military and political purposes.
|
From page 34... ...
Defense in Depth Against Ballistic Missiles Active defense against ballistic missiles must be considered, in the strategic sense, as only the last stage of a defense in depth that begins with peacetime policies including deterrence of aggression in the first place. More specifically focused deterrence attempts to inhibit the spread of effective ballistic missile capability, through treaties and treaty-like arrangements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime to which many nations, including the United States, the nations of NATO Europe, Russia, and China, subscribe.
|
From page 35... ...
However, if the Russians had it, Hey might not agree with us about what a "rogue nation" is, and they would be able to threaten our allies in NATO Europe who have strategic deterrents of their own or those where He dual-capable aircraft of NATO's theater nuclear capability are based. Thus, 9Wolfgang Panofsky points out that "attacks against the United States by states other than Russia, if they are to occur at all, and protection of allies against analogous attacks, are likely to be delivered by means other than ballistic missiles.
|
From page 36... ...
homeland and those designed to be used at relatively short range in theater missile defense. Defense against theater ballistic missiles is acceptable within the constraints of the ABM treaty.
|
From page 37... ...
These analyses should be incorporated into net assessments of the United States compared with potential adversaries and allies. Net assessments should define the problem, identify U.S.
|
From page 38... ...
Both of these analytic tools can be useful in examining important strengths and weaknesses of all sides-essential information for effective deterrence. Both can and should be applied a priori to anticipate potential crisis situations and the field of possible responses.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.