Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix D: The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
Appendix D: The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
Pages 104-112
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From page 104... ...
The NPT codifies an uneasy bargain among the nonnuclear weapons states party to the treaty and the five nuclear weapons states. The components of this bargain interpreted broadly are the following: .
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From page 105... ...
. Nuclear weapons states agree to make civilian applications of nuclear technology freely available to nonnuclear weapons states party to the NET, provided such civilian activities are being carried out under "full scope" safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
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From page 106... ...
We will also never know with certainty the extent, if any, to which the stockpiles of nuclear weapons with their rapid growth in the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War deterred armed conflict. The historical evidence is clear that conventional weapons, including the potential availability of chemical or biological weapons, have not deterred all-out world wars; conversely, nuclear weapons also have not deterred the hundred or so localized nonnuclear conflicts which have taken a larger toll during the nuclear age than that inflicted by the nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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From page 107... ...
What residual mission for nuclear weapons can be justified? FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION Although initially acquisition of nuclear weapons was generally justified by a "more bang for the buck" rationale, the core purpose of U.S.
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From page 108... ...
However, the core purpose, referring to deterrence of nuclear aggression from whatever quarter it might originate, remains a principal rationale for retention of nuclear weapons. There is continuing debate over whether, or how, the concept of nuclear deterrence can be, or should be, modified from its bilateral meaning during the Cold War to deterrence of potential proliferators presumably from the Third World, including the so-called "rogue" states.
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From page 109... ...
The threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of suicidal fanatics, such as the Japanese cultists who recently released poisonous nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, can clearly not be credibly countered by deterrence in any form. Only worldwide vigilance and an unrelenting effort to prevent the possession of nuclear weapons by such groups can limit this risk.
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From page 110... ...
In principle biological weapons may produce lethal results comparable to nuclear weapons per unit weight of delivered munitions against civilian populations, but happily the military effectiveness of biological weapons remains to be established. Biological weapons are not effective battlefield weapons.
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From page 111... ...
By proclaiming that nuclear weapons may be necessary to counter biological or chemical warfare, the United States may inadvertently actually accelerate the development of these means of warfare by de facto characterizing them as the "poor man's nuclear weapon." Moreover, extending the potential use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological weapons runs counter to the obligation assumed by the United States under the nonproliferation bargain to shrink rather than expand the military and political leverage of nuclear weapons. This obligation is in fact recognized in the NPR, which emphasizes that the purpose of the DOD counterproliferation initiative is to give military commanders, and the President, a sufficient range of nonnuclear options to contain the biological and chemical weapons threats.
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From page 112... ...
If the core function remains the only justifiable role of U.S. nuclear weapons, the question continues to resurface whether this fact should be recognized by declaratory policy or merely be implemented by such actions as reduced numbers of nuclear weapons, elimination of tactical nuclear forces, reduced quick response readiness, improved survivability, and more robust command and control.
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